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The O bjective
Money affects every aspect of life and yet its im pact on a m acro or micro 
level is not clearly understood. From an individual’s point of view an ef­
ficient cash m anagem ent policy could free resources for consum ption which 
otherwise m ay have been wasted on either holding or transaction costs. B ut 
few models analyse a risk-averter’s cash m anagem ent decision and its im pact 
on the  money stock. P a rt of this deficiency can be a ttribu ted  to  the difficul­
ties which arise from the non-linearities inherent in concave u tility  functions.
The sheer com plexity of modelling the dynam ic evolution of variables which 
influence the cash m anagem ent decision, and, the interaction between them  
has been another factor.
The history of research into the dem and for money is vast and has been an 1
im portan t feature in the evolution of macroeconomic theory. Numerous m od­
elling approaches have been utilised to study the  many properties of money,
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varying from general equilibrium  analysis to  micro-based models in which 
the  agent behaves like a private optimiser.
Im portan t contributions have been m ade by em inent economists on how the 
money stock behaves. F isher’s quantity  theory identity M V  =  P Y ;  M  is the 
nom inal stock of money, V  is the velocity of circulation, P  is the  price level, 
and Y  is the  volume of transactions or real income, which was developed in 
1911 still features prom inently in economic analysis. The velocity of circu­
lation is assumed to be determ ined by an exogenous paym ents mechanism 
and therefore constant. Hence any change to the money stock yields neutral 
effects over the long run. Pigou (1917) changes this to include the consumer 
allocation problem , interest rates and wealth, which subsequently comes to  
form the basis of the Cam bridge equation. These models set the tone for the 
litera tu re  which later followed from the various Classical schools arguing in 
favour of a passive m onetary policy.
Keynes in his General Theory of  Employment^ Interest and Money  (1936) 
radically challenges this view by arguing th a t velocity was not constant, but 
varied w ith the price level and income, which, therefore, required an in ter­
ventionist m onetary authority. He divides the money stock into three com­
ponents proposing th a t agents hold money for three very different reasons. 
The first he concludes is the transactions m otive where agents hold money to 
satisfy planned expenditure. The second is the precautionary motive where
r ‘"
money is held as a buffer stock to  absorb any unanticipated expenditure
shocks. The th ird  is the  speculative m otive where agents hold money because 
it is an asset. At the tim e Keynes wrote his general theory real appreciations 
in the value of the nom inal money stock were not uncommon. Therefore the 
role of money as a speculative asset was more im portant then, than  it is now.
Baum ol (1952) and Tobin (1956) formalise the transactions m otive by placing 
it w ithin a dual asset optim isation framework. Agents in these models opti­
mally determ ine their money stock by minimising the associated opportunity  
costs. Miller and Orr (1966) develop this further by introducing uncertain ty  
through a discrete steady state  random  walk. By lim iting the type of agent 
considered to be risk neutral, they effectively model the problem  as a dual as­
set m anagem ent exercise in which the agent optimises his u tility  of his wealth, 
sim ilar to Tobin (1958). Constantinides and Richard (1978) model the cash
m anagem ent decision as a net present value problem. Increasing the tim e 
.horizon reduces the frequency of transactions in which agents switch from 
cash to the interest earning asset or vice versa but increases their m agni­
tude. Sm ith (1989) expands on this by allowing for interest ra te  uncertainty. 
A critical review of the current literature on the transactions money dem and 
for money is presented in C hapter 3.
The original objective of this thesis was to expand on Sm ith (1989) by devel­
oping a model th a t studied a risk-averter’s cash m anagem ent decision which
7
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included genuine aspects of risk and a discretely varying stochastic interest 
rate. The motive behind this was to study the im pact of increased risk sen­
sitivity on an agent’s money dem and function and also capture the discrete 
jum ps which interest rates exhibit in the real world.
T he Thesis
The standard  approach to modelling a stochastically varying cash inventory 
assumes th a t net disbursem ents follow a W iener process. This assum ption is 
also m ade here ensuring th a t the new results presented here are not driven by 
prescribing a different evolution of the state. This reduces the m anagem ent 
problem  to one of optim al “im pulse” control. The standard  m ethodology for 
obtaining a solution requires
1 . constructing the cost function,
2 . expanding it in a Taylor series using Ito ’s lemma to obtain the Hamilton- 
Jacobi-Bellm en (H JB) equation and
3. determ ining the optim al targets and thresholds using the “sm ooth past­
ing” and “value m atching” conditions.
In other areas of economics the “sm ooth pasting” condition has also been 
used as an auxiliary condition to satisfy perceived economic assum ptions.
4
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However, within the stochastic optimal control literature the use this condition 
has not been observed.
Increased risk sensitivity is introduced through a Von Neumann-M orgenstern 
u tility  function. For risk averse individuals these are assumed to be concave 
and give rise to a non-linear relationship between interest rates and money 
holdings in the  inhomogeneous te rm  of the HJB equation. Thus requiring 
the problem  to be num erically solved. The algorithm  involves
1. solving the  HJB equation using the  natura l boundary conditions, and,
2 . optim ising it w ith respect to the targets and thresholds.
On the other hand, applications of ‘^smooth pasting’’ only requires gradient 
conditions to be imposed with respect to the initial state. This strange fea­
tu re  along w ith unexpected numerical results led me to explore bo th  the Ito 
stochastic differential equation and the  Chapman-Kolmogorov equation in 
m ore detail. This led to  the discovery of the natural boundary conditions 
which are presented in C hapter 1 .
C hapter 2  analyses their im pact on the simple menu cost model in Dixit 
(1991a). The results obtained highlight some lim itations of the  “sm ooth 
pasting” condition. A lthough the economic intuition does not differ from 
w hat is suggested in D ixit (1991a), situations could be envisaged where it 
could.
i
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Chapters 3 and 4 re tu rn  to the original objective of this thesis. C hapter 
3 critically analyses the key contributions on the transactions dem and for 
money. Their strengths and weaknesses are highlighted. Some models which 
were previously assumed to be robust, under the detailed scrutiny of this 
chapter, appear to be logically inconsistent. Chapter 4 solves the problem  
which was initially outlined. The results present a different image of agent 
behaviour to w hat existed before. The optim al targets and thresholds do not 
appear to be as obvious as perviously believed.
■a
The R esults
This thesis makes four unique contributions to the current literature. These 
are dealt w ith in the four core chapters.
C hapter 1 dem onstrates th a t “sm ooth pasting” fails to quantify the costs 
faced by agent in a more general class of problem. Questions are raised about 
its validity as a first-order optim isation condition. The natura l boundary con­
ditions for optim al “im pulse” controlled problems are derived and are shown 
to  be the  “value m atching” conditions. Thus, enabling “im pulse” control 
problem s to solve in a way which is consistent with the principles of optim al 
control. However, it does not seek to detract from its im mense value as a 
heuristic tool. In simple problems like Dixit(1991a) it yields the  same answer
6
as the more rigorous approach. Also, from a non-scientific view it provides 
fundam ental insights into how agents determ ine their optim al exercise ta r­
gets for American option type models.
C hapter 2 provides a solution to the Dixit menu cost model using the rigor­
ous form ulation of an im pulse control problem. The richer solutions obtained 
yield insights into agent behaviour which were previously unobservable. Also 
various properties which were assumed are now proven. An analytical equa­
tion specifying relationship between the discount rate  and the zone of inertia
7
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is derived. Formerly this could be only deduced by making an em pirical link.
A critical review of the current literatu re  on the transactions dem and for
money is provided in C hapter 3. The strengths and weaknesses of the “sem- 
.inal” contributions are highlighted. Also a contrast between the results pre-
:
sented in these models and the  em pirical literatu re  is provided.
C hapter 4 returns to the original objective of this thesis. The sim ilarity be­
tween liquidity preference and transaction money dem and models is briefly 
illustrated  in section 4.2, The results clearly show th a t the dem and for money 
is not well behaved as the existing literatu re  predicts. In fact they demon­
s tra te  the  existence of m ultiple optim a which point to  a sequence of u tility  
maximising strategies. Unlike m ost rational expectations models, the exis­
tence all bu t one optim um  cannot be dismissed through partia l equilibrium  
argum ents.
A brief sum m ary of the results is offered in the final chapter.
3
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C hapter 1
A R e-Evaluation o f the
“Sm ooth P asting” C ondition in
Problem s of “Im pulse Control
1.1 Introduction
Stochastic optim al control has become increasingly popular in economics and 
finance as a tool for modelling optim ising behaviour w ithin an environm ent of 
ongoing uncertainty. Its applications have been numerous, ranging from op-
:3
tion pricing theory to target zone and menu cost models, e.g. Pindyck (1988), 7
K rugm an (1988), Dixit (1991a), and, Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Under costs 'x;'
of ad justm ent, or any other form of friction these models dem onstrate the
7;3
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existence of inertial responses where it is optim al for an agent to wait before 
acting. The boundaries of the optim al zone of inertia are derived through 
heuristically m otivated boundary and first-order conditions, commonly re­
ferred to as the  “value m atching” and “smooth pasting” conditions.
This chapter considers the stochastic optim al control of a W iener process in 
the presence of any cost of adjustm ent including “im pulse” control. Ana­
lytical boundary conditions are derived for the problem explicitly from the 
m artingale or optim al stopping framework and do not rely on any heuris­
tic m otivation. A lthough the results yield a condition similar to  the “value 
m atching” condition, the “sm ooth pasting” condition, which is also used in 
many applications of stochastic optim al control, does not feature in any way.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 provides a general overview 
of the “sm ooth pasting” condition, highlighting some of its perceived strengths 
and weaknesses and the need for a strict analytical solution to the boundary 
value problem. Section 1.3 uses a general example to describe the problem  of 
im pulse control. The Bellman value function (value function) is form ulated 
in Sections 1.4 and 1.5 and the boundary conditions are derived. The ideas 
are expounded in one dimension, although the methodology extends na tu ­
rally to any dimension. In addition, the analysis is restricted to  the case with 
constant coefficients but a variety of problems with non-constant coefficients 
can be dealt w ith in a similar way.
17
more complex problems, or, situations in which only the value function needs
1.2.1 T he O ptim al S topping P rob lem  A nd “S m ooth  
P astin g”
The u tility  of “sm ooth pasting” and its applicability to a wide range of 
problem s w ithin an environm ent of ongoing uncertainty is best illustrated 
through the simple optim al stopping problem  provided in Dixit and Pindyck
18
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1.2 The ‘^^ Smooth P asting” Condition
“Sm ooth pasting” is a useful heuristic first-order optim isation condition for 
fram ing m any target-threshold type models and helps convey the economic 
in tu ition  behind numerous situations in a way th a t is easily understood. 
Indeed, C hapter 2  confirms th a t both  “sm ooth pasting” and the rigorously 
fram ed optim al stopping strategy yield algebraically equivalent answers. B ut, 
the  critique offered la ter in this section and an analysis of the necessary con­
ditions for optim a in Section 1.6 suggests why this need not be the  case for
to  be ascertained such as option valuation.
The argum ents for and against “sm ooth pasting” are outlined in detail, in­
cluding reasons as to why it is absent from a rigorous form ulation of the 
m ethod of impulse control. However, it m ust be emphasised th a t, in the ab­
sence of any contradictory results to the stochastic optim al control approach 
to  solving a problem, it still remains a valuable first-order condition.
X-iii-
?
(1994). Consider an entry-exit decision in where a firm is faced w ith a simple 
binary choice at every instant. It can either wait and accrue a profit or 
exercise an option at an endogenously determ ined barrier for a term ination 
payoff. Both the  profit earned and the term ination payoff will functions of 
sta te  and tim e. Assume th a t the sta te  follows a W iener process
dxi =  fi{x, t)dt  +  cf{x,t)dzt.  (1 .1 )
p being the discount rate. In an entry decision 7 (0:, t) — p \ ( x ,  t) has to increase 
as X increases. If x  is large. For an exit decision this expression m ust decrease
19
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In an exit decision a firm chooses to stop production and sell its equipm ent 
for scrap value. E ntry  decisions can be framed in a similar way. The value 
accrued during the waiting period is zero. E ntry implies investm ent. The 
associated term ination payoff is the expected net present value of fu ture 
profits less investm ent costs.
Self evidently there exists a critical value of the state X  at each point in tim e
.for which x < X  would im ply continuation will be optim al and x > X  for 
which stopping will be optim al. Therefore, there m ust exist some condition 
which helps us determ ine X .  Let 'y{x, t) denote the flow profits and X(x, t)  
be the term ination payoff. The payoff facing a firm at each instan t can be 
characterised as being
1
in a:. To illustrate the link between optim al stopping and “sm ooth pasting” 
I shall only consider the  former.
It is obvious th a t X  m ust divide s ta te  and tim e space into two regions, where 
continuation and term ination are optim al. Of course, an a priori knowledge 
of X  is not possible. Instead it m ust be endogenously determ ined.
The Bellman value function for this optim al stopping problem takes the form
E \V {x  +  dx, t +  dt)\xo = a;]V { x , t )  =  max A(.T,q,7(a;,q +
1 4- pdt
In the bounded region in which the s ta te  moves this can be expanded in a 
stochastic Taylor series expansion through I to ’s lemma to yield
a ( x , t y Vxx{s:,t) 4- p{x, t)Va:(x, t)  4- Vt{x, t)  -  p V ( x , t )  +  j { x , t )  = 0.
In the stopping region clearly V { x , t )  = A(æ,t), therefore
y (x ,q  = A(x,t) vt.
This is referred to  as the  value m atching condition since it equates values of 
the yet to  be solved value function V { x , t )  to  the  already established term ina­
tion payoff X{X, i). D eterm ination of X  requires another auxiliary condition. 
This is the “smooth pasting” condition and it requires th a t 'j{x, t) and A(æ, t) 
to  m eet tangentially at X .  T hat is
= Xo,{x,t) y t .
20
K(x,t)=l(x,t) V 
“smooth pasting” tx,t)
Mx,t)
X
Figure 1.1: “Smooth Pasting” Gradients
Therefore the optim al stopping tim e or the zone is exactly determ ined. On 
the face of it this sounds a perfectly acceptable argum ent. Indeed, it provides 
valuable insights into how “sm ooth pasting” optim ally evaluates the stopping 
tim es at which control is exercised.
1.2 .2  S m ooth  P astin g  and Im pulse control
The m ethod of “im pulse” control has its genesis in the famous Scarf (1960) 
inventory control model in which the agent is tasked with optim ally m an­
aging the stock of a com m odity for retail sale in the presence of a random  
flow of sales and lump sum  purchasing costs. If the stock falls below a
21
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critical lower barrier a the quantity  (I — a) is ordered, where I is the  point of 
replenishm ent. The purchasing cost has the effect of reducing the frequency 
and increasing the size of the orders. Dynamic cash m anagem ent models 
increase the dimension of this problem by adding a similar policy at the top 
end. Stochastic income flows are assumed to add to the inventory Zt, while 
planned and unplanned expenditure requirem ents are assumed to  deplete it. 
If holding costs are continuously incurred a t a ra te  proportional to the money 
stock, and transaction costs are assumed to be linear, the agent’s decision is 
to choose not only how much cash to w ithdraw  (/ — a), bu t also how much to 
convert into another asset (b — u), where h is the upper barrier and u is the 
point to which Zt is restored (see Constantinides and Richard (1978), and 
Sm ith (1989)). The optim al m agnitudes of a, 6 , I and u are determ ined by 
applying the so called flrst-order “sm ooth pasting” condition which is also 
widely used in other areas of economics. The following two sections consider 
its use in the literature on irreversible investm ent and exchange ra te  target
zones.
Irreversible Investm ent
Irreversible investm ent and option pricing models use an “im pulse” control 
framework to  dem onstrate how the  optim al investment decision of a firm 
could differ from the standard  M arshallian investm ent criterion (see Pindyck 
(1988), Pindyck (1991), Dixit (1992) and Pindyck and Dixit (1994)). If firms
22
face uncertain  dem and or costs, new capital can be purchased at a random  
or fixed price and the  cost of investm ent is linear; it can be shown th a t 
firms invest until the  m arginal revenue product equals its full cost. The 
la tte r includes both the  cost of purchase and installation and the  cost of 
keeping the option to invest alive. Pindyck (1988) shows th a t this involves 
optim ally regulating the  associated costs and revenues at an upper barrier. 
Similarly Dixit (1992) dem onstrates th a t disinvestm ent entails the regulation 
of operating losses at a lower barrier.
Consider a competitive market  in which a firm has the capacity to  produce 
one unit of ou tpu t by incurring a sunk cost I. Assume th a t variable costs are 
zero and firms which have incurred a sunk cost will want to produce a t its 
capacity level. If the m arket in which the firm operates suffers from industry  
wide dem and shocks th a t follow a continuous stochastic process, the  price of 
a single unit of ou tpu t can be expressed as
f  =  %/D(g).
P  is the price level, y is the industry wide shock, q is the  current level of 
o u tpu t and D{q) is the determ inistic downward sloping com ponent of the 
dem and curve. Let y  follow a geom etric W iener process given by
dy = ayds  +  cydzsy
where a  is the tim e gradient and a  is the standard  deviation of the  W iener 
increm ent. Of course, w ithin an infinitesimally small tim e interval ds no new
23
entry will take place. Therefore q will be fixed and P  will be proportional to  
j/, giving rise to the relationship
, dP = a P d s  +  crPdzs. (1.2)
The net present value of a firm ’s expected profits II will depend on the current 
price P  and also the expected future price level. If the dynam ic evolution 
of the price level is specified by ( 1 .2 ), then the expected future price level 
will only depend on P.  Therefore II will exclusively be a function of P , i.e.
n(P).
A firm waiting to enter will observe the price level and use a high price 
as a trigger to invest. Therefore at some upper barrier P  a new firm will 
enter, causing q to  increase and P  to  decrease, making P  a reflecting upper 
boundary. If a reflecting boundary did not exist at P , then the value of the  
firm will be
n(P) =
where 5 = r — a,  i.e. the difference between the risk free ra te  r  and the m ean 
ra te  of growth of the price level. However, the reflecting barrier P  reduces 
some of the upside to  potential profits and prices. Hence H (P ) <  P/S.
If P  <  P , then over the  infinitesimally small interval ds H (P ) can be ex­
panded using a Taylor series through Ito ’s lem m a to  yield the  second order
24
differential equation
2  n " (P )  +  ( r -  ^ )P W (P ) -  rH (P ) +  P  =  0. (1.3)
This can be solved to obtain
TliP) = BPO + J ,  (1.4)
where B  is an arb itrary  constant and (3 is the positive root of the charac­
teristic  equation of (1.3). The value of B  can be determ ined by elim inating 
the possibility of sure arbitrage profits. To do this the gradient of II(.) at P  
needs to  be zero, i.e.
n '( P )  =  /3 S P ' ’- '  +  1  =  0 .
Solving for B  and substitu ting the resulting expression into (1.4) yields
n ( P )  = y  -  (1.5)
Firm s make zero profits in a com petitive dynam ic equilibrium. At P  firms 
will be indifferent between entering the m arket and staying out. The net 
present value accrued as a result of entering the  m arket m ust equal the  entry 
cost I . Using this relationship in (1.5) yields
If / ( . )  is the value of the firm ’s option to enter, it can be shown th a t it is a 
function of P  and takes the form
/ ( P )  =  AP».
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(see Dixit and Pindyck (1994)), A  is an arbitrary  constant whose value 
needs to be determ ined by the first-order “smooth pasting” condition. If a 
firm enters at a price level P , it incurs a sunk cost I  and receives an income 
n(P). At the optim al entry trigger P*, / ( . )  needs to satisfy the “value 
m atching” condition
/ ( P 3  =  n ( P 3  -  (1 .6 )
and th e  “sm ooth pasting” condition
f ( p * )  =  n% p*). (1.7)
Solving (1.6) and (1.7) simultaneously yields
which is the same as P . Also A =  0, which implies th a t / ( P )  =  0. Pindyck
and Dixit (1994) use this property to argue th a t a firm contem plating entry
into a com petitive m arket faces a zero value of waiting, and conclude th a t 
the
prices”
see Figure 1 .2 . A model of disinvestm ent entails a similar argum ent at the 
lower boundary.
1
SC
“... value of waiting is negative for most of its price range, and 
only climbs to zero at the upper end of the range of possible
^Dixit and Pindyck (1994) p. 259
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Figure 1 .2 : The Option of W aiting 
E x c h a n g e  R a te  T a rg e t  Z ones
The literatu re  on target zones introduces the m ethod of “im pulse” control 
as a means by which a m onetary authority  could lim it the volatility of its 
exchange rate. An exchange ra te  target zone is a hybrid mechanism by which 
the exchange ra te  is allowed to freely float, bu t w ithin a clearly defined region. 
The m onetary authority  regulates the exchange rate  by selling the currency 
at an upper barrier and by buying it a t a lower barrier, thus keeping the 
currency w ithin a fixed band. In models of infinitesimal intervention, the 
exchange rate  is restored to a point which is ju st within the target zone. In 
the case of discrete intervention an im pulse is exercised on the  boundary to 
restore the  exchange ra te  well w ithin the  target zone. In K rugm an (1991)
27
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this gives rise to a A-shaped movement of the exchange rate  w ithin the band 
which is tangential to its boundaries a and 6 , ruling out expectations of 
unbounded exchange ra te  appreciations or depreciations.
Consider a flexible exchange ra te  which follows the K rugm an law of motion, 
i.e.
l{s) == k{s) +  a > 0 .  (1.8)
l{s) is the natura l log of the exchange rate, 7  is the Cagan interest ra te  semi­
elasticity and the  expectation operator E[.] is conditioned on the current 
inform ation set. Of course, only inform ation on the independent variable k 
is relevant, k is assumed to reflect the rates of change in the value of foreign 
currencies, the domestic money supply, real Income levels and expectations of 
money dem and shocks. Thus k can be controlled by the m onetary authority, 
specifically to keep the exchange rate  w ithin a desired band l\ < I < E.  Let 
fc, absent control, follow a W iener process of the type
dk ~  ipds T adz  s.
The coefficients tjj> and a  are assumed to  be constants. Using this specification 
of k^ K rugm an (1991) explicitly develops a functional form of the exchange 
ra te  solution, I = m{k).  Flood and G arber (1991) argue th a t m (k)  is a 
solution to  l{s) and expand it using I to ’s lem m a to obtain
^  =  0 m'(Â:) +  ~ m ' \ k ) .  (1 .9 )
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This is solved to yield
I = m{k)  ”  +  7 ^  +  (1 .1 0 )
where Ai and Ag are the roots of the characteristic equation of (1.9). The
values of A  and B  are determ ined by the “smooth pasting” condition which
requires th a t the exchange ra te  be tangential to G and h, i.e.
m%A;%) =  0  and m'{kf)  ~  0
see Figure 1 .2 . D iscrete intervention requires the additional conditions
m{ku) ~  m{Q)  m{ki) — q.
1.2 .3  T he C ritique
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The first-order condition which determ ines the  optim al barriers and thresh­
olds in “im pulse” control models is the “sm ooth pasting” condition. In in- 
.vestm ent and option pricing models it ‘equates the value of waiting with
the value of the investm ent trigger h or the  disinvestment trigger a \  The
intuition  behind this is th a t the first derivative of the option price m ust be
the same value before and after an option is exercised. In the target zone 
.litera tu re  it provides the justification through arbitrage for the tangential 
relationship between the exchange ra te  and the upper and lower barriers a
Q L* ku k
Figure 1.3: A Model of Exchange R ate Target Zones
and 6 , In inventory theoretic money dem and models it is used to pin down 
the boundaries and thresholds a, I, u and 6 , equating the m arginal cost of 
being on a boundary with the m arginal transaction cost.
These applications of the “sm ooth pasting” condition would suggest th a t the 
controls a, /, u and b are chosen to  either optimise the value functions or sat­
isfy some economic argum ent. But in reality this is not the case. In problem s 
where the “sm ooth pasting” condition is used as a first-order optim isation 
condition, it is derived by equating the derivative of the value function, w ith 
respect to the initial s ta te  and the gradient of the cost of adjustm ent on the 
boundary (see Dixit (1994, ppl29-130), D ixit (1991b, 667-668), Constan­
tinides and Richard (1977), and Sm ith (1989)). Although the value function
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1olds are im plicit in their construction and not variable. For a certain choice 
of param eters the gradient conditions on the  initial sta te  num erically fix 
the values of a, /, u and 6 . A nother facet of this simplification is manifest 
through the apparent inability of the current model of im pulse control to 
quantify the extent to which a prescribed strategy deviates from th a t which 
is optim al. For instance behaviour of an agent who initially lies outside the 
‘op tim al’ boundaries (i.e. outside the interval (a, 5)) cannot be com pared 
w ith one who initially lies w ithin these bounds. Constantinides and Richard 
(1978), and Sm ith (1989) provide solutions for the value function outside the
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is a function of both  the initial state and the set of admissible controls, the 
principle of O ptim al Control requires the value function to be optim ised only 
w ith respect to the set of admissible controls (see Bensoussan and Lions 
(1975a), (1975b), and Richard (1977)). It is only by choosing the controls 
a, I, u and h to optimise the value function that the marginal payoff which 
jïows from controlling a system is set equal to the associated marginal cost.
The initial s ta te  is merely an inheritance from a previous unknown history 
and is not a control variable. Its functional relationship w ith the  value func­
tion is fundamentally different to th a t of a, /, u, and b. Of course, the initial 
s ta te  m ay influence the choice of boundaries particularly under high discount j;
rates, ;■'■ÿ'
Furtherm ore, the num erical values of these ‘optim al’ boundaries and thresh- y
f■I
.“optim al” boundaries, bu t these do not satisfy the Ham ilton-Jacobi-Bellm an 
equation (H JB) they obtain. Here a functional form for the value function 
is derived from which the costs associated with a sub-optim al choice of a, /, 
u, and h can be evaluated. Flem ing and Rishel (1976, Appendix E), Ben­
soussan and Lions (1975a), (1975b) and Richard (1977) show th a t the HJB 
has convex solutions and therefore has only one control vector, whereas the 
“sm ooth pasting” strategy does not seem to  suggest any.
In the  litera tu re  where “sm ooth pasting” is used to make a model satisfy cer­
ta in  economic argum ents, such as the target zone models on exchange rates
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or the zero profit condition in the model of irreversible investm ent described 
.earlier, reflecting boundary conditions need to be imposed on the forward 
sta te  of the W iener process; not on the initial sta te  as it is currently done. 
This would ensure th a t when the exchange ra te  hit an upper or a lower bar­
rier, it would be instantly  restored into the interior of the target zone by 
either an infinitesimally small am ount or a discrete quantity. However, im ­
posing boundary conditions on the  forward state is a non-trivial task and 
would require the dynam ic evolution of the exchange rate  to be com puted 
through the transition  density function. Since the Ito stochastic differential 
equation has not been adapted to capture boundary conditions on the for­
ward state, it is not suitable for use in problems of this type.
In dynam ic program m ing involving infinite horizons the value function is
f
considered a function of the  initial state, despite the fact th a t it is the for­
ward sta te  which experiences the impulse control. This m ade possible due 
to  the Markov property which enables the evolution of a stochastic process 
to  be described in term s of its initial sta te  and time. For models in which 
the sta te  is given by a W iener process this can be done through either Ito ’s 
lem m a or the backward Chapman-Kolmogorov equation (see G ihm an and 
Skorohod (1972)). The initial state plays no other explicit role in an infinite 
horizon impulse control problem (see Flem ing and Rishel (1975) chapter VI, 
Bensoussan and Lions (1975a), (1975b) and Richard (1977)).
These argum ents, though robust, do not explain the algebraically equiva­
lent results obtained using both  the “sm ooth pasting” and optim al control 
strategies in C hapter 2 . Indeed, this may point to the existence of some 
undiscovered properties of the HJB equation and the value function. On the 
other hand, it may be a feature restricted to  the Dixit menu cost model due 
to its unique nature. However, w ithout further evidence which dem onstrates 
th a t “sm ooth pasting” and the stochastic optim al control strategy yield dif­
fering results, it still rem ains useful as an approxim ation of the necessary 
first-order condition for optim a.
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1.3 Im pulse Control
Let the  s ta te  follow a W iener process with the corresponding stochastic dif­
ferential equation
dxs =  pds  -f crdzs s G [0 , oo) Xq — æ,
over the continuation region (a, 6 ), and, let Tq ^  Ti ^  T2 ^  ^  ^  ■
be the  series of stopping times; i.e. the series of points in tim e at which the 
process being controlled exits the continuation region and a “ju m p ” control 
is exercised to  restore the process to  an interior point.
The m ethod of “im pulse” control requires the existence of a feedback control 
law u which optimises a performance criterion subject to  some initial datum  
and boundary conditions and is described at tim e s by
Ib — u if rcs =  6 , a — I if == a,where u and I are respectively the interior points to which the process is 
restored to when the upper boundary b or the lower boundary a is encroached. 
Clearly a ^  a  ^  6 .
Let the instantaneous holding cost be given by the real function M{xg),  
s G [0, oo), and assume a constant discount ra te  of p. The object, therefore, 
will be to  arrive at a policy
P =  { ri,U i;T 2 ,U 2 ; • • - • • •},
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of a series of stopping tim es and controls which minimise the  value function
y(a;, u) ~  E
in f u Lao e-^’ M i x . )  ds + Y i ,  e->"'R(u)i =0
where R{u)  is the cost of adjustm ent defined by
i?(u)
B{b^ u) if Xs — 6 ,
D{a, I) if Xs = a.
It is now dem onstrated th a t this value function satisfies the HJB equation.
By using Ito ’s Lemma and expanding (1.11) in a Taylor series, it follows th a t
A V {x ,  u ) — pV{x ,  u) +  M(æ) =  0, (1.12)
where
A  = T ■d (1.13)dx  2  dx'^
Equation (1.12) is referred to  as the HJB equation. In particular, the for­
m ulation of (1 .1 2 ) depends on the boundary conditions at a and 6 . Solving 
this equation subject to the correct boundary conditions yields the dynam ic 
program m ing equation, which is also the performance criterion y (( r ,u ) . Its 
infimum with respect to the control law u , is E(æ ,u*). Equally u* can be 
obtained by minimising (1.12). The existence of an optim al feedback con­
trol law for this equation has been dem onstrated by Bensoussan and Lions 
(1975a) and Richard (1977).
35
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1.4 The M artingale Form ulation of the B ell­
man Value Function
The m artingale form ulation of the value function divides into two compo­
nents. The first measures the  net present value of holding costs accrued until 
the first stopping decision while the second computes the net present value 
of all costs, i.e. holding costs and costs of adjustm ent, which follow from this
u :decision. It can be shown easily th a t this construction of the value function
'
also satisfies I to ’s Lemma.
Consider the W iener process introduced in the last section. W hen Xs is 
on the boundary, th a t is — <2 , or Xs = 6 , the process enters a stopping 
zone and is absorbed. For convenience let the forward state  Xs be denoted 
by y. Hence the transition  density function for this process, /(y ,s |æ ,0 ) ,  
m ust satisfy the boundary conditions / ( 6 , s |a ;,0 ) ~  0 , and / ( a , s |a ; , 0 ) =  0 , 
along with the initial condition /(y ,0 |a ;,0 )  — 5{y — x). It is common knowl­
edge th a t f ( y , s \x ,Q )  satisfies the forward Chapman-Kolmogorov equation 
(Fokker-Planck equation)
f s {y , s \x ,  0) =  - p f y { y , s \ x ,  0) -h y /y y ( j / ,  s|a), 0), (1.14)
Define a distribution function E (y ,s |a :,0 ) w ith the property th a t
Fy(t/,0 |æ ,0 ) =  f { y , s \ x ,0 ) ,
":3-
It is also clear th a t probability mass through the upper and lower boundaries 
will be respectively
Fs(b,s\x ,0) ,  (1.16)
and
Fs{a,s\x,0) .  (1.17)
Expressions (1.16) and (1.17) define the probability th a t the  process will en­
te r the  zone through the  upper and lower boundaries at tim e s, respectively. 
Thus, the  first costs of adjustm ent at the upper and lower boundaries, S ( 6 , u)
and Z)(a, /), will be incurred at rates given by (1.16) and (1.17) respectively.
Hence the value function, constructed in term s of an optim al stopping prob­
lem is
'6poo pb
V (z ,u )  =  / / M {y) f{ y , s \x , { ) )d yJo iJa dspoo
F  e ^^[77(5, a ) - |- y ( u ,  u)]Es(6 , s|a;, 0 ) ds (1.18) Jopoo
+  / e -^ '[D (a , /) -P V (/, u )]Fs(f  6 k ,  0 ) ds.Jo
The derivation of this is straightforward. The first integral on the right- 
hand side is the net present value of the holding costs accrued until the first
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. 1 if a: =  %/, TE ( j / , s k , 0 ) =
0  if X ^  y.
Thus, F (^ , s|æ, 0 ) m ust satisfy the backward Chapman-Kolmogorov equation 
Fs{y, s\x,  0 ) =  pF f fy ,  s|æ, 0 ) ■+■ s\x,  0 ). (1.15)
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stopping decision. The second and th ird  integrals evaluate the net present 
value of the  sum of the first cost of adjustm ent, B{b,u)  and and all
holding costs and costs of adjustm ent which accrue from this decision, i.e. 
y ( u , .) and y ( / , .).
The application of an “im pulse” control on the upper boundary a t tim e s, 
instan tly  changes the sta te  from b to u. Given th a t y(. , .) is a functional of a 
Markov process which contains the net present value of all holding costs and 
costs of adjustm ent, this defines a new Markov function w ith an initial sta te  
u  over the tim e horizon [s, oo) which contains all holding costs and costs of 
adjustm ent th a t accrue from tim e s onwards, i.e. V{u, .) ,  The m ultiplier 
discounts to net present value. The same holds for V{1, .). Since y  ( a , .) 
and y( / , .) contain both  holding costs and costs of adjustm ent which accrue 
as a result of the first stopping decision. It is therefore clear th a t the  above 
sum yields the expected net present value of a policy of “im pulse” control at 
the upper and lower boundaries.
Integrating (1.18) w ith respect to tim e it is clear tha t
y(a;,u) [  M { i j ) f { y , s \ x , 0) d y  -da d s
F[B{b,u)  +  y(n,u)] 
F[D[ aR)  + y(/,u)]
poo
I — p e“ ^^E(6 , s k ,  0 ) Jo
poo
1 — p  e “ ^®jP(a, s|a;, 0)Jo
d s
ds . ( 1.19)
Î
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It is now dem onstrated th a t the constructed y ((c ,u ) satisfies the H JB equa­
tion.
Applying the differential operator in (1.13) to (1.19) and use the Chapm an- 
Kolmogorov equations (1.14) and (1.15), it is clear tha t
e“^V(y,6k,0)  dsA V { x , n ) = p  M{y) dy ~  M {x)
p(X>
—p{B{b^u) — V{u,u)] 1 — p e^ ®A’(6 , s k ,  0) dsL Jo .
poo
- p [ D { a J ) - V { l , n ) ]  l - p  eP^F{a,s\x,0)ds  .(1.20)
L Jo J
See Appendix A for the derivation of A (a;)y(a;,u). E lem entary calculation 
now reveals th a t
A V { x ,  u ) -  pV{x,  u) +  M{x)  = 0, (1.21)
which is the H JB equation. Minimising this w ith respect to u  will yield the 
optim al “im pulse” control policy. It is also obvious th a t we could use Ito ’s 
lem m a and expand (1.19) in a Taylor series to  also obtain (1.21). Therefore, 
the optim al stopping framework used to set up V (æ ,u) is also self consistent.
1.5 C om putation of the Value Function
The probability density function of the absorption process is first calculated. 
This function is then used in the constructive definition of the  value function 
y(.T ,u) in (1.18) for general B{b,u),  D ( a J )  and M{y).
To ease the com putation of the value function in (1.18), it is convenient to
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introduce the non-dimensional variables
. y — a X — a aih — a)
/3 = - d - ^ ,  and < =  ( 1 ,2 2 )
W ith  this change of variables the partia l differential equation satisfied by 
/ ( y , s k , 0 ) becomes
m  %  + 2  d ë — ’  ^  ^ ^
where / ( ^ ,  0 ) satisfies the  boundary conditions /(1 ,7 k ,  0 ) — 0 , / ( 0 ,7 k , 0 ) :
0 and the  initial condition /(&  Ok; 0) — d(^ — g). The distribution function 
F (^ , s k ,  0) in (1.15) now satisfies
c>F(C%0) d F{ U\ g , 0 )  , l d ^ F { i , s \ g , 0 )
dg ^ 2  dg-‘ '  ^ ’
The value function now becomes
[ h - a ]y(5^,u) =  [^
0 *oo
dta"
dt
f  M ( e / ( C i |s ' , 0 ) ( 6 - a ) d e  Jopo  _
+ /  e=#-[B(l,«) +  y(t*,u)]C,(l,t|s,0)Jopoo+ /  6 2 [B(o, 0 + y(z, u)]f,(o, (|g, 0)Jo
Hence the expressions for the  non-dimensional y(æ , u ), 7?(6, n) and D {a J )  
become
l> =  ^ ,  5  =  and £ )={ b - a f ’ { b - a f ’ ( b - a ) ^ '
40
1.5.1 D erivation  o f th e transitional P D F
Using the m ethod of separation of variables, it can be verified th a t
is a solution to  (1.23) satisfying its boundary conditions for all integers n. 
Using Fourier m ethods it can be further proved tha t
OO
/ ( / ,  7k , 0 ) =  2  sin(nîT^) sin(nTr^)
n = l
is the  com plete solution of (1.23) satisfying the boundary and initial condi­
tions. The details of this calculation appear in Appendix B.
The probability flux, or the probability mass exiting through the upper and 
lower boundaries is respectively
and
This effectively defines the probability distribution function of the process 
entering the stopping zone. Here / ( I ,  s k ,  0 ) =  /(O, s k ,  0 ) — 0 , and, therefore
the flux on upper and lower boundaries b and a are ( l / 2 )jft , and, (1 / 2 )/^
respectively, i.e.
1%/(  ^ =  7 r ^ n s i n ( n 7 r ( l - ^ ) ) (
n=l
oo
7T n sin(n 7T^)e" Q'(7-Ua;^ +n^ 7r^ )t
n = l
It is im m ediately obvious th a t
F ,( l ,7 k ,0 )  =  - / ( and F f(0 ,7k ,0 ) =  
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(1.25)
(1.26)
It can further be shown th a t
HÊ1e 2 E^(0,7k, 0)d7 =  e
f i - , ) Sinhxff 
sinh X ’
s in h x ( l -  S')
s inhx (1.27)
where % =  -\J(3 F ex?- See Appendix B for the evaluation of the infinite 
integrals in (1.27).
1.5 .2  C alculation o f th e  value function
The expressions in (1.27) can be used to com pute the net present value of all 
costs which accrue from the first stopping decision at the upper and lower 
boundary. It remains to evaluate, tp(^), the net present value of the holding 
costs accrued until the first stopping decision which is defined by
‘1
M ( 0
dt
d t (1.28)
Using integration by parts it can be shown th a t
j: =  -  coshx7X sinh X
where w =  1 — k  — / |  and q =  1 — ^ See Appendix B for in term ediate 
steps.
H istorically linear and quadratic holding cost functions have been used for 
M{y)  (see Dixit (1991a), Constantinides and Richard (1978) and Sm ith
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(1989)). However T (^) can be evaluated for a general holding cost func­
tion. Suppose th a t M (/)  has a half range cosine Fourier series
h^  cos(i7r/),
j = i
then standard  Fourier analysis yields
bj =  2 [  M(/)cos(j7T^)d/, j  = 0,l,2,---.Jo
Using this representation of the holding cost function, the net present value 
of holding costs accrued until the first stopping decision is
®(<7) = X siiihx
-ag
- oo ^1
6 j  I  c o s ( j 7 r C ® ' * ^ [ ™ s h x t u  — coshxTl d fy . (1.29)
This integral can be evaluated using integration by parts resulting in the 
form
H 3 )
i - 0
i=o i=o
, (1.30)
where
( q . 2  „  ^ 2  „  COs(j!7r%)
[ j V  +  ( a  -  x ) ^ ] [ f  7T^ F {a +  x ) f t l
In view of (1.29) and (1.30), the value function finally simplifies to 
y (ff ,u )  =  [ s ( i ,u )  +  y (u ,u ) ]e “(‘- » ) ^ g ^
+[£>(o,/) +  y(;,u)]e
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-qflSinhx(l - g )
sinh X
:
+2
J= 0
j - O  j=zO
The derivation of the boundary conditions is straight forward. W hen x =
^ — 1. Hence
y ( 6 ,u )  -  B { b , u ) F V { u , u ) .  (1.31)
On the  other hand when x = then g = 0 and
y ( a ,u )  =  D (n ,/) +  V (/,u ). (1.32)
It is now obvious th a t (1.31) and (1.32) define the behaviour of the value 
function on the  boundaries and, therefore, are the boundary conditions to  an 
“im pulse” control problem. Solving (1 .1 2 ) subject to (1.31) and (1.32) will 
yield y(æ ; u). The optim al values of a, 6 , /, and u are obtained through the  
first order conditions
and ^ 1 ^  =  01.33)da ob ol ou
1.6 “Sm ooth Pasting vs. Stochastic O ptim al 
Control
U ndoubtedly the most significant conclusion from this analysis is the conspic­
uous absence of anything resembling the “sm ooth pasting” condition which
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suggests the ‘optim ality’ conditions 
dV{a) dD {aJ)
da da
dy(7) d D (a J ) and
dV(b) _  dB{b,u)  
db db ’
dV{u) dB{b,u) (1.34)dl dl du du
It is not exactly clear w hat these derivative conditions imply. It is stated  th a t 
they are obtained by differentiating the “value m atching” conditions in (1.31) 
and (1.32), and claim to show th a t the marginal cost of being on a boundary 
m ust equal the marginal cost of adjustm ent. However, this is clearly not 
true. Let us consider an agent who initially is on the upper boundary, i.e 
X  = b. From (1.31) it can be seen th a t his marginal costs are given by
(9V(æ,u)ay (æ , u)
da
ay(a;, u)
db
ay (æ , u)
dl
a y  (a;, u)
du
x~b da
^ H (6 , a) d V ( x , u )+db 
ÔV(a),u)
db
37~b dl (1.35)
dB{b ,u)  5 y (æ ,u )  T
x —b du du
The left hand side gives the marginal costs of initially being on the boundary 
b w ith respect to  the choice of controls a, 6 , I and u. The right hand side gives 
the  m arginal costs of transacting down to u w ith respect to these controls. 
The choice of a barrier 6 affects the choice of a, / and u. This is not the case 
w ith the “smooth pasting” condition. The first-order conditions described 
in (1.34) evaluate a, /, u, and b independently of each other by equating the 
gradient of the  value function w ith respect to  the initial sta te  to  th e  gradient
45
This analysis shows th a t the marginal costs of being on a boundary m ust
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of transaction costs on boundaries and thresholds. Intuitively this cannot 
be correct. The choice of one boundary m ust clearly affect the probability 
of h itting  the other boundary or being restored to a threshold. Hence both  
boundaries and thresholds m ust be selected simultaneously to optim ise the 
value function, not independently of each other. Costs are at a m inim um  
only when (1.33) is satisfied concurrently by a, /, u and b.
1.6.1 O ptim al S topping and th e  C hoice o f  C ontrols
Since a, /, u and b determ ine continuation region, it m ust follow th a t they 
also select the stopping zone outside (a, 6 ). In stochastic calculus the ex­
pected tim e at taken for a Weiner process starting at an initial s ta te  x  to 
exit {a, b) into the stopping zone can be easily evaluated using the backward 
Chapman-Kolmogorov equation of, the distribution function F{.). Therefore 
choosing u, and b optim ally ensures th a t the stopping tim es t i ,  T2 , ... are 
also chosen optimally. It is not obvious th a t choosing stopping tim es using 
(1.34) ensures optim ality. Indeed, in complex problems it is likely th a t the 
process will be stopped prem aturely because any costs which flow from mov­
ing down to u are ignored. However, in the Dixit menu cost model C hapter 
2 clearly dem onstrates th a t both  (1.34) and (1.33) yield algebraically equiv­
alent answers.
j
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1.7 Concluding Rem arks
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equal the marginal costs of  transacting which includes the m arginal costs of
adjustm ent on th a t boundary, not exclusively the marginal costs of adjust-
.m ent as the “smooth pasting” conditions suggests.
In this chapter the boundary conditions for an optim al policy of “im pulse” 
control have been derived by constructing a system from first principles us­
ing stochastic calculus. It shows th a t the value of stopping at a s ta te  and 
exercising an “im pulse” control m ust equal the net present value of holding
costs accrued up to th a t state. This also sounds intuitively correct, if the
.to tal value of exercising a stopping decision exceeded the net present value 
of holding costs accrued until this decision was made, it would clearly be 
sub-optim al to stop. Conversely if the net present value of holding costs 
exceeded the net present value of the stopping decision, it would im ply th a t 
the stopping decision should have been taken earlier. By approaching the 
jum p control problem  from a different perspective, the natu ra l m athem atical 
boundary conditions for the HJB equation has been m otivated in a non­
heuristic way. The solution technique exemplified here enables a new class 
of model to be constructed in economics and finance. These should provide 
revealing and accurate insights into optim ising behaviour w ithin an environ-
m ent of ongoing uncertainty.
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Chapter 2
Control R egim es, Transaction  
C osts and B usiness Cycles
2.1 Introduction
49
1
Menu cost models have evolved significantly since they were first developed 
. . .in the  m id eighties (see Akerlof and Yellen (1985), Mankiw (1985) and Blan­
chard and Kiyotaki (1987)). Earlier models analysed the im plications of nom­
inal rigidities and sub-optim al welfare outcomes caused by dem and shocks 
w ithin a static  environm ent. Later models expanded on these by ascribing to 
the firm  the net present value of the losses accrued from these shocks within 
an environm ent of ongoing uncertainty. The contrast in results between the 
two approaches is significant. W hen firms are forced to minimise costs over
1„;:Ç
a much longer tim e horizon with discounting, the zone of inertia and the 
strategies adopted change dramatically. In the Dixit model the range of in­
action is two orders larger than  the Akerlof-Yellen model (see Dixit (1991a)).
The Akerlof-Yellen, Blanchard-Kiyotaki and Dixit models study the behaviour
of firms functioning as private optimisers in a monopolistically com petitive
m arket. It is obvious from  the assum ptions which underpin Cham berlinian
monopolistic com petition th a t each of these firms will practice horizontal
price differentiation. This will create a gap between the price set by each
.firm and the m arket price. W ith  a downward sloping dem and curve, it can 
be shown th a t this gap will give rise to  a holding cost, m easured in lost prof­
its. These models prove th a t, if a cost is attached  to closing this gap, there 
exists a zone of inertia in which it will be beneficial for each firm to  sustain 
costs ra ther than  elim inate them  through price adjustm ent. Im plicit here is 
th a t each firm will face its own unique cost function.
One im portan t feature these models rely on is the pecuniary externality  which 
can be observed in a general equilibrium  models involving m onopolistic com­
petition. If a firm reduces its price level slightly it increases the dem and 
for its goods. It also increases real money balances, increasing dem and for 
other firms ou tpu t as well. In monopolistic com petition, since ou tpu t is ini­
tially not equal to the social optim um , the increase in real balances has a 
positive effect on welfare. Of course, the opposite situation could hold as
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well. This implies th a t money, at least in the short run, is non-neutral and 
therefore would require the regular intervention of the m onetary authority. If 
the m onetary authority  has access to new inform ation on exogenous shocks, 
after firms have set their prices, system atic feedback rules could stabilise 
ou tpu t. If the m onetary authority  fails to react to these nom inal changes, 
em ployment levels and output would experience the negative im pact forecast 
by these models.
In labour m arkets inertial responses in price setting behaviour induces a 
change in the real wage, the direction of which will depend on both  the mag­
nitude and tim ing of the change in price. The m agnitude of the wage change 
will depend on the elasticity of the labour supply curve. Large fluctuations 
in em ployment will result from small menu costs, only with an elastic labour 
supply curve. In a model such as Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) in which 
price setters do not want to change relative prices to each other and the cost 
of not adjusting wages is not large, it is not clear why wage setters; w hether 
they be unions, firms or even workers, would settle for large changes In em­
ploym ent for relatively small changes in output.
The appeal of menu cost models is th a t they predict welfare losses, result­
ing from inertial responses, which are much larger th a t the actual cost of 
adjustm ent. In the Akerlof-Yellen model not to react instantly  to any price 
change results in a second order loss to the firm. However, the welfare losses
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are of first order m agnitude. In the Dixit model the waiting tim e between 
changes in aggregate dem and and firms adjusting prices is two orders larger 
than  Akerlof-Yellen. The infinite planning horizon punishes firms m ore than  
the preceding static  models. This has the effect of reducing the frequency 
and increasing the size of adjustm ents. As a result nominal rigidity becomes 
more entrenched, causing much larger output and welfare distortions. By 
incorporating uncertainty and a tim e horizon into the existing m enu cost lit­
eratu re Dixit (1991a) reveals a more accurate picture of the effects of nominal 
friction.
The instantaneous holding cost in the Dixit model is an increasing function 
of the difference between the price set by firms and the m arket price. Hence, 
it is to  be expected th a t the initial cost and the costs accrued in the first few 
tim e periods will contribute more towards the  value of the cost function than
those in la ter periods, especially if the discount rate is high. However, this
'
is not the case. The results illustrated in Dixit (1991a) show th a t the zone 
of inertia  is only determ ined by the exogenous param eters driving the cost 
function and is independent of the initial cost. Of course, this is im plicit in 
the specification of the heuristically m otivated first order “sm ooth pasting” 
condition used to evaluate the  optim al zone of inaction. The initial cost is 
excluded from the solution technique. Here it is shown under an optim al 
stochastic control framework th a t, even when the initial cost does feature
52
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in the  evaluation of the  optim al zone, it plays no role in determ ining the 
optim al zone of inaction. However, this probably has more to do with the 
type of costs faced by the firm.
The “sm ooth pasting” condition also excludes the set of admissible controls 
and the link which exists between them  (see C hapter 1 ) in the com putation of 
the optim al zone of inertia. For a given set of param eters, the gradient con­
ditions w ith respect to the initial sta te  fix the values of the ‘op tim al’ bounds. 
This is evident through the Dixit m odel’s apparent inability to quantify the 
extent to which a prescribed strategy deviates from th a t which is optim al. 
Thus the  Dixit model fails to capture the  price adjustm ent behaviour of any
firm whose initial price gap m ay lie outside the narrow optim al zone of in-
.ertia. Here, the costs faced by such firms along with their prescribed price 
adjustm ent strategy is derived.
The assum ption th a t the zone of inertia  is symmetrically disposed about the 
m arket price is an im portan t feature of models in the current literature. In 
s ta tic  models this is self evident because both  holding costs and the costs of 
adjustm ent are assumed to be sym m etric about the m arket price. However, 
there exists no a priori reason for this to be the case in net present value 
models w ithin an environm ent of ongoing uncertainty. Nevertheless, these 
models make this assum ption in deriving the optim al range of inaction. Here 
it is proved th a t, w ithin the Dixit model, the optim al zone of inertia  will
■f
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always be sym m etric, if firms adjust prices to completely elim inate the price 
gap between their price and the m arket price, i.e. follow a zero threshold 
policy. A nalytical expressions which link the behaviour of the boundaries 
of the optim al zone of inaction to all the exogenous param eters driving the 
cost function are also derived for this policy. It is difficult to exam ine the
im pact of the intertem poral discount ra te  of each firm on the optim al range
..............................of inaction in D ixit (1991a).
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However, com plete price adjustm ent, or the zero threshold policy, is only a 
lim ited form of the general optim al control policy for such a problem. If firms 
are allowed the flexibility to  choose the m agnitude of their price adjustm ent 
in an optim al way, it is not obvious th a t they would opt for a zero thresh­
old policy. The results obtained here confirm th a t firms always opt for a 
zero threshold policy even if they are offered this flexibility. Effectively, this 
chapter confirms the results obtained in Dixit (1991a) through an optim al 
stochastic control framework and provides a solution technique th a t allows a 
more general type of problem  to be solved, quantifying the extent to  which 
a specified price setting policy deviates from th a t which is optim al in a non­
heuristic way.
In Section 2, the Dixit m enu cost function is com puted using the form ulation 
in Chapter 1 for models of “im pulse” control rather than the “sm ooth past­
ing” condition. In Section 3, it is proved th a t the zone of inertia  is indeed
%
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sym m etric about the m arket price, and analytic expressions are provided 
linking the exogenous factors driving the net present value cost function and 
the zone of inertia. In Section 4, the  optim al price adjustm ent policy is 
derived and results are illustrated  in Section 5.
V’(æ) ™ min E
poo ^
J  dt +  æ(0) =  x
where Tj denotes the discrete tim es at which a “jum p” control is exercised 
to restore the process to zero.
The standard  technique of stochastic calculus reveals th a t V{x)  satisfies
-V ' \x )  -  pV{x)  +  kx'^ = 0.2
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2.2 T he zero threshold policy
Let the sta te  variable x  be the natural logarithm  of the difference between 
the firm price and the m arket price and follow a driftless W iener process
dxt — crdzt, € ( a , 6 ),
where dz is the W iener increm ent, where a ^  0 and 6 ^ 0 .  Let the in­
stantaneous holding cost function be given by kx'^. Furtherm ore, let the 
transaction cost g be incurred at each instan t the process exits continuation 
region (a, b) and is restored to  zero. Then the net present value of holding 
and transactions costs will be given by the value function
where A  and B  are arb itrary  constants.
For a policy of com plete price reconciliation, in which restoration to zero is 
forced upon the process exiting the continuation region, the value function 
F(aj) m ust satisfy
y(6) -  y(o) = 6^, y(a) -  y(o) = (2.2)
on the  top and bottom  boundaries respectively. Note th a t the “sm ooth 
pasting” condition is not necessary for the evaluation of the the constants 
A  and B  (see chapter 2). To ease the  trea tm ent of (2.1) let us define the
7  sinh z
The interm ediate steps in the  derivation of (2.3) are provided in Appendix C.
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w ith solution
y  (a:) =  A cosh(o:a;) +  H sinh(aa;) -|--------- 1 —, a  ^  y  (2 .1 )
non-dimensional variable w  and param eters y, z, and 7  by
'
a x  aa ab gp^^  =  _  .  =  _  y =  _  ^  =  _ .  (2.3)
In view of (2.2) and (2.3), equation (2.1) has solution
^ ,z )  =  ^  +  l +  , (2.4)
7  7  smh(y — z)
where
• m  ^
i*
2.3 O ptim al boundary values
Simplifying (2.6) and (2.7), it is clear th a t y and z satisfy the conditions
f {y )  -  y(z) cosh(y - z ) -  f { z )  sinh(î/ -  z) =  0 , (2 .8 )
f { y )  sinh(î/ -  z) -  f {y )  cosh(y -  z) +  f { z )  = 0. (2.9)
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The cost function in (2.3) m ust now be minimised with respect to  the choice 
of boundaries on which firms adjust prices for a given initial position. The 
“sm ooth pasting” condition in Dixit (1991a) would require the  first-order 
condition
^  =  0. (2.5)
Stochastic optim al control requires
d V{ w] y , z )  __ [ f { y )  sinh(y -  z) -  f ( y )  cosh(y -  z) +  f {z)]  cosh(2w -  z)
dy  sinh^(y — z)
=  0. (2.6)
and
d V{ w] y , z )  _  [f{y)  -  f { z )  cosh(y -  z) -  f ( z )  sinh(^ -  z)] cosh(2w -  y)
dz  sinh^(y — z)
=  0. (2.7)
E quation (2.6) and (2.7) pin the values of a and b so th a t V(.) is minimised. 
It is not clear what (2.5) does. The cost function seems to  be optim ised with 
respect to th e  initial state. B ut in stochastic optim al control the initial state 
is only a param eter of the  problem, an inheritance from an unknown past. 
Not  a control variable.
2 zf ( y )  sinh z +  / ( z )  sinh(y — 2 z) H sinh(y — z) =  0 . (2 .1 0 )
Similarly substitu ting  for f ' {y)  in (2.9) and m ultiplying through by s'lnhy 
gives
sinh(i/ — z) -  f { y )  sinh(2 ?/ — z) +  / ( z )  sinh y =  0 . (2 .1 1 )
7
[tanh(y -  z) ~  (y “  z)](z +  y) =  0  (2 .1 2 )
1
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It is now obvious th a t the optim al boundaries as provided by the values y 
and z are independent of the initial s ta te  x,  and, hence, the optim al solu­
tions of the two boundaries will only depend on the exogenous param eters of
'
the process. These results im ply th a t the zero threshold policy compels all
.firms whose initial positions lie outside these optim al boundaries to transact 
instan tly  and adjust their price level to m atch the m arket price. This na tu ­
rally follows from the optim al stochastic control framework used here due to  
the unique costs faced by the firm. In applications of the “sm ooth pasting” 
condition this is implicit in its construction, irrespective of the in itial price 
gap and the costs faced by the firm.
Equation (2.8) and (2.9) are now solved for y and z. Substitu ting for f ' {z)  
in (2 .8 ) and m ultiplying the resulting expression by sinhz yields
Subtracting (2.11) from (2.10), dividing resulting expression by 2 cosh(^ — z) 
and then substitu ting for f {y )  and / ( z )  yields
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Its clear th a t (2.12) has two possible solutions
z +  y =  0 , and tanh(y  — z) — (y — z) =  0 .
log 7  =  2  log p +  log g — log k — 2 log S,
a n d ,so
d j  2 7  d'y 7  ^ 7  — 7  d'y —2'y
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The la tte r condition is only satisfied when z =  y, i.e. a ~  b. However, the 
boundaries were initially defined as being a ^  0 and 6 ^ 0 .  Hence z — y 
cannot be a solution. This leaves z +  y =  0, which is true  when b =  —a. 
Therefore firms operating a zero threshold policy under a sym m etric holding 
and transaction cost regime will find their optim al zone of inaction sym m et­
rically disposed around the m arket price. This result is not unexpected and 
sounds intuitively correct since both  costs are sym m etric about the  m arket 
price. However, Dixit (1991a) assumed this property. I
Now th a t z +  y =  0 it can be shown th a t z and y m ust satisfy
y — tanh(y) — — =  0 . (2.13)y
Appendix D contains the interm ediate steps in the derivation of this equation.
Differentiating y with respect to 7 , yields
'I
*  =  y ( 2 141d-/ 7  +  y2 tanh*(y)' ' ’
It is now clear th a t y is an increasing function of 7 . Furtherm ore
7
Since y =  ab/2  and then
l e
Î
#
b = a y ^ j ^ .  (2.15)
m V;:,
It is clear from this expression for b th a t for economically realistic values of 
the param eters, the range of inertia  defined by the optim al boundaries could 
be either small or large depending on how the sta te  is scaled. It is now clear 
th a t 6  is a decreasing function of k and an increasing function of g. This 
shows th a t firms will wait longer before adjusting their prices as menu costs 
increase. But will wait less if the  ra te  a t which losses are accrued increases.
The behaviour w ith respect to  tJ and p is less obvious. From the  definition 
of b it follows th a t
I db 1 /Y /  dy d ' j \
h d ^  -  k V A
_  y tanh^(y) -  7  
cr[7  +  y tan h ^(y )]‘
From (2.13) it is obvious th a t 7  =  — y tan h (y ) and so
y^ tanh^(y) -  7  =  y^ tanh^(y) -  i f  -\-y tanh^(y)
=  y tanh(y) -  y^sech^(y)
=  ysech^ [cosh(y) sinh(y) — 2 y]
=  yseciy(y)[sinh(2 y) -  2 y)] >  0 .
Hence b is an increasing function of a. T hat is, the variance of the  process and 
the zone of inertia move in the same direction. This reinforces the intuitively
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appealing idea th a t, as uncertainty increases, firms will delay action to  avoid 
the downside of transacting too frequently while trying realise the  potential 
upside of X decreasing. The value of waiting clearly increases w ith increased 
uncertainty.
By differentiation of (2.15) with respect to p, it can be shown th a t
i!
Î
p ^  ^  3 7  -  tanh^(y)
b dp  2 ( 7  +  tan iy  (y))
See A ppendix E. Clearly 2 ( 7  T y^ tanh^(y )) >  0. It is also obvious th a t when
y =  0 ,
3 7  — y^ tanh^(y) =  0 . (2.16)
If (2.16) is an increasing function of y, then it naturally follows th a t db/ dp  ^  
0. D ifferentiating (2.16) w ith respect to y yields
y — tanh(y) >  0 .
Therefore
db
From this it is apparent th a t the zone of inertia  and the constant discount 
ra te  are proportional to  each other. It dem onstrates th a t firms will accumu­
la te  losses if these losses decrease in value over time. Clearly current losses 
decrease in value rapidly over tim e under high discount rates. Therefore as 
p increases, it becomes relatively cheaper for firms to increase their waiting 
tim e because in real term s, as tim e evolves, the value of holding costs being
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accrued will decrease relative to  the  cost of adjustm ent. A lthough this rela­
tionship is intuitive it cannot be deduced from the Dixit model. The discount 
ra te  vanishes in simplifying Taylor series expansion used to obtain a simpli­
fying approxim ation of b. It is only by making an em pirical link between p 
and <j^  th a t the effect of p on 6  can be analysed.
2.4 The O ptim al Price A djustm ent P olicy
It can also be easily dem onstrated th a t when the zero threshold policy is 
abandoned in favour of an optim al price adjustm ent policy, V{x)  m ust satisfy
=  y  y w - y ( Q  =  y ,  ( 2 . 1 7 )
where b and a are the upper and lower boundaries respectively, and, u  and 
I are the upper and lower thresholds respectively (see chapter 2). To ease 
the  trea tm en t of (2 .1 ) let us introduce the non-dimensional variables and 
param eters
qp^ a(b — u) a ( 6 - fu )  a(a — l) « ( a - f  0
(2 .18)
Substitu ting (2.17) into (2,1) and solving the resulting sim ultaneous equa­
tions yields
V { v , w , x , y , z )  =  ^  +  1  +  -  u r f ( Ï -  2 . ) ’
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where
- f  - y z
sinh y cosh(z — 2v)
See Appendix F for interm ediate steps in the derivation of (2.19).
For an optim a a necessary condition is
= y^[  — l ^ + 7  =  0 . (2 .2 0 )dV( v ; z u , x , y ,  z) / ta n h y
It is clear th a t
tanh(y) ^  1 Vy.y
Since k, p, and g are positive quantises, it m ust follow from (2.20) th a t
- 7 > 0.tanh  y — y
Hence >  P,  and therefore |a| >  |/|. Another necessary condition for 
op tim a is
d V ( v \ w , x , y ,  z)  / ta n h— =  wx  'dw
Using the  same argum ent, it can be dem onstrated th a t |6 | >  luj.
In addition to these two conditions, the condition x G (a, h) such th a t a ^  
l , u  ^  b m ust also m ust be satisfied. This implies th a t a ^  0 and 6 ^ 0 .
It is difficult to obtain analytical expressions for the optim al solution in this 
four dim ensional problem. Therefore the problem  is reparam eterised in term s 
of four different param eters to  obtain the optim al values for boundaries and 
thresholds using num erical m ethods.
63
Let
I =  a +  Cl Cl ^  0 (2.22)
b  ~  U  + C2  C2 ^  0.
From this it trivially follows th a t 6 ^  a +  ci and also 6 ^  a +  C2 . The initial 
price gap x  was defined to satisfy the condition a  ^  x ^  b .  Therefore a  and 
b  can be expressed as
This implies th a t
C3 + C4 §  max(ci,C2),
and
C3 +  C4 =  m ax(ci, Cg) +  C5 C5 ^  0 . 
A lternatively we have
I
■tr
a  =  X ^  C3 C3 ^  0 (2.23)
b  =  X  ^  C4  C4 ^  0 .
Given th e  definition of the boundaries and thresholds, (2 .2 2 ) and (2.23) need 
to satisfy
z 4 - C4 ^  z — C3 d- Cl and C2 +  æ — C3 ^  æ T C4 .
Therefore
C4 ^  Cl — C3 and C4 ^  C2 — C3 .
■
, î
C3 +  C4 ^  Cl ^  0  and C3 +  C4 ^  C2 ^  0 . 
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a  =  X  —  C3 ,
b = a; +  C4,
I =  a  -f- A,’iC3 T  k\C4
— (K +  A:iC4 T  (fci — l ) c 3 ,
u — 6 — C2
— a^  T  C4 — A)2C3 — /C2C4 
=  a: — ( 1  — k \ ) c 4  —  k 2 C 3 .
The BFGS m ethod for unconstrained m inim isation (a quasi-Newton algo­
rithm ) is used to perform  the four dimensional optim isation. Details of this 
are available in Technical Annex 1 and Bulirsch and Stoer (1980).
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Now we can write
Cl =  k i { c s  4- C4) 0 ^  ^  1
and
C2 =  ^^2(03 +  C 4 ) , 0 ^  ^2 ~  1-
Thus the entire problem can now be reparam eterised in term s of four con­
stants ki ,  ^2 , C3 , and C4 such th a t
0 g  /ci g  1 0 g  A:2 g  1,
and
C3 ^  0  C4 ^  0 .
.Now we can derive new expressions for a, 6 , I and u. T hat is:
I
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2.5 R esults
Results are provided in two parts. Table 1 provides a comparison of the 
values obtained from the m enu cost function under a zero threshold policy 
w ith those presented in Dixit(1991a). The punitive costs associated with fol­
lowing a sub-optim al pricing strategy are quantified by V{w) .  Firm s which 
initially lie outside the optim al zone of inaction and do not instantly  transact 
down to zero face huge costs. Firm s which transact down to zero confront 
only a fraction of these costs. Thus providing firms with a clear incentive to 
transac t downwards. These observations are in contrast to the Dixit model 
in which these losses cannot be measured.
Table 2 provides an illustration of the results of the general price adjustm ent 
model given. The optim al zone of inertia  remains the same, bu t the  values 
of y (u )  are clearly different to  the values of y (tc) for similar values of x.  
A lthough not applicable in this problem, these results indicate th a t the more 
general optim ising strategy could be relevant in circumstances when the type 
of costs faced by firms change. A discussion of how the results obtained here 
could change when some the assum ptions dealing with costs are relaxed is 
also provided. For the source code used to generate these functions see Tech­
nical Annexure 4.
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2.5 .1  C om parison o f th e  zero threshold  policy  and ex ­
isting work
Vbixit(a^) =   r - r j -T T C O sh ia x )  +  h —— ,p asm li(ah)  p p^
where h is the so called optim al sym m etric boundary value, to  the optim al 
values given in Section 3. The value of h is the first positive root of the 
equation
y — tanh(y) — — =  0. (2.24)
hbixit(^) increases w ith respect to  x for only a sym m etric interval of a; G 
(—0.3,0.3). For x  ^ (—0.3,0.3) the “sm ooth pasting” strategy suggests th a t 
firms should instantly  incur cost g and elim inate their price gap, reducing 
(increasing) their to ta l costs to y T  F ( 0 ), w ithout evaluating the potential 
costs (or benefits) of following this strategy. In Table 1 V( w)  quantifies these 
costs, providing firms w ith clear incentive to change x to zero if they initially
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The values of the cost function derived here, which does not contain the 
heuristically m otivated “sm ooth pasting” condition, highlights a pa tte rn  
of optim ising behaviour th a t previously was not observable. To provide a 
comparison, the same values are chosen for the exogenous param eters as in 
Dixit(1991a), i.e. a = 0.1, p =  0.05, g =  0.1 and k ~  0.5. Table 1 com­
pares the optim al values derived for the cost function in section 2 with D ixit 
(1991a) given by
Ï
. . y .
—2kh  . , , kx'^ kcr"^
lie in this outer region.
The findings here are interesting. They confirm what Dixit (1991a) suggests. 
They show th a t if firms adopt a zero threshold policy, then the  optim al zone 
of inertia  will be constrained by the exogenous param eters driving the cost 
function. Firm s, behaving as private optim isers, initially lying outside this 
zone will instantly  adjust their prices, at tim e zero, to m atch the m arket 
price and bring themselves inside it, incurring an adjustm ent cost of g. This 
effectively implies th a t no firm will set its initial price so th a t its initial price 
gap lies outside this zone. Firm s with x  G (—0.3, 0.3) will be faced w ith a 
cost of y(æ ). Firm s with x ^  (—0.3,0.3) will confront a cost of g +  y (0 ).
This analysis clearly dem onstrates th a t the costs associated w ith letting 
prices diffuse outside optim al zone of inertia  are large. Firm s make a sig­
nificant cost saving by adjusting x  down to zero. Therefore firms will only 
to lerate small deviations in their price from the m arket price, because, large 
price gaps are too costly. However, the resulting narrow zone of inaction re­
quires elastic dem and curves in output m arkets and supply curves in labour 
m arkets to cause large welfare fluctuations. This is a strong assum ption to 
impose on m arkets.
68
2.5 .2  T he O ptim al P rice A djustm ent P olicy
The zero threshold policy compels all firms when adjusting their prices to 
m atch the  m arket price. It is silent on the  behaviour of firms who may other­
wise choose to let their prices to deviate significantly from the  m arket price. 
This is because the zero threshold policy is only a lim ited form of the general 
optim al control policy for dealing w ith such problems. It allows firms no 
flexibility in optim ally determ ining the m agnitude of price adjustm ent. In 
essence, it imposes synthetic constraints on the  zone of inaction.
The results for the  optim al price adjustm ent policy are remarkable. It cap­
tures the behaviour of firms functioning as complete optimisers. As can be 
seen from Table 2, firms will always opt for a zero threshold framework, 
even if their initial price difference is sufficiently large. This is because the 
potential downside associated with waiting exceeds the upside of m atching 
the  m arket price, albeit by a small am ount. But clearly for x  ^  (—0.3, 0.3), 
V{v)  < y(ru). This is because firms now have the flexibility of partially  ad­
justing  their prices. Although, this policy does not yield any further insights 
here due to the unique costs faced by the firm, these results suggest th a t a 
strategy based on firms partially  adjusting their prices may yield in terest­
ing results in situations where holding costs and discount rates dynam ically 
evolve, ra ther then being held constant, and the cost of adjustm ent Is changed 
to include a proportional element.
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2.6 C oncluding Rem arks
This chapter utilises an optim al stochastic control framework to  confirm the 
results obtained in D ixit (1991a). By adopting a non-heuristic approach it
,1
If the cost attached to adjusting a positive price gap is different to th a t of 
adjusting a negative price gap, it is unlikely th a t the zone of inertia  will 
be sym m etrically disposed about the m arket price. Changing costs of ad­
ju stm en t to  include a proportional element is likely to result in some firms 
adjusting prices to reduce rather than  elim inate the price gap. Discount 
rates and holding costs which dynam ically evolve could also have varying 
effects. In some instances the results m ay not change from those forecasted 
by the model derived here. In other cases firms may only partially  close the 
price gap, the optim al zone of inertia could be asym m etric or both. The key 
feature driving firm behaviour would be the equation of m otion governing 
discount rates and holding costs. Under these circumstances making an a 
priori decision on the type of adjustm ent policy to follow, such as the zero 
threshold policy in the  Dixit model, would be to abstract too much from the 
true  natu re  of costs faced by firms. The zone of inaction forecasted by a 
Dixit type price adjustm ent policy would clearly be at odds with how firms 
priced their output in the real world. Only the partial price adjustm ent 
policy described here will accurately evaluate how firms tru ly  behave.
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quantifies the  potential costs to firms in areas which previously were un­
observable due to the “sm ooth pasting” condition. As a result it becomes 
clear why firms opt for a zero threshold policy. Earlier models such as the 
Mankiw or Dixit models use various heuristic arguments to make this an 
a priori feature. Also analytical expressions are derived describing optim al 
agent behaviour as the underlying param eters change. Obviously, by relax­
ing some of the assum ptions m ade in the Dixit model on adjustm ent costs, 
holding costs, or the discount rate  m any of the results could be expanded on. 
However, the aim of this chapter is also to dem onstrate some of the ex ante 
restrictions placed on the solution by the heuristically m otivated “sm ooth 
pasting” condition. In order to do this best, it was considered helpful to 
confine the analyses to an established model so th a t all its lim itations could 
be easily observed.
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X y (w ) a b h
-2 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.815624 -2 .0 1 0 0 0 0 0 .0 1 0 0 0 0 0.434207 0.340147
-1.900000 5.685384 -1.910000 0 .0 1 0 0 0 0 0.434207 0.340147
-1.800000 5.556160 -1.810000 0 .0 1 0 0 0 0 0.434207 0.340147
-1.700000 5.427494 -1.710000 0 .0 1 0 0 0 0 0.434207 0.340147
-1.600000 5.299132 -1.610000 0 .0 1 0 0 0 0 0.434207 0.340147
-1.500000 5.171162 -1.510000 0 . 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.434207 0.340147
-1.400000 5.044232 -1.410000 0 . 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.434207 0.340147
-1.300000 4.919831 -1.310000 0 .0 1 0 0 0 0 0.434207 0.340147
- 1 . 2 0 0 0 0 0 4.800695 - 1 .2 1 0 0 0 0 0 .0 1 0 0 0 0 0.434207 0.340147
- 1 . 1 0 0 0 0 0 4.691372 - 1 .1 1 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.434207 0.340147
- 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.599035 - 1 .0 1 0 0 0 0 0 .0 1 0 0 0 0 0.434207 0.340147
-0.900000 4.534703 -0.910000 0.421127 0.434207 0.340147
-0.800000 4.515216 -0.810000 0.403579 0.434207 0.340147
-0.700000 4.566686 -0.710000 0.385571 0.434207 0.340147
-0.600000 3.816582 -0.610000 0.368207 0.434207 0.340147
-0.500000 3.466724 -0.510000 0.353139 0.434207 0.340147
-0.400000 0.456546 -0.410000 0.342751 0.434207 0.340147
-0.300000 0.434207 -0.340147 0.340147 0.434207 0.340147
-0 .2 0 0 0 0 0 0.395923 -0.340147 0.340147 0.395923 0.340147
-0 .1 0 0 0 0 0 0.355556 -0.340147 0.340147 0.355556 0.340147
0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.339286 -0.340147 0.340147 0.339286 0.340147
0 . 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.355556 -0.340147 0.340147 0.355556 0.340147
0 . 2 0 0 0 0 0 0.395923 -0.340147 0.340147 0.395923 0.340147
0.300000 0.434207 -0.340147 0.340147 0.434207 0.340147
0.400000 0.456546 -0.342751 0.410000 0.434207 0.340147
0.500000 3.466724 -0.353139 0.510000 0.434207 0.340147
0.600000 3.816582 -0.368207 0.610000 0.434207 0.340147
0.700000 4.566686 -0.385571 0.710000 0.434207 0.340147
0.800000 4.515216 -0.403579 0.810000 0.434207 0.340147
0.900000 4.534703 -0.421127 0.910000 0.434207 0.340147
1 .0 0 0 0 0 0 4.599035 -0 . 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 .0 1 0 0 0 0 0.434207 0.340147
1 .1 0 0 0 0 0 4.691372 -0 .0 1 0 0 0 0 1 .1 1 0 0 0 0 0.434207 0.340147
1 .2 0 0 0 0 0 4.800695 -0 .0 1 0 0 0 0 1 .2 1 0 0 0 0 0.434207 0.340147
1.300000 4.919831 -0 . 0 1 0 0 0 0 1.310000 0.434207 0.340147
1.400000 6T44232 -0 . 0 1 0 0 0 0 1.410000 0.434207 0.340147
1.500000 5.171162 -0 . 0 1 0 0 0 0 1.510000 0.434207 0.340147
1.600000 5.299132 -0 . 0 1 0 0 0 0 1.610000 0.434207 0.340147
1.700000 5.427494 -0 .0 1 0 0 0 0 1.710000 0.434207 0.340147
1.800000 5.556160 -0 .0 1 0 0 0 0 1.810000 0.434207 0.340147
1.900000 5.685384 -0 .0 1 0 0 0 0 1.910000 0.434207 0.340147
2 .0 0 0 0 0 0 5.815624 -0 .0 1 0 0 0 0 2 .0 1 0 0 0 0 0.434207 0.340147
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Table 2.1: The Zero Threshold Policy vs. The Dixit O ptim al Policy
" i
X F (u ) a I u 6
-2 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.059944 -2 . 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.191338 0.191338 0.461514
-1.900000 1.944792 -1.910000 0.188907 0.188907 0.459699
-1.800000 1.832973 -1.810000 0.185915 0.185915 0.457472
-1.700000 1.723971 -1.710000 0.182246 0T82246 0.454752
-1.600000 1.617223 -1.610000 0.177767 0.177767 0.451447
-1.500000 1.512131 -1.510000 0.172325 0.172324 0.447459
-1.400000 1.408090 -1.410000 0.165743 0.165743 0.442661
-1.300000 1.304525 -1.310000 0.157823 0.157823 0.436946
- 1 .2 0 0 0 0 0 1.200951 -1 .2 1 0 0 0 0 0.148344 0.148344 0.430187
-1 .1 0 0 0 0 0 1.097061 - 1 .1 1 0 0 0 0 0.137069 0.137069 0.422267
- 1 .0 0 0 0 0 0 0.992916 - 1 .0 1 0 0 0 0 0.121611 0.119480 0.416121
-0.900000 0.888780 -0.910000 0.107210 0.105323 0.405815
-0.800000 0.785938 -0.810000 0.088047 0.085194 0.393846
-0.700000 0.686441 -0.710000 0.068057 0.063766 0.382879
-0.600000 0.593698 -0.610000 0.046432 0.043729 0.367149
-0.500000 0.513858 -0.510000 0.021980 0.015662 0.355389
-0.400000 0.456470 -0.410000 0.004171 0.000762 0.344190
-0.300000 0.434207 -0.340147 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 0 0.340147
-0 .2 0 0 0 0 0 0.395923 -0.340147 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.340147
-0 . 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.355556 -0.340147 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.340147
0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.339286 -0.340147 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 0 0.340147
0 . 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.355556 -0.340147 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 0 0.340147
0 .2 0 0 0 0 0 0.395923 -0.340147 0 .0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.340147
0.300000 0.434207 -0.340147 0 .0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.340147
0.400000 0.456470 -0.344190 -0.000762 -0.004171 0.410000
0.500000 0.513858 41355389 -0.015662 -0.021980 0.510000
0.600000 0.593698 -0.367149 -0.043729 -0.046432 0.610000
0.700000 0.686441 -0.382879 -0.063766 -0.068057 0.710000
0.800000 0.785938 -0.393847 41085193 -0.088046 0.810000
0.900000 0.888756 -0.404789 -0.106189 -0.107472 0.910000
1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.992916 -0.416121 -0.119480 -0.121611 1 .0 1 0 0 0 0
1 . 1 0 0 0 0 0 1.097061 -0.422267 -0.137069 -0.137069 1 .1 1 0 0 0 0
1 . 2 0 0 0 0 0 1.200951 -0.430187 -0.148344 -0.148344 1 .2 1 0 0 0 0
1.300000 1.304525 -0.436946 -0.157823 -0.157823 1.310000
1.400000 1.408090 -0.442661 -0.165743 -0.165743 1.410000
1.500000 1.512131 -0.447459 -0.172324 -0.172325 1.510000
1.600000 1.617223 -0.451447 -0.177767 -0.177767 1.610000
1.700000 1.723971 -0.454752 -0T82246 -0.182246 1.710000
1.800000 1.832973 -0.457474 -0.185914 -0.185915 1.810000
1.900000 1.944792 -0.459699 -0.188907 -0.188907 1.910000
2 .0 0 0 0 0 0 2.059944 -0.461514 -0.191338 -0.191338 2 . 0 1 0 0 0 0
73 ,Table 2.2: Results From The O ptim al Price A djustm ent Policy
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Keynes (1936) identifies three reasons for holding money. The first is the 
transactions motive, where agents select an optim al cash balance by m inimis­
ing the costs associated with m anaging a portfolio of cash and an interest 
earning illiquid asset. The second is the speculative motive, where money is 
held as a component of a portfolio of assets optim ally selected to maximise 
re tu rn  while minimising risk. The th ird  is the precautionary motive, where 
money is held as a buffer stock to absorb any unplanned expenditure shocks. 
These ideas were subsequently formalised in models which incorporated ei­
ther one or two of these motives. This chapter looks at how the literatu re  
on the  transactions dem and for money has evolved, highlighting some of its 
perceived strengths a weaknesses.
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Chapter 3 
Transactions D em and for 
M oney; A Critical R eview
3.1 Introduction
The early contributions are discussed in Section 2. Subsequent developments 
are analysed in Section 3 highlighting the a ttem p t to synthesise bo th  the 
transactions and the precautionary motives. The most recent literatu re  is 
reviewed in Section 4, looking at how valuable inform ation could have been 
discarded by authors when obtaining analytic solutions. Finally the bene­
fits of combining the inventory theoretic approach with the various portfolio 
models, which exam ine both  the speculative and precautionary motive, are 
discussed. When referring to money or cash here, it is not strictly in the 
sense o f  MO, but assets with cash like attributes
3,2 Early Transaction M oney D em and Mod» 
els
M odern transactions money dem and models have their genesis in Baumol 
(1952) and Tobin (1956) (Baumol-Tobin) which look at money holdings from 
a micro basis. Transactions are assumed to occur at a constant ra te  and are 
perfectly foreseen, and agents seek to optim ise a portfolio consisting of cash 
and an illiquid interest earning asset.
Take an agent who spends TC7 at a uniform rate. To do this he m ust either 
borrow or draw on his savings and incur an opportunity  cost in the form 
of forgone interest income, say 7  per period. All withdrawals are m ade in 
fixed quantities of £ M  and with each withdrawal a lum p sum transaction 
cost of (3 is incurred. Thus any M  ^  C  will perm it the agent to m eet 
expenses if a sufficient num ber of withdrawals are made. Hence a m inim um  
of C JM  w ithdrawals will be required costing £f 3C/ M.  If  £ M  is expended
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at a constant rate, then average money holdings will be £ M / 2 .  If interest is 
earned every C / M  periods then the interest opportunity cost will be j M j 2 .  
The to ta l cost of holding money will be
M inimising this costs w ith respect to  M  and making M  the subject yields
V 7
which is the  expression for the optim um  level of money holdings. It is obvi­
ous from  this th a t, if (7 =  P Y  where P  is the price level and Y  is the  level of 
real income, the income elasticity of money will be 1/2. However, numerous 
em pirical studies have shown this not to  be the  case. Narrow money has 
been dem onstrated to have a short run income elasticity of close to zero and 
a long run income elasticity of close to  unity.
M any explanations can be forwarded as to  why these models fail to m atch 
em pirical findings. F irstly  they are determ inistic and therefore do not ac­
count for precautionary balances. The interest ra te  is held constant. Hence 
any change in the level of expected money holdings will not reflect any in­
ertial responses which occur due to interest ra te  uncertainty. Because the 
model is static  it also fails to capture the true intertem poral opportunity  
cost of holding money. Also, it takes a lim ited view of agent optim ising be­
haviour. Unlike most portfolio based models, where agents seek to  m aximise 
wealth by holding a portfolio of assets, of which money may be one, in an 
environm ent of ongoing uncertainty, these models assume a world of perfect 
foresight. Given these lim itations it is not surprising th a t the Baumol-Tobin 
approach does not reflect em pirical findings. However, the model also yields
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some useful insights. It captures th e  long run directional sensitivity of the 
money stock to  changes in key macro variables, serving as an approxim ation 
of the equilibrium  behaviour of transactions money balances.
3.3 The D iscrete Stochastic Cash Flow M od­
els
i
- j .
I
The criticism  levelled at Baumol-Tobin in the literature th a t im m ediately 
followed it was th a t it failed to  reflect the money holdings of firms both  from 
positive and norm ative points of view. Miller and Orr (1966), (M iller-Orr) 
argue th a t the  typical p a tte rn  of money holdings is not as simple as the 
determ inistic view in Baumol-Tobin, bu t th a t they typically follow a ran­
dom walk. This assum ption instantly  changes the dimension of the problem. 
Firm s not only have to decide on how much to  withdraw when cash holdings 
h it a m inim um  level, bu t also how much surplus cash to switch into the  in ter­
est earning asset. Transfer costs like Baumol-Tobin are assumed to be lum p 
sum, say £(3. All transfers between the two accounts occur instantaneously. 
Also the cash balance is not allowed to  fall below a m inim um  level. Firm s 
seek to minimise the long run average cost of managing their money stock by 
using a two param eter control policy. The two param eters being the  upper 
lim it of cash holdings h and a threshold of z.
Given these assum ptions, the cost of managing a firm ’s cash inventory over 
a finite horizon of say T  days will be
E[C] = f ) ^  + vE[M] ,
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where E[N] is the expected num ber of cash transfers over tim e horizon T , j3 
is the marginal cost of each transfer, E[M] is the expected daily cash balance, 
and ^  is the  interest earnings per day. Obviously the firm ’s objective will be 
to minimise E[C\ w ith respect to h and z.
To solve this problem Miller and Orr express E [ N ] /T  in term s of the control 
variables A, and z. If the tim e span between transfers into and out of the  
cash account are given by xq, 3:2 , - -, which are independent random  variables 
from a population w ith a well defined probability distribution with a m ean 
D  and a finite variance, then
E[ x \  +  X2 +  ’ ' • 5 4-3;ft] ^  r  <  E[ x i  T  X2 T  ' ' ' ,  -fXn+i],
or
D .E {N )  g  T  <  D.E[N]  +  D,
since E[xi  +  X2 +  ■ ■ • =  D.E[N].  From the above equation it can be
im plied th a t
1 1 E[N] . 1----------- <■ —L—i <  „D T  T  = D
It is obvious th a t if T  grows unboundedly, then E [ N ] /T  will tend towards
1/D .
For a sym m etric random  walk the m ean first passage tim e out of the contin­
uation region (0,h), D {z ,h )  is given by Feller (1957) to be
D(z,  h) =  {z){h — z).
M iller-Orr convert this value into the expected duration between cash trans­
fers per day letting z'  =  z .m  and h' = h .m  to arrive at
(/)(h ^  -
rrPt
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Next they express E[M]  in term s of z and h. The probability th a t the  cash 
balance will contain precisely x  units is
f { x )  = p f { x - I )  Y  x ^ z ,
which m ust satisfy the boundary conditions
/ ( ^ )  =  P[f{^ ~  1) +  f { h  -  1)] +  q[f{z +  1) +  / ( I ) ] ,  (3.1)
and,
m  = 0, f{h) ^  0,
and the distribution condition
è / ( - u = i -æ=0
Solving these equations yield a solution of the form
f { x )  =  +  B i x  0 < X < z, (3.2)
and
/(x )  =  Ag -f F^(& — x) z < X < /i. (3.3)
The linearity of (3.2) and (3.3) gives rise to a m ean of the distribution they 
form of (h +  z)/3 . Further letting  Z  — h — z the cost function to  be minimised 
will now be
This is nothing more than  the gam bler’s ruin problem  which is described in 
Feller (1957). M inimising this expression it is clear th a t the  optim al threshold 
z is
0(3rrPt 
4q
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and the optim al size of the upper boundary h will be
h ~  3z.
:S"
By substitu ting  the optim al level of z into the above equation it can be easily 
seen th a t a firms steady sta te  average cash balance M* Is given by
If m  =  P Y  it is clear th a t the income elasticity of average steady sta te  money 
holdings will be 2/3.
Here again like Baumol-Tobin the model deviates from what has been em ­
pirically observed. A lthough M iller-Orr introduce uncertainty to expand on 
the determ inistic nature of Baumol-Tobin, the model still rem ains discrete, 
failing to  take account of the continuous process by which cash flows occur. 
Interest rates are assumed to be constant. By leaping to the steady state, 
the m odel is constrained to being essentially static. Also, in reality it could 
be argued th a t costs faced by agents are not in fact lum p sum  but linear and 
asym m etric. By assuming th a t agents do not borrow, the effect of debt and 
the asym m etric responses which this gives rise to are also excluded.
However, M iller-Orr breaks new ground on m any fronts. It marries the trans­
actions and precautionary motives for holding money. Cash balances are a 
risky asset whose value is stochastic and given by a random  walk. If interest
revenue from the illiquid asset is normalised to zero, then the risky asset cash
.will generate an income of retu rn  —ip. The agent effectively maximises the 
expected value of the payoff from holding the risky asset by optim ally decid­
ing w hether to go long or short on cash in the  form of the interior threshold, 
in the presence of fixed hedging costs. W hen cash balances h it zero, the
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agent buys an optim al quantity  of cash at a fixed cost to restore him self to 
the interior point. If balances h it some upper boundary, the agent sells cash 
due to  its punitive return  at a fixed cost. This effectively, makes M iller-Orr 
an expected utility maximisation problem. W ith all the risky and risk free 
retu rn  transferred to cash, it is clear from the m athem atical properties of 
linear u tility  functions, th a t u tility  m axim isation by a risk neutral firm will 
yield the  same optim al targets and thresholds as a cost m inim isation exercise. 
Effectively, agents maximise the payoff of playing a fair game. The appealing 
idea of this approach is th a t money balances are only adjusted when they 
hit only an upper or lower boundary. Tem porary and short-term  changes in 
the  in the money stock are voluntarily held.
3.4 The Continuous Stochastic Cash Flow M od­
els
3.4.1 S teady S tate  M odels
M ilbourne, Buckholtz and Wasan (1983) (MBW) try  expand on M iller-Orr 
by introducing continuous cash flows in the form of a W iener process. The 
results obtained are identical to  M iller-Orr. Frenkel and Jovanovic (1980) 
allow for continuous cash flows as well, bu t opt for a single param eter con­
trol policy like Baumol-Tobin, which yields a short run income elasticity of 
money holdings of less than  a half.
The robustness of these models lie in the modelling techniques utilised. 
Frenkel and Jovanovic (1980) impose an upper boundary which is unbounded.
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7t(x) =
z < r < hh[ h - z )  ^  ^
limt-+oo dx
Firstly
C l, and lim _ 
a;= 0  t-^oo ox
(T^  d 7t{x )
x= h
2
does not exist, since the  second derivative of 7t (x ) does not exist. Thus the 
d istribution of net cash holdings is th a t of a purely determ inistic process,
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This forces the agent to incur holding costs which are punitive, w ith a prob­
ability th a t is non-trivial, when cash balances diffuse upwards. No action is
available to m itigate these losses. Therefore, it is not surprising th a t despite 
.introducing uncertainty they obtain an income elasticity smaller than  the 
purely determ inistic perfect foresight model described by Baumol-Tobin. A 
finite upper boundary which is chosen optim ally like M iller-Orr will serve to 
make this model realistic and also yield a smaller income elasticity.
MBW  should yield similar results to M iller-Orr, but not identical since they 
use a continuous tim e framework. Agents restore balances to  an interior point 
z if cash balances h it an upper lim it h or a lower lim it of zero. M BW  obtain 
a steady sta te  differential equation for the distribution of cash holdings of 
the type
where x denotes the stock of money and its variance. They solve (3.4) to 
obtain  a cash distribution
i
Cl  and C2 are defined to be
C o .  Î
som ething like Baumol-Tobin. Secondly 7t(x) does not satisfy (3.4). Also for
(3.4) to  hold C\ m ust equal C2 . In other words
t-^ oo  O X  I a7=0 t-4-oo Ox
or
hz  h{z  — h)
This obviously cannot be true unless h = 0. But h was initially defined to be 
not equal to zero. Thus the solution th a t MBW provide for the d istribution 
of cash holdings does not satisfy the differential equation from which it is
Clearly the logical foundations of both models are suspect. From an eco­
nomic standpoint they do not significantly add to the insights provided by 
Baumol-Tobin and M iller-Orr. The cost m inim isation criterion used to de­
term ine the optim al boundaries and thresholds allow for only the optim al 
cash m anagem ent decision of risk-neutral agents to be analysed. And, like 
the preceding models the so called solutions are only valid for a steady state 
view of the world.
3.4 .2  N et P resen t Value C ost M inim isation  M od els
Constantinides and Richard (1978) ascribe to  the agent the net present value 
of a cost m inim isation problem , where net cash disbursements dxt follow a 
W iener process, i.e
dXt = (idt -V (TosdZa;.
fjL is the m ean fiow of net cash disbursem ents, (Jx is the standard  deviation 
of net cash flows and dz^ is a W iener increm ent. The net present value of
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obtained.
t
s
holding costs are given by
P O O  ^
V(m,r;u)  = E / e~'’*C{x,)<H+ Y^e~'‘'^‘B(<Pi)
m / u  L Jo  ; = 1
Holding costs C{x)  are assumed to be
C{x) hx  X ^  0 
- p x  0 ^  X.
p  is the  discount rate, and the transfer costs are given by
K+  +  (n -  U)k+ X ^ u
K+ +  (D -d )fc +  d ' ^ x .  
Expanding (3.5) using a stochastic Taylor series expansion yields
crp U (x )  +  / / y ' ( x )  -  y M a ; )  -  C (x )  =  0.
(3.5)
(3.6)
Solving (3.6) with respect to the “sm ooth pasting” and “value m atching” 
conditions given by
V'{D) + k+ = 0 V'{U)  -  fc- -  0,
and
V{d) =  V{D )  +  K + +  k+{u -  U) V{u)  =  V{U)  +  K '  + k - { D -  d).
respectively, yields a solution of the form
y ( x )  =  ^
y (n )  +  (x — u)k~,  
h x / p  T  hp/p^^ +  0  ^  x ^  n
—p x /p  — p p /p  +  +  C4 e^2'^ , d ^  X ^  0
y(d,r) -b (d — x)A)+, X ^  d.
1
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Cl, C2 , C3 and C4 are constants. Note th a t the overdraft ra te  only affects U (x), 
i f f  in itial cash holdings x  are less than  zero. Otherwise it has no effect, de­
spite the fact th a t it m ay still apply when cash holdings drop below zero.
The results generated differ significantly com pared to preceding models. Con­
stantinides and Richard (1978), by looking at the net present value of costs 
associated with managing a cash inventory increase the tim e horizon over 
which costs are generated. Discounting ensures th a t transfer costs are pun­
ished more than  in the steady state  literature. Clearly the zone of inertia  
increases. This is im portant, because it points to a longer adjustm ent lag and 
a higher long run income elasticity than  predicted by steady s ta te  models. 
Proportional costs are continuously incurred at a rate  proportional to the 
storage level of money, and costs accrue at a much faster ra te  than  the finite 
horizon considered in steady sta te  models. This has the effect of reducing 
the frequency and increasing the size of withdrawals and deposits. Of course 
some of this increased inertia  could be partly  due to assuming th a t transfer 
costs are linear in the size of the transaction. The modification of these costs 
to  reflect the asym m etric costs encountered when depositing and withdraw­
ing cash yield the asym m etric targets and thresholds encountered in reality. 
The overdraft ra te  of —p  could also contribute towards this.
The weakness in this model lies in its use of the “smooth pasting” condition 
as an optim isation tool. This is a heuristically m otivated condition which 
cannot be reconciled w ith the optim al stochastic control theoretic framework 
used. Effectively, gradient conditions are imposed on the cost function with 
respect to the initial level of money holdings. A critique of this condition 
is provided in C hapter 1, where the natu ra l conditions for this problem  are
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derived. It is also clear th a t the solution to  the cost function in the re­
gions u ^  X and x ^  d do not satisfy (3.6). Due to these inconsistencies 
the  forecasted behaviour of this model could detract from the underlying 
assum ptions of the model.
Sm ith (1989) tries to develop Constantinides and Richard (1978) further by 
introducing a m ean reverting stochastic process to model interest rates. This 
yields a significant breakthrough allowing the optim al targets and thresholds 
to capture not ju s t cash flow uncertainty, bu t also interest ra te  uncertainty. 
From an economic standpoint, the assum ption of mean reversion is question­
able. It is only a long run observation. To confirm this in most economies 
would require da ta  sets spanning a long tim e period. Given th a t structural 
and institu tional regimes influencing the prices and rates of re tu rn  on al­
ternative assets to money have experienced numerous changes w ithin each 
decade, it is unlikely th a t m atching interest rates over a lengthy tim e span 
would reflect the same opportunity  cost of holding money. In fact it would 
be more realistic to assume th a t interest rates follow a Poissonian type pro­
cess in which the interest ra te  experiences discrete jum ps at discrete tim e 
intervals.
Sm ith (1989) models the m ean reverting interest ra te  as an Ornstien-Uhlenbeck 
process
dr =  q: ( 7  — r)dt  +  a,.dzr a  ^  0
where r  is the interest rate. The coefficient 0 1 (7  —r) captures the m ean revert­
ing effect, and dz,. is a standard  W iener increment. Applying a stochastic 
Taylor series expansion on the resulting cost function with respect to the
II
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initial sta te  yields a partia l differential equation of the type
p V { x , r )  -  pVx{x ,r)  -  a ( j  -  r ) y .( x ,r )  (3.7)
(Jff
2  r) ^x,rYxr (x, t )  g (x ,r )  =  (7 (x ,r).
This is solved using the  “smooth pasting” and “value m atching” conditions 
to  obtain  the cost function
V { u , r ) { x  — u ) k ~ , u ^ x
{p -j- q:)~^[x7’ +  a j x / p  +  (p +  a)~^pr  
y (x , r) =  + ^ 7 a ( l  +  p(p +  a)"^)/p^  +  0-3,^/^] +  O ^ x ^ u
—p x j p  — pp /p  + d ^  X ^  0
V (d ,r) +  (d — x)k^, x ^  d.
The above solutions to (3.7) do not necessarily correspond to the assum p­
tions m ade in Sm ith (1989). Consider the solution for the region 0  ^  x ^  a. 
This is only valid if e,- — 0, i G. if the  stochastic component of interest rates 
is removed. But this would imply th a t interest rates are determ inistic. In 
fact a meaningful solution to (3.7) can only be obtained if « (q  — r) < 0. If 
a ( j  — r) >  0 , then the anti diffusion effect of this coefficient would cause 
extrem e instabilities. This effectively implies as t -> 0 0  interest rates will 
be unbounded and negative. Consider the solutions for V (x ,r)  in the re­
gions X ^  d, and u ^  x. These like Constantinides and Richard (1978) do 
not satisfy the differential equation (3.7). Hence V(u,?^) +  (x — u)k~ and 
V (d ,r)  ff (d — x)&+ cannot be solutions to (3.7).
These inconsistencies along w ith the heuristically m otivated “sm ooth past­
ing” condition may explain why Sm ith (1989) does not yield any significantly 
different results to Constantinides and Richard (1978). If interest rates over
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3.5 .1  A n Em pirical Survey
Artis and Lewis (1976) estim ate a first order partial adjustm ent model, and 
look at the stability of the estim ated coefficients for the period 1963(2) to
.'4
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tim e become negative and grow unboundedly, agents after a finite period of 
tim e will hold all their wealth in cash. This effectively reduces the tim e hori­
zon under consideration to be a finite one. Assuming th a t cry =  0 elim inates 
any inertial responses th a t may occur due to  interest ra te  uncertain ty  from 
the model, effectively reducing the model to a type similar to Constantinides 
and R ichard (1978). Therefore it is not surprising th a t Sm ith (1989), like 
previous models, concludes th a t the dynam ic process governing aggregate 
money dem and is a product of the “chattering” of cash balances between the 
targets and thresholds.
i|
■a:
3.5 Em pirical E vidence
Inventory theoretic money dem and models suggest a stable money dem and 
function and a lagged adjustm ent in the money stock to exogenous expen­
d iture shocks. Here the em pirical evidence is discussed. The literatu re in 
this area is vast. Therefore rather than  provide an exhaustive account of all 
the research done, certain illustrative examples of the most recent work shall 
be discussed. The literatu re  is discussed w ithout any recourse to  problems 
which arise from aggregation bias. However, this issue shall be dealt with in 
the subsection which follows the em pirical survey.
,::K,
1973(1). The rate  of retu rn  on broad money is measured as the difference 
between the own rate  of money and gilts. Risk in all equations is incorpo­
rated  through introducing the variance of bond prices in all equations. They 
find th a t all equations fail the Chow test for the period 1971(1)-1973(1). For 
broad money this instability extends over a much longer period. A rtis and
Lewis (1976) argue th a t these instabilities are caused by disequilibrium  in the
_money m arket. Hendry (1979,1985) studies the dem and for transactions bal­
ances in the non-bank private sector. It is assumed th a t the long run dem and 
for M l is determ ined by real income and an opportunity  cost which is consid­
ered to be the 3 m onth local authority  rate. The findings suggest a short run 
income elasticity of less than  0.5. The error-correction component has a one 
to one relationship between the money stock, prices and income indicating a 
long run income elasticity of money of unity. An interesting finding is th a t 
velocity is negatively correlated to real money balances, suggesting a smaller 
a zone of inertia  w ith increased velocity. Evidence of a lagged adjustm ent in 
the money stock is also found. M ilbourne (1983), and Cuthbertson (1986) ef­
fectively confirm these findings. C uthbertson and Taylor (1991) suggest th a t 
the the dem and for M l seems to  experience structural changes in the late 
eighties, and also find some instability  in the period 1968(4)-1983(4). Using 
a longer da ta  set Artis and Lewis (1981) show th a t M2 has a long run elas­
ticity  of unity. Hendry and Erricson (1988), examining da ta  for the period 
1867-1975 for broad money, using the Engle-Granger two step cointegrating
technique, obtain a long run income elasticity of unity. M uscatelli (1989)
.dem onstrates th a t whilst M3 has a unitary  long run elasticity M l does not.
The cointegrating vector for M l only appears in the dem and for money equa­
4
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tion, im plying short run divergences from the equilibrium dem and equation. 
It dem onstrated  th a t the M3 equilibrium  error exists in the price, income 
and interest ra te  equations highlighting a more complex adjustm ent pattern . 
H um  and Muscatelli (1991a,b) also find evidence of a small short run income 
elasticity for MG and M4 and a long run elasticity of close to unity.
In the USA most models dem onstrate instabilities in the post 1973 period. 
Goldfeld (1976) finds a stable money dem and function with a low short run 
income elasticity for the periods 1952(2)-1973(4), but in dynam ic simulations 
the model over predicts money balances for the period 1979-1982 (see C uth­
bertson (1985)). Laidler (1980) finds th a t M2 is much less stable than  M l, 
which is interesting because in this period the targeted aggregate was M l. 
Gordon (1984) uses an ADL-ECM approach to model the dem and for narrow 
money, bu t finds considerable instability  in the estim ated equations. A com­
prehensive account for narrow money is provided by B aba et al. (1988) for 
the periods 1960(2)-1984(2). They find a short run income elasticity which is 
0.34 and a long run elasticity of 0.5, the interesting aspect about this study 
are the  various measures of opportunity  costs used.
The em pirical evidence is clearly mixed. The perceived stability  or instability 
of the money stock clearly depends on the specification of the money dem and 
equation and the kind of statistical techniques used, for exam ple GLS, ADL- 
ECM or the Engle-Granger two step technique. There exists clear evidence 
of lagged adjustm ent, however, a significant m inority of the surveyed litera­
tu re  seems to find an unstable money dem and function. W hilst the former is 
consistent w ith agents using a target threshold inventory m anagem ent tech­
nique, the la tte r does not support this view. Theoretical models need to
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account for these two differing views on how the money stock behaves in 
order to be consistent w ith the em pirical evidence.
3.5 .2  A ggregation  Bias
The previous section draws conclusions on the  validity of micro money de­
m and models based on the results derived from macro aggregate em pirical 
models. However, there exist a num ber of problems associated with recon­
ciling both  these approaches. A large body of the theoretical econom etric 
literatu re  addresses the issue of aggregation bias, which is defined as being 
the deviation of macro param eters from the average of the corresponding 
micro param eters, in detail highlighting some of the im portant issues which 
need to  be dealt with. See Pesaran, Pierse and K um ar (1989), and, Lee, 
Pesaran and Pierse (1990).
Consider the following disaggregated model
F/a : yi =  X il?i-f Ui i =  1,2, • • • , ?n. (3.8)
yi is a n X 1 vector of the dependent variable, Xi is a x A: m atrix  of 
observations on the regressors in (3.8) and /?i is a A; x 1 vector of coefficients
and Ui is the associated disturbance term . The aggregate equation, which 
satisfies the K lien-N ataf consistency condition is
Hb. : ya =  X aba +  Va- (3.9)
'4
and m m
y .  = Z , Y i  Xa =  X ;X i .
1=1 i=l 191
ba is a A: X 1 vector of aggregate coefficients. The basic test of aggregation 
concerns itself w ith the problem  of
m
74 : )/j = y]X iA -X aba = 0.
The test statistic  J) is assumed to be a Gaussian variable. There exist many 
reasons for the null hypothesis H,p being rejected most of which result from 
the micro dynamics of the variables concerned. Structural breaks in the micro 
d a ta  for specific dependent variables yi may lead to the null hypothesis being 
rejected. Misspecification of either the aggregate or disaggregate models 
could be another im portant factor. Furtherm ore, there exists a large array of 
micro based estim ation issues which could lead to either a significant upward 
or downward bias in the com puted values of both the long and short run 
elasticities of the real money stock with respect to the interest ra te  or income. 
Aggregation bias could also enter when one moves from a narrow m easure 
of money to a broader measure. The inferences drawn from the  em pirical 
literatu re  m ust consider this problem before accepting or rejecting hypothesis 
based on the results derived in the current micro based theoretical literature.
3.6 C oncluding Rem arks
The inventory theoretic approach generates targets and thresholds using a 
dual asset m anagem ent framework for only risk-neutral agents. The effects 
of changes in macroeconomic variables only affect the money stock through 
the associated opportunity  costs of holding money. Although this approach 
yields significant insights into how the transactions motive affects the aggre­
gate money stock and captures the precautionary motive for holding money
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in cases of risk neutrality; it does not analyse the effects of risk. This may 
explain why some of the results described above may not necessarily be com­
pelling as alternative approaches, or be consistent with the em pirical evi­
dence. Clearly the contentious issue of instability in the em pirical literatu re 
needs to be dealt w ith in models of the target threshold type described in 
this chapter if these models are to  cover the gam ut of accum ulated evidence.
One direction in which the theoretical literatu re could develop is to consider 
a different type of agent such as a risk aver ter. The non-linearities caused by 
a concave utility  function could significantly alter the ‘n ea t’ results obtained 
in existing models. Liquidity preference models developed by M arkowitz 
(1952), (1959), Tobin (1958) Feldstein (1969) and Courakis (1988), and also 
expected utility  theory would be the natu ra l starting  point here. The Lu­
cas critique offers some promise in this direction. A sound m athem atical 
approach to  solving these problems may also yield differing results to the 
current heuristically m otivated techniques used.
Chapter 4
O ptim al M oney Holdings
4.1 Introduction
Transaction money dem and models explain the sensitivity of money balances 
to interest rates, and, the lagged adjustm ent of m onetary aggregates to exoge­
nous changes in macroeconomic variables through a dual asset optim isation 
approach. The agent, usually assumed to be a risk neutral firm, optim ally 
selects a portfolio consisting of an interest earning illiquid asset and cash in 
the presence of transaction costs and an exogenously specified stream  of cash 
flows. On the other hand, risk aversion models represent money holdings as 
a com ponent of a portfolio of assets, optim ally selected by an agent to m ax­
imise his u tility  of wealth, trading off risk and return. This chapter links these 
two ideas to determ ine the optim al portfolio choice of a risk averter in the 
presence of stochastic shocks to  asset prices and an equilibrium  net income 
stream . Numerical solutions are obtained for the optim al zone of inaction 
using a utility  m axim isation framework. The results do not yield the well 
behaved inertial responses derived in conventional cost m inim isation prob­
94
lems. The m ultiple optim a observed dem onstrates th a t the optim al value of 
waiting for going long or short on cash discretely varies despite holding the 
underlying param eters and risk preferences constant. This clearly indicates 
th a t a one off change in a key macroeconomic variable will result in several 
discrete adjustm ents being m ade to the money stock over a long period of 
tim e. This is also confirmed by the intuition behind the popular General 
To Specific (GTS) em pirical modelling technique. The use of flexible lags 
in form ulating the money dem and equation in the presence of a m ultiplicity 
of accessible long run equilibrium  relationships allows for the possibility of 
an exogenous shock forcing the economy onto a new equilibrium. Of course, 
the  GTS m ethod a priori allows for only a unique long run equilibrium  re­
lationship, thus discounting the existence of m ultiple optim ising strategies. 
However, the use of some kind of spectral estim ation technique will overcome 
this lim itation. Based on the varying lags of the error correction mechanism 
found in the current em pirical literature, there exists strong evidence to  be­
lieve in the presence of more than  a single long run equilibrium  relationship.
Section 2  provides a brief illustration of risk aversion models and highlights 
their sim ilarity to transactions money dem and models of the M iller-Orr type. 
A simple exam ple is also provided. Section 3 sets out the model, and the 
underlying assumptions. The initial value problem is solved in Section 4. Al­
though this deals w ith a very special case, its values are necessary to obtain 
a numerical solution to the general problem. Finally, numerical solutions 
obtained by solving the model are presented in Section 5. All the technical 
detail is relegated to the Appendices and Technical Annexures.
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4.2 R isk Aversion M odels vs. Stochastic Trans­
action M oney D em and M odels
Risk aversion liquidity preference models analyse the optim al portfolio choice 
of a risk averter. Given a risk preference, an initial level of wealth and 
a wealth constraint, the agent is faced w ith the problem of allocating his 
w ealth among a portfolio of assets which maximises his u tility  (of wealth) 
over a given tim e horizon. This allocation is made among both  risky and 
risk free assets. Holding assets with a higher risk may increase his return , 
b u t at the same tim e increase the possibility of a capital loss. Money on the 
other hand does not yield a retu rn  but is also risk free and thus may prove to 
be a ttrac tive  as a component of the portfolio (see M arkowitz (1952), (1959), 
Tobin (1958), Feldstein (1969), Dalai (1983)). Herein lies the justification for 
agents holding money as a component of a portfolio of assets. It is explicitly 
dem onstrated here th a t risk aversion and th e  initial level of wealth plays an 
im portan t role in determ ining the optim al choice of cash and the interest 
earning asset.
In m any ways risk aversion and transaction money dem and models overlap. 
An optim al portfolio selection exercise equates the loss in m arginal utility  
to an agent as a result holding a portfolio of a risk free and a risky in­
terest earning asset to the gain in marginal u tility  arising from both  these 
assets. A risk averter attaches a dim inishing marginal u tility  to each unit 
of additional wealth. A change in u tility  resulting from a change in wealth 
specifically depends on the level of wealth itself. Hence wealth needs to be 
explicitly included in an optimal portfolio selection exercise for a risk averter
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Also assume th a t at the end of the current period cash flows can cause the 
stock of cash to be in one of three states, i.e. m i with probability p, m 2 w ith 
probability q and m 3 w ith probability 1 —p — q. The states have the ordering 
m 3 < m 2 <  mo <  m i. Then the expected wealth of the agent a t the end of 
period can be characterised as
P w (l +  r) +  m i +  g w (l +  ?') +  m 2 {1 — p — q) u j(l +  r) +  msj
5'
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like Tobin (1958) does. On the other hand, risk neutral agents a ttach  a con­
stan t m arginal u tility  to increasing levels of wealth. Thus norm alising the 
w ealth level and the interest income earned with it to zero will not change 
the  optim al portfolio decision of the agent. This is what M iller-Orr and sub­
sequent stochastic transaction money dem and models do. The introduction 
of a stochastic interest ra te  in Sm ith (1989) allows for a price varying asset.
In fact M iller-Orr explicitly conclude th a t the closed form solutions obtained 
are analogous to a dual asset portfolio selection exercise for firms w ith risk 
neutral preferences.
Consider a simple exam ple in which an agent who is initially endowed with 
an interest earning asset of am ount w and a stock of cash mo. Assume th a t w  
earns a ra te  of return  r  per tim e period, payable on its outstanding balance 
at the end of each period after all portfolio adjustm ents have been made.
I
The distribution of probabilities in this example implies th a t only one state 
above and two below the current sta te  are accessible. Suppose th a t the agent 
can only hold a quantity  of money th a t is either less than  m i, or greater than 
m 3 . If the agent has a cash level of ?tii at the end of the period he will need 
to  convert money into the interest earning asset. On the other hand if he has 
m 3 he will need to convert some of the illiquid asset into cash. If the agent
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has m 2 he m ay or may not wish to draw on his illiquid asset. B ut clearly he 
faces an increased chance of h itting  m 3 in the following tim e period.
Let the agent convert a quantity  of money into the illiquid asset in sta te  
1, and in states 2 and 3 w ithdraw am ounts m^ and m^ , respectively. The 
expected cost of these transfers are given by the function C{ma,mb,mc)  
where C{.) is an increasing function of its arguments. The agent’s expected 
payoff will be
P {w +  m a)(l +  r) +  (m i -  m„) -  C(m a, m^, m^)
+ g {w — m i){ l  +  r) +  (m 2 T  m&) -  C(m^, m^, m^)
+ (1  - p - q )  {w ~  m c)(l -f r) +  (m 3 +  m j  -  C{ma,  m&, m j  
If the agent wishes to maximise his expected utility, he faces the problem  
m ax p U (  (u; T m a)(1 +  r) +  (m i -  ?72a) — ^(m fl, 7726, me) )771a,mj, ,me \ L  J /
-\rqu(^ {w -  mb ) { l  ~\r r ) { m2 +  mb) ~  C { m a , m b , m c )  )
T(1 - p  -  q)U  ^  (w -  m j ( l  +  r) +  (m 3 +  m^) -  C(m a, mb, m^) ^ .
If the  re tu rn  on the illiquid asset r  is normalised to  zero, the problem  becomes
m ax p U l  {w-h ma) + {mi — ma){l -  r) ~  C{ma,mb,mc)  ) m a , m h , mc  \ l  J /
-\-qlI {w ~  mb) +  (mg +  m 6)(l -  r) -  C(ma, m^, m^)  ^
+ ( l - p - ç ) t / ^  (u; — me) +  (m 3 +  m c)(l -  r) -  (7(ma,îu&,mc)
If the agent is risk neutral, it can be easily be seen th a t the first order 
conditions for maximising the above equation with respect to m^, mb and me 
will be same as those obtained from
I
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m ax p(rm a) -  q{rmb) -  (1  -  p -  ç ) ( r m j  -  (7(ma,mj,, m^),ma,tnb,mc
or
m in -p{rm a)  +  q{riJib) +  (1 -  p -  q){rmc) +  (7(ma, me).
This is a straight forward cost m inim isation exercise, similar to the M artin­
gale framework utilised by Miller-Orr. However, if the agent is a risk-averter, 
then it is easily seen th a t w explicitly enters into the first-order optim ising 
condition similar to  liquidity preference models. In fact the only difference 
between this exam ple and the liquidity preference models discussed earlier, 
o ther than  the obvious simplification, is th a t the risky asset here is cash. In 
the liquidity preference models the interest earning illiquid asset is the risky 
asset.
U ndoubtedly this analysis dem onstrates th a t cost m inim isation stochastic 
transaction money dem and models not only analyse the effects of cash shocks, 
bu t also im plicitly derive the optim al portfolio choice of risk neutral agents. 
They also contain a wealth constraint, which enters through the  specification 
of the interest ra te  and the shocks to cash. Effectively transaction  money 
dem and models of the M iller-Orr type and the  liquidity preference models 
pioneered by Tobin (1958) are two sides of the  same coin. The first difference 
lies in the  transfer of risk from the illiquid interest earning asset in liquidity 
preference models to cash in Miller-Orr. The second is th a t the la tte r looks 
at risk neutral agents, whereas the former considers risk-aversion.
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4.3 The M oney D em and M odel
=  \{rt  -  l )Pr- i{ t)  -  (A (n) +  +  7 (n  +  l)Prt+i{t)- (4.1)
Î
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Each agent is assumed to be endowed with an initial level of wealth, which 
consists of an illiquid asset w and cash m. w earns a retu rn  in the form of
interest, which could be negative, whereas m  does not. The objective of the 
agent is to  maximise
P O O
/ e {gPr t)H{-~mt) ] )d t ,Jo
where U{.) is an increasing and strictly  concave Von Neum ann-M orgenstern 
u tility  function satisfying the conditions V(0) =  0, and f7'(oo) =  0. rt is 
the in terest ra te , g is the constant overdraft prem ium , and i J ( —m*) is a 
Heavy si de step function which helps capture the overdraft charges.
In terest rates are assumed to follow a Poissonlan B irth-D eath type process 
whose probabilistic evolution is given by
.This implies th a t at tim e t  if the interest ra te  is n  (n  ~  . . . ,1 ,2 ,. . .) ,  then 
the probability of transition  —> Tf -T 1 in the inhnitesim ally small tim e 
interval {t +  di) is given by X(rt)dt +  o (a ) ,  where o{dt) contains higher order 
term s of dt. Similarly, if at tim e t the interest rate is n  (rj =  ..., 1 ,2 ,...) , the 
probability of the transition  rt n —1 in the interval (t-i-dt) is 'y{rt)dt-\-o[dt). 
The probability of a transition  to any other sta te  other than  a neighbouring 
sta te  is o{dt). The probability of interest rates rem aining constant is 1 — 
{A(r^) +  7 (r^)}dt -f- o{dt). It follows th a t if the evolution of the transition  
density function for interest rates is given by (4.1), it can be shown th a t 
expected interest rates evolve according to the law
^  \{rt)  -  q (n )  To =  r. (4.2)
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The assum ption of non-constant coefficient is driven by the feature th a t net 
cash flows at each point in tim e are dependent on the level of wealth [ m tp w t)  
agents hold. The inconvenience losses which arise from cash asset transfers 
are
-f A;+u if u  ^  0 
I<- +  k " n  if u  g  0,
B{n)
where
u
See G ardiner (1985. pp. 237-238) for a derivation of (4.2).
Net cash flows follow a W iener process w ith non-constant coefficients, i.e.
d m t  —  +  W t ) d t  -f- a { 7Ti t  +  W t ) d z t  mo — m  E { a ,  6). (4.3)
b  — u [Î Xt — b ,  
a  —  I i f  X t  =  a .
The vectors (6 — u) and (a — I) are the size of cash transfers at the upper and 
lower boundaries respectively, and K ~ , k~ are constants. The loss in 
u tility  arising from these transfers is U{B{u))  since B (u )  is an unrecoverable 
outflow of wealth. Obviously if ^  0 agents will hold all their wealth as m  
to avoid incurring unrecoverable transfer costs. It can be seen easily seen th a t 
in this case (4.3) reduces to a geom etric W iener process. It is obvious th a t w 
will im plicitly depend on the control vector and the sta te  variable. However, 
it only enters the HJB equation through its inhomogeneous term , th a t is 
the instantaneous u tility  function U. Equation (4.3) has been form ulated to 
elim inate the possibility th a t the to ta l wealth of agents will be negative since 
a negative wealth level is precluded by some utility  functions. In others it 
yields economically unacceptable solutions.
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The objective of the agent is to arrive at a policy
P =  {Ti,Ui;r2,U2; • • ■ • • •},
of a series of stopping tim es and transfers which maximise his infinite horizon 
u tility  subject to cash transfers u, i.e.
y ( m , r ; u )  =  E
supu
■ POO
. Jo dt
(4.4)+  Y ,e~'"‘U{B{ui)) m,r,0
î=0
where p is the ra te  of tim e preference, or the subjective discount ra te  which 
is assumed to be strictly  positive.
It can be shown using I to ’s Lemma th a t (4.4) m ust satisfy the Ham ilton- 
Bellm an-Jacobi equation
(w -}- 777.)^pV {m ,r ;  u ) ------------------- u) -  p{w  -f m )W i(m ,r; u) (4.5)
—(A(r) — 'y{r))Vr{m,7- u) — U{w -f 7u[l — (p +  r ) i7 (—m)]) =  0.
In obtaining (4.5) it is assumed, as w ith any other stochastic control prob­
lem, th a t the  probability transacting in the first inhnitesim ally small tim e 
interval [0,dt] is zero. Hence the absence of any transactions costs in the 
inhomogeneous term  U{w +  7u[l — (p T r ) H { —7n)]).
4.4 The Initial Value Problem
Equation (4.5) is a parabolic partial differential equation. To solve it, the 
behaviour of V"(.) needs to be explicitly specified when r  =  0. O btaining 
a profile of f/( .)  when r  =  0 is referred to as the initial value problem . Of
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V { M)  = E M ,0 (4.7)
Equation (4.7) gives the  expected utility  over an infinite horizon when cash 
(wealth) flows are specified by (4.6). N aturally (4.7) ceases to be a control 
problem  because both  opportunity  and transfer costs vanish.
Expanding (4.7) in a Taylor series using Ito ’s Lemma yields
p V [ M )  -  Ç m ^Vm m {M)  -  i x M V (M )  -  U{ M)  =  0. (4.8)
Solving (4.8) will give the profile of V ( M )  when r  — 0.
Equation (4.8) is a differential equation of the Cauchy-Euler type and can
be shown to have a solution of the  form
course, this profile will be independent of the dynamics of the  problem  and 
will only be given by economic argum ents.
As sta ted  earlier, if the ra te  of return  on w  is either zero or less, agents will 
store all wealth in m to  avoid unrecoverable wealth outflows in the form of 
transaction costs, and negative rates of re tu rn  on w. Since u; — 0, r  will 
cease to  influence V(.). Obtaining this y ( .)  will provide the solution to the 
initial value problem.
The W iener process governing net cash flows now becomes
dMt = f iMtdt  4-  aMtdzi  Mq = M  Mt G [0 , o o ) ,  (4.6)
where M  = w m.  The infinite horizon u tility  function will be
1
cr^{a2 -  Oil) Jo 
1 r°^
 r  /  dæ,cr^{a2 -  a i )  J m
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See Appendix G for the derivation of (4.9).
Critical to  this problem is the behaviour at V ( M )  . It is obvious th a t
M - O
U( M)  =  0 by the defining property of a utility  function. Since the 
M = o
evolution of M  is given by a geometric Weiner process, if initially M  =  0,
then Mt  =  0. As a result it is clear th a t V (M ) \  = 0. Effectively if an
\ M —0
agent is endowed w ith a wealth level of zero, the geometric W iener process 
constrains bo th  his wealth and utility  over the infinite horizon to  be zero. 
Equation (4.9) needs to have this property to  be economically consistent.
It can be dem onstrated th a t 
and
lim   dx — 0.
m - 4 0  cr^{a2 -  a i )  J m
Since U{ M)  =  0, then provided th a t A =  0 it is clear th a t 
M = o
lim y (M ) =  0.M-^0+
See Appendix H for the proof. As a result (4.9) now becomes
9M«2- V ( M )  =  ----------- r U ( y ) y - ‘-^+“^ U y  (4.10)a^[a2 -  CKi) Jo
P O O
J m(J^{a2 — Oil) M
In order for V { M)  to be congruous with the assumed attribu tes  of U{M) ,  it 
m ust also satisfy the condition limM-^oo V \ M )  — 0, i.e. if an agent is initially 
endowed with infinite wealth, then his m arginal infinite horizon utility  w ith 
respect to his initial endowment m ust be zero. This intuitively follows from 
the property th a t limM- -^oo U'{M) = 0.
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Differentiating (4.10) w ith respect to M  it is clear th a t
—y '(M )  =  T ------------- r I  dya \ a 2  -  ai)  J q
See Appendix I for interm ediate steps. It can be dem onstrated th a t
>M^ « 2 -1  /
M —>00
and
p
lim M “=-‘ /  C ( y ) r < ‘+“=* dy =  0,W-+  do
'O O
lim  /  {7(p)y"f^+"i) dy = 0.
M -J-oo J M
See A ppendix J  for in term ediate steps. Hence
lim  V '{M )  =  B a i  lim
M —j-oo M - aoo
Setting B  ~  Q will yield
lim  V '{M )  = 0.
M ~ a o o
This satisfies the m arginal u tility  condition imposed on the u tility  function. 
Thus
n  r p M- V ( M )  =  — -------------   M«2 /(jffag -  CKi)
Now let « 2  — « 1  =  —2(7. Then the solution to (4.8) satisfying the properties
 p o o
./o J m
V { M )  = 0  and limM-j-oo W (M ) =  0 will be
1
M = 0
M
y (M )
PlVl
Jo
(4.11)
0-2(7
/  U(y)y-(^+«^) dyJM
For (4.11) to be consistent w ith the conditions imposed on U{M)^  it also 
needs to  have the  property limM-).oo F (M ) =  oo. This follows from the
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choice theoretic assum ption limM-^ooU(M) =  oo. It requires th a t, if an 
agent is endowed w ith an infinite quantity  of wealth his instantaneous u tility  
at tim e zero will be unbounded. Since an infinite wealth level cannot ever be 
exhausted to a finite quantity, even over an infinite tim e horizon, it follows 
th a t the infinite horizon u tility  function m ust also be unbounded. It can 
be shown th a t (4.11) satisfies this condition, and is therefore the com plete 
solution (4.8). See Appendix K for the proof of limM-)-oo V { M )  =  oo.
E quation (4.11) can be further simplified into a form th a t will make it 
am enable to numerical evaluation. Let y = M x  m  both integrals of (4.11). 
Then V ( M )  simplifies to 
1V { M )  = Jo
p o o
•1  p o o1
a^C
Clearly
dx —U {M x)x0:2
■U{M) M
«2
œ
4 I U '{M x)x  dx.
« 2  Jo
It is also obvious th a t
«1
U(M) M
OO po o
dx
4- —  / U '(M x )x  dx. a i  0:1 Ji
Hence, V { M )  can be further reduced to
1V ( M )  - U (M ) M 1------02 02 [  U'{Mx)t  Jo
-Û!2 dx
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+ K  r  U ' ( M x ) x - ‘"  dx
O tl  CXi 7i
In the  la tte r integral on the the R.H.S., setting x = I j z  yields
j: '0U '(M x )x  dx = U
L
M ■dz
z /  \ z
dz.z  J
It is also clear th a t
_!____ l_
Oi 02
02 — Ol 
O1O2 
Co-2
Therefore V { M )  can expressed as
V { M )  = 1 U {M )C a^  , M  p+  ■O2 Jo U '{M x)x  dx~\-
M
Ol Jo
«1—2U' dz
Letting v = M / z  it can be shown th a trM  I z  Jo yOl
See Appendix L for in term ediate steps. Therefore the reduced form of the 
solution to the initial value problem  becomes
V { M ) U{M)  1 -----------r Jo
M
0 2
dx
Equation (4.12) is the exact expression to com pute the profile for the  infinite 
horizon utility  function for specific u tility  functions for given levels of M  
when r  — 0.
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4.5 N um erical Solutions
Many functional forms could be substitu ted  for U{M).  Here it assumed th a t
t/(M ) =  ln (l +  M ), (4.13)
where ln (l +  M ) is a constant relative risk aversion u tility  function. Now, 
from (4.13) it is clear th a t
vU'
Hence
Therefore
(vU 'b
I  V
(1 + vy
(  j  u'{Mx)x-'^  ^d x + y  j  z'=‘^ -yvu'(vy dz
7o y r r w
Jo 1 H
1
a 2 J  1 +  M x  ' a l  Jq z^(l +
1 x~^^ , 1
0 2  J   +  M x  ^ a j  Jo {M  +  z Y
Substitu ting this into (4.12) will yield the solution to the initial value prob­
lem for a logarithm ic u tility  function.
A nalytical solutions of the  type described in the literature would necessitate 
the  discarding of valuable inform ation in both  (4.5) and (4.12). Usually such 
solutions also require the use of strong assum ptions which could detract from 
reality. To overcome these lim itations (4.5) and (4.12) shall be solved num er­
ically. The num erical algorithm  used here requires a detailed knowledge of
spectral m ethods, integration rules, and optim isation techniques. Therefore
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The integration technique used to obtain a solution to (4.5) requires the 
com putation of the infinite horizon utility  function V { m ,r ,  u) and its partial 
derivatives Vm{'m,r,u.) and Kn.nx(m, r, u) as Chebyshev polynomials. This 
requires the interval m  G (a,b) to  be m apped into 0 G (—1,1), and is done 
through the transform ation
2(m -  a)0 = —  r 1, 0 = arccos(a^).(6 -  a)
109
i;.1-;
Î
all technical detail will be relegated to the Technical Annexures.
A description of how (4.5) is solved is as follows. An agent is endowed with 
some level of illiquid assets w, and cash m  G (u, 6), and follows a control 
policy of the type
f  6  I Î  X t  =  b ,  
y a II Xt = a.
The analysis is restricted to a zero threshold policy because la ter results 
confirm th a t a more general four param eter control policy described in the 
current literatu re  is unlikely to  yield any further insights. Also, the  four 
param eter control policy forms the envelope of the zero threshold policy. 
Therefore a detailed analysis of y ( .)  under a zero threshold policy will also 
reveal the  im portant properties of V(.) under the more general four param eter 
control policy.
The initial endowments enable the com putation of a solution to (4.12) over 
the interval (Ma, Mf,) where = w a, and Mb = w b. Since (4.12) 
is in the form of an integral, its numerical solution is evaluated through a 
Simpson’s rule adaptive integrator. See Technical Annex 2 and the source 
code in Technical Annex 6 for details of this.
Next, the derivatives Vm {M)  and Vm m (M)  are com puted from the  numerical 
solution to (4.12) through collocation differentiation. Once this is done, and 
the probabilistic evolution of interest rates has been specified, i.e.
A(r) -  7 (r) =
> 0 
=  0 
< 0.
the solution to y ( m ,r ,  u ) can be com puted through a fourth order Runge- 
K u tta  integration scheme for r  >  0 utilising the boundary conditions derived 
in C hapter 2. For details on the  R unge-K utta scheme and Chebyshev’s poly­
nomials see Technical Annexures 3,4 and 6. Here a Chebyshev polynomial 
of order twenty is used to estim ate V { in , r ,u ) .  If the com puted solution 
of y ( m ,r ,  u) proves to  be a hill w ith a single m axim a with respect to  the 
boundary values (or controls) a and 6, then this m axim a and the corre­
sponding values of a and b can be deduced by an optim isation routine such 
as BFGS.
4.6 R esults
The results highlight some very interesting properties. Risk averse agents 
w ith identical risk preferences do not have homogenous money dem and func­
tions. The optim al exercise prices at which cash is bought and sold vary by 
discrete am ounts, even if th e  underlying param eters driving asset prices are 
the same. As a result any one off change in a macroeconomic variable will 
result in several discrete adjustm ents being m ade to the money stock over a 
long period of time.
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then the reflecting properties described by the two conditions above ensure an 
equilibrium  interest ra te  of 5 percent per year, i.e. when cos(57rr) =  sin(57rr). 
This also corresponds to the long term  equilibrium interest ra te  observed in 
em pirical studies. The properties of the coefficients are such th a t the further 
away r* is from the equilibrium, the more rapidly it converges to  the equi­
librium , which is also consistent w ith reality. The overdraft prem ium  is set 
a t 2 percent annually. To ensure th a t distortions are not caused by differing 
m arginal rates of substitu tion and transform ation (exclusive of transaction 
costs), p is also set to five percent. The m ean cash flow in each tim e period 
is assumed to be zero, i.e. p = 0.0. This is analogous to assuming th a t the 
agent’s income stream  and consum ption path  are in a long term  equilibrium  
situation, and, any changes to the level of cash is caused by exogenous shocks. 
The standard  deviation a  of the process governing net cash flows is assumed 
to be normalised to 0.05.
Transaction costs are assumed to be linear and asymm etric. The cost of 
selling cash and buying the illiquid asset is assumed to be less than  the cost
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Let A(r) — q (r) , be given dynamically for all r  and assume th a t r is reflected 
upwards when r  =  0, effectively ensuring th a t r  ^  0. This requires th a t
A(0 ) =  1 , and 7 (0 ) — 0 .
Furtherm ore, let r  be reflected downwards when r  =  R, where R  is the upper 
bound of r. Thus
X[R) = 0 , and 7 (R) =  1-
If
A(r) ~  cos(5?rr), and 7 (r) =  sin(57rr),
I
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Figure 4.1: A(r) — 7 (r) Dynamically Given
of selling the illiquid asset and buying cash, which is in line w ith what is 
observed in the  real world where the cost of buying cash is much higher than 
the  costs of selling cash. The proportional cost of selling nit for and the 
cost of selling wt into mt  are assumed to be 1 and 3 percent of the size of 
the transaction respectively. The fixed cost component of transaction costs 
is assumed to  be sym m etric and is set at 0.001 percent of the value of the 
initial portfolio. This is a relative quantity  based on the fact th a t w  has been 
norm alised to be 1.0. It also corresponds to reality where the fixed costs of 
adjusting a portfolio of assets are very small indeed. Initial cash holdings m 
are assum ed to  be zero. These endowments are given exogenously and there­
fore can be arbitrarily  specified. In Figure 4.1 a cross section of the value 
function 1/(77%, r, u) is taken at a =  —0.02 and is plotted against values for 
b G [0.001,0.04]. Clearly I/(77%,r, u ) is undulating, and an optim ising routine
I:'f
I
I
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rs,|'
could converge to  any of the local optim a. Significantly these optim a are not
lum ped together in a localised region, bu t are spread out. The im portant
feature driving this is the constant natu re of cash deposits and withdrawals.
Many param eters such as the size of the withdrawals, p and r  also contribute
towards this. If h is only slightly larger than  the initial cash endowment of
zero, then  the agent is likely to h it the upper boundary more frequently and 
.will be forced to endure frequent and irreversible outflows of wealth in the 
form of transaction costs. As h increases these outflows are likely to  dim inish 
and thus conserve the pool of wealth. As b increases even more the  oppor­
tu n ity  cost associated w ith tolerating a large zone of inaction will take effect 
penalising the agent.
W hy then  the second, and th ird  hills? The answer to this lies in the differ­
ence between the  rate  of tim e preference and the actual ra te  at which wealth 
grows. The key is to understand the intertem poral dynamics of f / (m ,r ,  u).
If the agent is risk neutral, it is easily observed th a t the trade-off between 
the MRS and th e  expected MRT of utility  will be of a linear nature. This fol­
lows naturally  from the linearity of a risk neutral utility  function. In Section
4.2 it was dem onstrated th a t u tility  m axim isation by a risk neutral agent is 
equivalent to cost minim isation. This implies th a t the MRT of a risk neutral 
agent will be independent of his level of wealth, and, only depend on the 
ra te  at which costs evolve. In this problem  holding costs accrue at a rate  
proportional to the expected interest rate. Transaction costs accum ulate at 
the ra te  at which the W iener process exits the continuation region through 
the boundaries a and b. Therefore, it intuitively follows th a t a linear trans­
form ation of the net present value of the sum of these costs will be m inimised
I
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Îfor a choice of a and b a t the turning point of a convex hull.
However, in situations where the agent is risk averse, the concavity of the u til­
ity function imposes a non-linear relationship between the MRS and MRT.
Furtherm ore, it is easily seen th a t the MRT will explicitly depend on wealth 
holdings. As wealth varies the MRT will be either larger, equal to, or, smaller 
than  the  MRS. It is this feature which causes the aperiodic fluctuations in 
V(.). Clearly, if wealth is large, U{.) will also be large. Also, I/(.) will be 
larger when C/(.) is large in earlier tim e periods rather than  in la ter tim e 
periods. This is an obvious effect of the ra te  of tim e preference p. If the 
agent fixes his upper boundary beyond the first optim um  value of 6, then his 
m arginal ra te  of substitu tion (MRS) will be greater than  his m arginal ra te  of 
transform ation (MRT), i.e. M R S  > M R T  (inclusive of transaction  costs). |
This is because the gain in l/( .)  due holding a certain level of illiquid assets 
and excess cash in earlier tim e periods is less than  offset by the gain in u tility  
in la ter periods resulting from the growth in wealth caused by switching some 
of the excess cash into illiquid assets. Effectively, the effect of p dom inates 
th a t of Vt causing R (.) to increase again. The transfer of excess cash into the 
illiquid asset results in unrecoverable losses in the form of transaction costs.
To offset this loss the MRT m ust exceed the MRS. This m ay require a rela­
tionship to be specified between the rate  of tim e preference p, the equilibrium  
rate  of interest, and also the nature of transaction costs. B ut, making this 
link is difficult. Even if such a relationship was specified it m ay only serve to 
dam pen the am plitude and change the  period of the infinite horizon utility  
function. For a link to be m ade one would need to model the com plicated 
feedback relationship between transaction costs, Vt and Wt which would re-
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Figure 4.2: A(r) — 7 (r) =  —1.0
suit in a unique optim a, and, then try  and establish some kind of link with 
p. The concavity of U{.) would almost certainly require such a problem  to 
be numerically solved. To simplify the  problem  it is much easier to make 
an em pirical link between the four param eters as has been done here. The 
concave nature of the u tility  function is clearly the m ajor factor driving the 
oscillatory nature of the solution. If state varying controls were used where 
a and b were allowed to dynam ically evolve rather than  being held constant, 
it could be the case th a t these hills vanish. However, again, there is no a 
priori reason to believe this.
In the previous exam ple it was assumed th a t interest rates converged to an 
equilibrium  ra te  of 5 percent per year. Here it is assumed th a t A(r) — 7 (r) — 
— 1.0. As a result expected interest rates follow a downward course, and in
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the long run push the agent towards holding all his wealth in cash w ith a 
profile of V(.) similar to the initial value problem. However, it can be still 
seen th a t V(.) is undulating due to the various points at which the substitu ­
tion and transform ation dom inate each other. The peaks observed in Figure
4.2 are also of a smaller am plitude and a larger period than  in the  previous 
example. This is because, the variance associated with the ra te  of return  on 
illiquid assets is much less here, and, therefore does not expose the agent to  
the same degree of wealth volatility as before. It can be clearly seen th a t the 
optim al values of waiting increase as the thresholds increase. This follows 
from the property th a t, as tim e increases, expected interest rates will become 
negative and unbounded. Agents will choose not to  opt for small targets be­
cause they will not be able to recover the frequent transfer costs incurred 
through any interest income they may earn. Although this situation is not 
likely, it confirms the validity of the previous set of results and the  underlying 
intuition of the modelling approach used here.
Intuitively it sounds plausible th a t increasing the discount ra te  will front 
load the problem. This would imply th a t, for the same u tility  function, both 
the value of of V{.)  and the am plitude of the aperiodic fluctuations observed 
in the two previous examples m ust decrease. Indeed, this is exactly what 
is observed. To make this feature obvious an annual discount ra te  of 100 
percent was chosen. The dam pening effect of this can be clearly seen in the 
Figure 4.3.
Diminished risk sensitivity should yield an optim al region th a t exhibits less 
volatility. Figure 4.4 plots the profile of V(.) against b for another utility  
function with constant relative risk aversion. U{.) is an exponential of the
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type U(x) = where ^  =  0.9. Risk aversion requires 0 <  *0 <  1. The 
agent exhibits less risk sensitivity as 1. The results clearly confirm
th a t stability  increases w ith decreasing risk aversion. Thus reinforcing the 
validity of the modelling approach used here.
These findings shed a new light on how agents behave. The existence of m ul­
tiple optim a clearly dem onstrates th a t the optim al value of waiting for going 
long or short on cash discretely varies, even with homogenous risk preferences 
and constant param eters. It also gives rise to a series discretely varying lags 
between a one off change in a macroeconomic variable and the money stock 
being adjusted. Significantly, the aggregate money dem and function will 
exhibit discreet jum ps over the different triggers at which agents choose to 
exercise their option to  go long or short on cash.
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In m ost rational expectations models the existence of m ultiple equilibria is 
associated with either unstable or saddle point solutions (in higher dim en­
sion models). Most of these solutions, for example the divergent dynam ic 
pa th  specified by the  complex roots of an ordinary differential in a standard  
two dim ensional macroeconomic model can be dismissed through a partial 
equilibrium  argum ent. Of course these require extrem ely strong assum p­
tions th a t rely on a degree of foresight and rationality  th a t is unobservable 
in practice. In contrast, none of the observed optim a here are unstable, and 
therefore cannot be dismissed through a partia l equilibrium argum ent. W hat 
is exactly the fundamental solution here is not clear since all of them  share 
the unique feature th a t the m arginal u tility  of the infinite horizon utility  
function w ith respect to  a boundary is stationary.
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If agents learn by doing, does this ensure th a t agents converge to the global 
optim um ? R ational expectations models have studied the possibility of 
agents converging to an unstable solution under simple linear learning m od­
els. De Canio (1979) and Evans (1985) argue tha t agents use observations 
over a finite period say T  to estim ate the param eters of a system. They then 
use this for another period of duration T  after which they recom pute the 
param eters again. Bray (1982) assumes th a t agents recursively estim ate the 
param eters driving the system  each period through a least squares m ethod. 
The outcome of both these techniques is th a t agents converge to the funda­
m ental solution as they continue to  refine their estim ates of the  param eters. 
Of course in this model there is no learning to be done because the exact 
values of the exogenous param eters driving the system are assumed to be 
known w ith perfect foresight.
If the m ultiple equilibria observed here cannot be dismissed through learn­
ing or by using stability argum ents, how does an agent converge to a global 
optim a? If all optim a share the same property, th a t is the m arginal u tility  of
the infinite horizon u tility  function with respect to a boundary is stationary,
. . . .even the most advanced optim isation routines such as the Quasi-Newtonian 
BFGS technique will not be capable of distinguishing a global optim um  from 
local optim a. The only way In which one could arrive at the global optim um  
would be to evaluate the infinite horizon u tility  function for all possible val­
ues of boundaries, which is clearly unbounded, and then use some kind grid 
search technique. Of course a grid search technique is an ad-hoc m ethod 
by which the value of one optim a is compared with the value of another. If 
the u tility  function is not evaluated for all possible values of boundaries and
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thresholds, it could be the case th a t a grid search m ethod only returns a 
local optim a. A m ultiplicity of optim a in a u tility  function could m ake this a 
very costly technique to use. In fact its ad-hoc non-scientific nature, its high 
cost, and the near impossibility of  pinning down a global optima reinforces 
the notion that agents are most likely to converge to the local optima that is 
most accessible to them.
4.7 Concluding Rem arks
In th is model it has been dem onstrated th a t, under tim e invariant controls, 
the  MRS and MRT effect alternatively dom inate each other over certain 
ranges of the control vector yielding solutions with m ultiple optim a. This 
shows th a t the optim al value of waiting for buying and selling cash discretely 
varies, despite all o ther param eters and risk preferences being held constant. 
The aggregate dem and function for a population of homogenous agents will 
not converge to  the well behaved functional forms hypothesised in the pre­
ceding literature. If agents converge to different optim a, the full effect of an 
exogenous shock may not be felt all at once as the current literature sug­
gests, due to all agents adjusting their targets simultaneously, but take effect 
slowly a t staggered tim e intervals. Its full effect taking tim e to work through 
the whole economy. This also sounds intuitively correct. In earlier models 
this effect could be only be explained by assuming th a t initial endowments 
were heterogonously d istributed among agents. This model provides an ex­
planation of the slow adjustm ent of targets by showing th a t agents, within a
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homogenous framework, may optimally vary the extent to which they hedge 
their risk.
Naturally, the assumptions m ade here could be further expanded by utilising 
sta te  varying controls, bu t in the absence of a theoretical basis providing 
the natu ra l boundary conditions for such a tool, the results obtained here 
could prove to be the most accurate approxim ation of the syntheses between 
the  inventory theoretic approach to modelling the transactions dem and for 
money, and the risk sensitive wealth m axim isation approach to  modelling.
«
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Chapter 5
C onclusions
I
This thesis presents three im portan t results, and, a critique of the  existing 
inventory theoretic money dem and models which sheds a com pletely different 
light on them . C hapter 1 provides an analysis of the heuristically m otivated 
“sm ooth pasting” condition which is used in stochastic “im pluse” control 
models as an optim isation tool and derives the natural boundary conditions 
for solving such problems. The necessary first-order optim isation conditions 
are also discussed. C hapter 2 deals w ith a simple application of the “sm ooth 
pasting” condition, highlighting some of its shortcomings. Unique insights 
into the Dixit menu cost model are obtained. Also previously assumed prop­
erties are proven. Chapter 3 analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the ex­
isting body of literatu re  on the transactions dem and for money. Key models 
are dissembled and critically analysed. Some of them  which were previously 
not subject to  the same degree of scrutiny, now do not hold up. In C hapter 
4 a m ore robust and logically sound alternative to the existing approach is 
presented. It tries to reconcile the two different findings of the em pirical 
literature; th a t is the lagged adjustm ent of the money stock to changes in
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5.1 Chapter 1
.A
:
i t
other variables, and, the perceived instability  of the money dem and equation.
Concepts from the existing transaction money dem and models are gelled to­
gether w ith those from liquidity preference models to obtain a p a tte rn  of |
optim ising behaviour which goes against the ‘n ea t’ results obtained in the
current literature.
The results in this chapter can be sum m arised as follows. “Sm ooth past- |
ing” condition is a heuristically m otivated condition which is absent from y
the  stochastic optim al control framework for dealing with “im pulse” con- |
tro l problems. This chapter provides a more rigorous approach to  solving 
such problems. However, la ter results in C hapter 2 confirm th a t bo th  tech- v
niques yield the same strategy. The results also confirm the “value m atching” |
condition as being the natural boundary condition for “im pulse” controlled 
problems. It dem onstrates th a t the value of stopping at a sta te  and exercising 
an “im pulse” control m ust equal the net present value of holding costs ac­
crued up to th a t state. This also sounds intuitively correct. If the to ta l value 
of exercising a stopping decision exceeded the net present value of holding 
costs accrued until this decision was m ade, it would clearly be sub-optim al 
to stop. Conversely if the net present value of holding costs exceeded the 
net present value of the stopping decision, it would im ply th a t the stopping 
decision should have been taken earlier. O ptim isation with respect to the 
set of admissible controls occurs as w ith any other stochastic optim al control 
problem .
Î
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5.3 Chapter 3
The ‘n ea t’ results which characterise m ost models is also com pared w ith the
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I
5.2 Chapter 2
A solution to the Dixit m enu cost model is obtained using the “value m atch­
ing” and natura l first-order optim isation conditions. Previously assumed 
properties such as symmetricity and the zero threshold policy are now proven 
to be optimal. A link between the intertem poral discount ra te  and the zone 
of inertia  is derived. This could not be deduced from Dixit (1991a) unless 
an em pirical link between variance of the W iener process and the discount 
rate  is specified. Also costs faced by a firm initially lying outside optim al 
zone are quantified, providing firms w ith a clear incentive to transac t down 
to zero. The benefits of following a partial price adjustm ent policy in cases 
where the costs faced by firms are different is also provided. From a technical 
point of view, a more accurate estim ate of the zone of inertia  is obtained. 
The simplifying expansion used in Dixit (1991a) is less accurate.
The key contributions in existing body of literature on the transactions de­
m and for money is surveyed in this chapter. Each model is scrutinised in 
detail highlighting its strengths and weaknesses. The logical foundations of 
some models are shown to  be not robust as perceived before. The m ath ­
em atical analysis used is clearly questionable. Those models which appear 
to be robust, analyse agent behaviour under restrictive conditions, e.g. the 
determ inistic and steady sta te  model of Baumol-Tobin, or the steady sta te  
model of Miller-Orr.
]:
ï
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em pirical literature. The general consensus is th a t although a m ajority  of 
em pirical models find evidence which supports the current target thresh­
old modelling approach, a significant m inority finds th a t the money dem and 
function is unstable. This goes against the stable behaviour forecasted by 
current models. A promising direction in which the the current body of lit- I
erature on the transactions dem and for money could evolve is discussed in 
the final section.
5.4 Chapter 4
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C hapter 4 returns to  the initial objective of this thesis. The money dem and
.problem  for a risk averter is solved. The m ean reverting diffusion process
;used to capture interest ra te  variations is replaced w ith a more realistic Poi- a:
sonnian jum p stochastic process. Spectral methods and num erical integra­
tions schemes such as Simpson’s rule and Runge K u tta  4 are introduced for 
solving the H JB equation for the first tim e. The findings here significantly 
differ from preceding models. The key conclusion is the existence of m ultiple 
optim a, which has interesting im plications for the money dem and function 
and im plicitly for the  dem and illiquid assets. This is in contrast to  the  static  
liquidity preference models in which in tertem poral effects are not considered.
However, unlike other rational expectations models, these optima cannot be 
dismissed as being bubble solutions. Learning by agents or the use of ad-hoc 
‘global’ optim ising routines also do not discount this possibility.
The m ultiple optim a results from the MRS and MRT effects alternatively 
dom inating each other over alternating ranges of the control vector. This
dem onstrates th a t ceteris paribus the optim al value of waiting for buying 
and selling cash discretely varies. If agents converge to different optim a, the 
full effect of an exogenous shock may not be felt all a t once, bu t take effect 
slowly, at discreetly staggered tim e intervals, as different agents discretely 
adjust their at targets varying points in tim e.
I
I
i
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A ppendices
A ppendix A
By differentiating (1.19) w ith respect to x  it is clear th a t
T4(a;,u) -p s M (æ(s))/a;(æ(s), s |x , 0) dx(s) ds
/'OO
—p[B{b,u) — V{u,u)]  / e“ ^®Fh(6, sla:,0) (A .l)Jopoo
—p[D{aJ) — V(l^u)]  /  e"^^Fa;(a, 0) ds.Jo
Differentiating (A .l) w ith respect to x  yields
IAa;(^) ^ ) — l e dsI M{x{s))f^a:(o:{s),s\x,Q)dx{s)a pco
- p [ B { b , u ) - V { u , u ) ]  e-<“F^^{b ,s \x ,0)ds  (A.2)Jopoo
—p [ D { a , l ) - V { l , u ) ]  / e~'’^ Fa;o:{a,s\x,0) ds.Jo
M ultiplying (A .l) by p  and (A.2) by cr^/2 and adding both  gives
A (æ )y(æ ,u ) — j e  Jo M{x(s) )Af{x{s}^  s|.T, 0) dx{s)poo
—p[F(6, w) — y (u , u)] /  e“ ^^AF(6, s |x , 0) dsJopoo
- p [ D ( a ,0  -  V (;,u )] /  e - '’* A f(a ,s lx ,0 )rfs . Jo
I
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d s
Substitu ting the backward Chapman-Kolmogorov equation (1.15) into the 
above expression yields
poo  r  r!)
A V { x , u )  == / I M {x{s ) ) f s {x{s ) , s \x ,0 )  dx{s)
J o  i J a  Jpoo
- p [ B { b , u ) - V { u , u ) ]  /  e~'’^ F,{b, s\x ,0)dsJopoo
—p[D{aJ) — V{l^u)] / e~^®Fs(a,s|æ,0) ds.Jo
pb  r poo
p I M{x{s ))  j  f [ x { s ) , s \ x ,0 )  ds J a l J o dx(s)  — M {x)
^p[B{b,u) -  V (u,u); 
- p [ D ( a J ) - y ( Z ,u ) ]
poo
l — p e‘^ ^F{b^s\x^O) dsJ o
poo
l — p  e'’®F(a, s[a;, 0) d J o (A.3)
A ppendix B
Derivation of the solution of the transition density function in the forward 
Kolmogorov equation.
Form (1.23) we have
Using the m ethod of separation of variables we obtain
f { e t \ g , o )  =  T{ t )Q( 0-
Substitu ting this into (1.23) yields
It is clear from this expression th a t the solution to T { t )  and Q{C) are of the 
form
T(t) = Be-^^ \
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where B  is an arb itrary  constant, and
Q (0  =  d) sin[\/A^ —
The boundary condition /(O , 0) =  0 implies th a t Q(0) =  0. This is satis­
fied when y  =  0. We also have the other boundary condition / ( I ,  t |p , 0) — 0. 
Setting  ^ =  1 we obtain a value for A in term s of the param eters of the 
differential equation; i.e.
"e#
A =  +  n^ TT^ .
This expression for A gives us an Eigenfunction of the type
sin(n7T^)e‘'^-K « '
which is a solution to (1.23) satisfying its boundary conditions for all integers. 
Therefore, /( ^ ,  t \g,  0) can be expressed as a solution to the forward Chapm an- 
Kolmogorov equation in term s of a Fourier sine series. T hat is
CO
n —l
where gn is a constant. We can now from the initial condition calculate the 
coefficients of the series. We have
gn ^  2 [  S{^ -  g)e~°^^ sm{n7T^)Jo
=  2e~°‘^  sm{n7vg).
Thus the Fourier series solution for the transition  density function from the 
forward Chapman-Kolmogorov equation is
oo
/ ( ^ 5  0) =  2 sin(n7T^) s m {m rg)
n ~ l
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The evaluation of  the discounted value of  the fluxes at the upper and lower 
boundaries over the infinite horizon 
We have
poo poo  oo
/  e~ dt — / 7î sin(n7r(l —
-/O '/ o  n = l
_  2n7T sin(n7r(l — g))eA^~^^
/? +  CK^ +  n^ TT^
We know as a fact th a t
^  2n7T sin(n7r(l — gf) _  sinh 
(3 F  P  n^ TT^  sinh vn = l  ^
Therefore we have
f  e -2 ‘F,{l , t \g ,0 )d t  ==Jo sinh y
Similarly we can com pute the rate at which the first stopping value is accrued 
on the lower boundary. We have
/ oo poo  ooe~ F t{ 0 , s \g . , 0 )  dt =  J  utt din = l
E 2n7T sin(n7T5')e—^ /?  +  +  n^TT^n = l
^  „ - „ . s i n h x ( l  - g )  
sinh X
The evaluation of the integral e~^* f((f i \g,{})  dt
We have
f / .  I . , _  4 sin(7%7T^ ) sin(n7r^)poo  oo2  e - f 7 ( f ,s |g ,0 ) < is  =  Y i^  /? +  +  n7T^
We also know as a fact th a t
2  sin(n7ry) sin(nTr^) cosh \ / f i  F  a^uj — cosh -\//3 + a'^y  ,______  _^_____
^  +  UTT^  ->/5"+~02 sinh (3
7
X 1
I■ %
.7f
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where to = 1 — \g — and 7  =  1 — ^ Now we can express the above 
integral as r /(f. %, 0) dt =  2 e .K - .) - 'h x w - c o s h x ^Jo Xsinhx
A ppendix C
I
It is obvious th a t
k(Py (o ) =  A +  —
substitu ting  this into (2 .1 ) yields
V {x)  = I y (0 ) — y '  I* cosh(aa;) +  F  sinh(o:æ) 4— — +  (C .l)
I P )  P  P
From the boundary condition on the upper boundary in (2.1) it is clear th a t
(C.2)
From the boundary condition in (2,1) for the lower boundary it is clear tha t
(C.3)
y ( 0 ) ------— j( c o s h (a 6 ) — 1 ) +  B s inh (a 6 ) = g ---------- —
ko"  ^1 koPy ( 0 ) -----------—  j(cosh(aG ) —  1) +  Bsinh(cKu) =  g  —
M ultiplying (C .2 ) by sinh(a:a) and (C.3) by s inh (a 6 ) and then subtracting 
the la tte r from the former yields 
kcr'^y(o) [sinh(o:a)(cosh(a;6 ) — 1 ) — sinh (a 6 ) (cosh(aa) — 1 )]
9 \ (  k o ? \) sm h(an) — [ g  sinh(a6).P J P J
Dividing through by (sinh(o:a) sinh(o:6 )) gives 
ka"^y(o) tanh  ( A l  -  tanh2 )  V 2 /
k}f i \  1
-p  J  s inh (a 6 ) 
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p )  s inh(aa)
-7-
IThis equation gives ] / ( 0 ) as a function of the boundary values and the pa­
ram eters of the problem. Similarly an expression for B  as a function of the 
boundary values and the param eters of the problem can also be obtained. 
Dividing (C.2) by (cosh(a6 ) -  1 ) and (C.3) by (cosh(aa) — 1 ) and then  sub­
trac ting  the la tte r from the former yields
B ( coth coth (?) kY.p ka?P\  \ 2  J \  2 /  J  cosh(a6 ) — 1 cosh(aa) — 1 ’
Simplifying the  above two equations further, and substitu ting into (C .l) gives 
an expression for V(a^ ’), i.e.:
y (^ )
7 2 7 2 (a -  _  (kx^ ka^ \9  p J smh{ab) \   1   _{  —  -------^ p J  s in h (a a )
+
tanh  — tanh 
■ { 9  ~  sinh(aa;) (^ g — sinh(aa:)‘-
X
cosh(o(6 ) — 1 
tanh  tanh  ^
tanh  — tanh
cosh(act) — 1
k d + kcF^ +
D -^)cosh(a{x-f )) (£f-^)cosh(g(a7-|))
2sinh(Ÿ) 2 s i n h ( ^ )
sinh a (¥ ) )
Dividing this solution for V{x)  by gj2  and substitu ting the non-dimensionalising 
param eters and variables in (2.3) yields
y (w ) 2vfi ^  1 ^  j \ y )  cosh(2 w — z) — f { z )  cosh(2 w -  y) 
7  7  sinh(j/ — z)
v1
I
.?
■I
I
?"
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A ppendix D
sinh(2y) -  f { y )  sinh(3î/) -  f ( y )  sinh 7/ =  07
Upon further simplification it is clear th a t
Therefore
2vf{y){sïnh.y  +  sinh3y) +  ~  =  0.
2y2f{y )  sinh 2y cosh y  sinh(cty) =  0.
Dividing through by (2sinh(<ay)) we obtain
-  +  f { y )  cosh y =  0. 7
7y — tanh(y) — — =  0.
Appe ndi x  E
3 7  — y^tanh^(y) =  2y^ +  y^sech^(y) — 3y tanh(y).
From this it is obvious the when y =  0, the  above expression is also zero.
I
1
Now th a t 2  +  y =  0, and / ( y )  is an odd function, we also m ust have z and y 
satisfying (8), i.e.
?
Substitu ting for /(y )  and simplifying further gives
■It is clear tha t
133
A ppendix F
The boundary conditions for the general price adjustm ent policy are
A[(cosh(o;6) — cosh(o:u))(sinh(aa) — sinli(aQ)
— (cosh(aa) — cosh(a/))(sinh(a6) — sinh(a'u))]
g  (6  ^ — (sinh(o;a) — sinh(a/))
g — (sinh(<a6) — sinh (ecu)).
A
j?
.y(6) -  y(w) =  y and y(a) -  y(/) = y, ■;S
'Iwhere u and I are the upper and lower thresholds respectively, see Sivanan- 
than  and Lindsay (1996). Substitu ting these boundary conditions into (2.1) 
it is clear th a t
kA (cosh(a6) — cosh(au)) +  B(sinh(o;6) — sinh(au)) 4— (6  ^ — vf )  — g, (F .l)  
and
kA (cosh(aa) — cosh(a/)) 4- B(smh{aa)  — sinh(a/)) 4— («^ — C) =  g. (F.2)
M ultiplying the first equation by (sinh(aa) — sinh(aZ)) and the second equa­
tion by (sinh(o;6) — sinh(au)) and then subtracting the la tter from the former 
yields
By simplifying the above equation further and making A the subject it can 
be seen th a t
^  ( 9 -  ^(6^ -  ^^)) 2 sinh cosh ( a ( ^ ) )
4A sinh ^ sinh (^a )  sinh j
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(g  -  2 sinh ( “ ( V ) )  cosh ( « ( 4 ^ ) )
4Asinh j  sinh ^inh ( a ( ° + 'y ~ ’*) )
' f i  -  -  - f i  + ( s -  ! ( « ' -  ‘f i »
s i n h ( a ( z 4 i ^ ) )
Similar to how A  was obtained, B  can also be obtained. If (F .l)  is m ultiplied 
by (cosh(o;u)—cosh(a/)) and (F.2) by (cosh(<n6)—cosh( ) )  and then subtract 
the  la tte r from the former, it is obvious th a t
B[(cosh(ao;) — cosh(a/))(sinh(a6) — sinh(ccu))
— (cosh(o;6) — cosh(a'u))(sinh(o;a) — sinh(a^))]
g — —(6  ^ — w^)^ (cosh(<au) — cosh(o;/))
g  {afi — F ) j  (cosh(ce6) — cosh(au)).
Using the same approach as was used for A, it can be shown th a t
B [a  -  -  - f i  # #  -  { s  -  -  ‘f i
sinh ( a ( î ± t ^ ) )
Now th a t expressions for the constants A and B  have been obtained, the 
Bellm an value function can be expressed as
V{x) kx^ ka^
(^ g — “ (6  ^ — u^Ÿj (^sinh (*^(““^ ) )  sinh(o:a;)
— cosh ( ^ ( ~ ^ “ ) )  cosh(aa;)^
^ 2  sinh smh ( « ( ^ ) )
(^ g — ^ (a^ — BŸj  cosh —) )  cosh(o;æ)
— cosh ( ^ ( ™ ^ ) )  smh(aa:)^
135
7.
■
'I
^ 2 sinh  sinh ( « ( A ^ ) )
kx^ ka^ f i s - ‘^ { a ^ - P ) ) o o s h ( a ( p ^ ' ^ ' ^
a — I'
+ s in h ( a ( ^ ) )
W -  “ (6  ^ -  u^)) cosh
sinh (^a ^
s i n h ( a ( ^ ) )  
u  T  /  — 6  —* n ))
Now w rite
I ! ^  T  / — h — usinh \ \  /  /[a 3r I -  2x — (b A  u -  2x)]\)) = ^ )
/  /  a -{-1 — 2x \  \  /  /6 -f-ii — 2x \  \
H  2 )) H ~ —2 ))
- j)  sinh ^a^-
-= sinh
— cosh ^
/ / \  \  2
a A  I ~~ 2 x \ .  . , /  /6  +  ri —2 a :\\ - ^ - ) ) s m h ( « ( ------ 2 -------) )
Therefore the value function can be expressed as
Now define a function
sinh(g(^))cosh(a(^iŒ jj ^kh(A(^jj
tanh  -  tanh ( a ( ^ ± î ? ^ ) )
(g  -  -  P ) )
sinh ( a ( ï = i ) )  cosh ’
Then the value function will be
# (a , /) — 0(6, u)V (x ) kx"^ kcr^ 1 —  H T" +  « -tanh -  tanh  ( ^ a ^  -
Dividing V (x )  by y /2  and introducing the non-dimensional variables and 
param eters in (2.18) yields
0(y,2r) -  0(w ,a;)2v^ 1V(v)  =  -f -  -b
where
7  7  ta n h (2; — 2ar) — tanh(a: — 2 u )’
0(u;, z) J  ~ y zsinhy  cosh(z — 2v)
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g.2 J  fj2 
It can be seen th a t a  has two solutions a i  and a 2 , i.e.
/i 1
and
Now let
Then
and
Ü _ 12
y  =
2[/(M)
+  « .(%  -  1)M “7 +
Grouping similar term s yields
(G .i)
I
;r
.A ppendix  G
The Homogenous equation V  = M “ is a solution to (4.8) where a  satisfies
y M " a (o f  -  1)M°‘-^ +  p M a M ^ - ^  -  pM ^  = 0.
Simplifying the above expression yields
+  ( 7  -  d «  -  7  =  0.
"7
It can now be easily seen th a t the function ({> satisfies
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2 , 2 p a i  2 p
Cfx,
Therefore (G .I) simplifies to
We know th a t Therefore,
Hence
(G.2)d M
It can be easily seen th a t
Furtherm ore
2«i + ÿ  -  “> + ÿ - ^  +  ^+ V ÿ + ( A “ S
“ i +  ÿ - 2  -  ^ A  +  l  +  , y g + ( A _ l )  - 2  +  ^  (G.4)
.^2 2 y cr^  ^  \ a ^  2
— (1 T  0(2 )•
'"Si-
I
: i
It can be easily shown th a t
Q'l -  on +  - 7 -  -  -y  =  0.
2 a  ^ p L rzp / p L\^“ 1 +  ^ - 2  -  +  - 1
=  - ( « 1  +  ! ) •
'if
— a i  — «2 +  1.
And
^ G , / A G 4 - i V
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Substitu ting (G .3) and (G.4) into (G.2) gives
d
d M
Integrating the above equation yields
2 pM
=  J / U{y)y-‘'-+“P dy + A.^  Jo
Dividing through by generates
cr"
p m
Jo
Integrating the above equation it is clear th a t
poo  o  r ° °  /  ra ; \
/  <{)a:dx------------- - j / U d y  j dx
J m  ^  J m  \ J o  jpoc
+  A /  J m
This integral has a solution
X Q’2 —CVl COOU{y)y - ( 14-0:2) dy
M
O r ° o  ^ o i 2 - ~ a i
4--IT /   U{x)x~^^'^‘^ ^^  dxJ a^  m  ^ 2  — « 1
A
0^ 2 — (^ 1
,«2 - 0:1
M
Therefore 
4>{oo) — 4> = - —-----------   limO' [CX2 — CKi j a:-+oo
2j\.fOi-af2
Jo U (y )y
ct2(o:2 -  ou) do 
2
j.«l—«2
— ( 1 + 0 :2 ) dy
A
,  , C/(æ)æ-<‘+“‘> rfx +o A a 2 - a i ) J j ^ 4  a i~~a2 0 -
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i
[  C/(a;)æ-('+“=> dreJ mo-2(o;2 “  a i )   a-2(Q ;2-ai)
It can be easily seen th a t
_ U{x) ^ hm  --------— 0,Cr (^a'2 — (Xlfi æ-lco
and also 4>{oo) = —B, where B is a constant. Therefore it follows th a t
■V{M) = +  B M ": +  — -----------   /  U{y)ya^(a2 -  a i )  J q
-(l + «2) dy
cr2(a2 -  a i)
PCX)
/  U{x)x-^^-^^^UxJ m
is the solution to  (4.8).
We have
U m M » A  C(y)y-(^+»^) dy =
U ( M )M - P + “ 1^ 
M-.0 —o;2M“ ('+“2)
- 7  lim [/(M )CK2 M-+0
_ F (0 )
â2
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Integrating the first te rm  of the R.H.S of the above equation by parts, it 
reduces to
C(y)y-<‘+-> dy t
A ppendix  H
The following properties naturally  follow from the assum ptions we make
'7':about u tility  functions.
"7:.
?
:.;,r?:
3
/ oo dy
mai
Using these two results and setting A =  0, it is clear th a t
M-+0 <7^o;2(a2 — CKi) a-^û;i(o;2 — a i)
2U(0)
a^aia2
=  0 .
A ppendix  I
Differentiating (4.10) w ith respect to M  it is clear th a t
- W (M ) =  F(y)y-('+ "^)cr\a2  -  a i )  Jo 
J-— ----- t/(M )M -< ‘+“’
dy
(j2(a2 — CKi)
f7ffa2 -  «1 J m
 ^ . f/(M)M-<^+“'>.e (^cK2 — Oil 
This can be further simplified to  yield
9 rv M " 2 “ 1 c M- V ' ( M )  =  B a iM “- - ‘ +  — -2----------r /  £/(y)y-<'+““> dycrffa2 -  a i)  Jo
. / I f O l - l  poo
■----------- /  U{y)y~^^'^‘^ ^^  dy.«2 — «1 J m(7^(a  
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Now let X — M y.  Then
poo poo
lim  M “‘ /  dæ =  lim /  17(M y)M -('+“‘>y-<i+“ ')M  dy^->-0 J m  M-io/ oo U (M y)y~7+ai)
*oo fi
I
M
A ppendix J
It is obvious th a t
'M
lim  ^ /  U(y)y  7 +«2)^^M-+00 L
If we let y =  Mæ it is also clear th a t
lim M^^-M —loo
poo
‘ /  U{y)y J m dy
1. I ^ U { y ) y
m S L
U(M)MA^+^2)  hm  —; -  .  ^ -^----M-ioo (1 -
lim
M - io o  (1 — Œ2) M  
0 .
poo
lim dæJmM - lo o
lim IM -io o
lim
M —loo -CïiM 1
1+ —  /  da;a i  Ji
f ! 2 M  + I fM-loo y a iM  0(1 Ji X dx
It can be easily seen th a t
M - ic o  a i M 0 .
Also
and therefore
lim U \ M x )  — 0,M^oo  ^  ^ ’
1 7°°lim  —  /  U '(M x )x  dx =  0.M - lo o  Oil
7 ;
I
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A ppendix K
It is clear th a t
lim ATM - lo o
pM
/  U{y)y- Jo =  lim rM - lo o  M “ "
=  lim
M —loo — O 2
Self evidently lim.M-4.00 V { M )  — 0 0  as Af —> 0 0 .
A ppendix L
It is easily see th a t letting  v M
M
ai ■vU\v)
7 m C / '( M )  +  —  [  y ’^^ - d v U ' M )  dz.«1 Oil Jo  A /
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Technical A nnexures
Ai
1
i.
I
I
Technical A nnex 1-BFGS M ethod for U n­
constrained M inim isation
Here the  multi-dim ensional optim isation technique BFGS which, is used to 
obtain the optim al values for a, /, u and b in C hapter 2, is discussed. F irst 
a simple explanation of m ulti-dim ensional optim isation is provided by dis­
cussing fini te-difference derivatives. Then Broy den’s m ethod on which BFGS 
is based is illustrated, and, finally the m ethod of BFGS derived.
Finite-D ifFerence D erivatives
In this section finite-difference approxim ations are derived by using first and 
second partia l derivatives. Also some aspects of efficiency, convergence, nu­
merical roundoff and m athem atical accuracy are discussed. From elem entary 
calculus it is clear th a t F  : M.” — > IR”’
Fi{x d  hej) -  Fi{x) dFi{x)hm  —  r  —  =  - ,/i—lO h ox  j
where ej is the J -th  column of the n x n identity  m atrix. This for obvi­
ous reasons is called the forward difference approxim ation and suggests the
144
\ \AjF{xc ,h)  -  J{xa)ej\\ g  -7 |/ i j |
Also i f  II • II is the li vector norm given by ||n ||i — l^il then in the fi
operator norm it is clear that
ll^lli =  1 ]  kû'l"
From this it trivially follows that
| | A f  ( x „ / j )  -  111 g  I t II^IIco-
Proof. The proof is established using the  remainder of a second order 
expansion of the  Taylor series. Define Mfi{xc  +  hjej)  as
M ^ { x c  T  hjCj) — F(xc)  +  J{xc)hjej.
T hat is {xcph je j )  is a  first order Taylor expansion of F[xc-\-hjej)  around 
Xc. Now it is clear th a t
\ \ A j F { x c , h )  -  J ( a ; c ) | |  =  \ h j \ ~ ^ \ \ A j F { x c F  h j C j )  -  F { x c )  -  J { x c ) h j e j \ \
=  +  hjCj) -  M ^ ( x c  +  hjcfiW
â  i + r ‘ ^ 7 i i 7 f  =  ^7171.
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' k b .
evaluation of the j - th  column of the the Jacobian m atrix  J { x c )  using
I
AjF{xc ,  h) = +  hjCj) -  F{xc)] (T1.5)
for a suitably chosen vector h.
L e m m a  1 Let F  G Lip.y[D), where the coordinates Xc and Xc +  hjCj for  
j  =  1, - • • ,n  are also in D. Furthermore let || • || be the vector norm where 
||ejjj =  1. Then 4
The proof in th e  fi operator norm  trivially follows. Clearly
\ \AF{xcfii) — J{xc)\\i — msiX \ \AjF{xc,h)  -  J{xc)ej\\i
1 1= m ax ~'y\hj\ =  “ T p lU -
Although the forward difference m ethod of evaluating the gradient is accurate 
enough, the  central difference m ethod m ay be preferable. Here it is defined 
as
r  r /  , s _  /(a^c +  h id )  -  f ( x c  -  hiCi)àij{Xc, h) — 2 ^  5
and
5f{xc,  h) == [Sif{xc, h), • • •, Snf{xc, h)].
L e m m a  2 Let H  G Lip f iD ) ,  H  being the Hessian matrix, where coordinates 
Xc and Xc +  hjej for j  =  1, • • •, n are also in D. Furthermore let || • || be the 
vector norm where ||ej[| =  1. Then the behaviour of 5if{xc, h) is given by
\^i f{xc,h) -  g
and
\ \Sf {xc ,h)~ g{xc)\\oo ^  ^'y\hi\lo^
where g{xc) — d f{xc) l2dx i .
Proof. Let (•) be the first order Taylor expansion of /(• ) . Then
[ f { x c  +  hi Ci )  -  { x c  +  hi Ci ) ]  -  [ f { x c  -  h i e f i  -
— f ( x c  +  h id )  — f{xc  — hiCi) — 2 h i - ^ -^ - -.
From the  triangle inequality it is clear th a t
\ f{xc  T  hiei) -  f{xc  -  h id )  -  2 h i ~ ^ \  =  ^ ^ \ h i f .
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;'V
is the Frobenius norm.
L e m m a  3 Let H  G Lip^{D), where the coordinates Xc and Xc +  hjCj for  
j  = 1, • • • are also in D. Furthermore let || ■ jj be the vector norm where
|ej|| =  1. Also let
r ^  1___ f ( y ^ c  “b hjCj -|- /ijCj) f { , ^ c  h i € i ^  y(^c 4" h j € j ^  -f- f ( ^ X c )L-WcJiJ =  —— hfhj
Then
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Thus it can be easily seen th a t the central difference gradient is more accu- 
ra te  than  the forward difference gradient, however, it requires 2n evaluations 
ra ther than  the n necessary for the forward difference. Let H{xc)  be the  
second order te rm  of the Taylor series expansion of a function f{xc-\-hiei).  If 
the  gradient of a  function can be derived analytically, bu t the Hessian m atrix  
needs to  be approxim ated, then (T1.5) can be used by applying it to  g{x) 
to  obtain the  approxim ation of Ag{xc, h). This approxim ation, however, will 
not yield a sym m etric m atrix , whereas H{xc)  will. Here a  sensible strategy is 
to  use Be =  \[Ag{xc)  +  Ag{xc)'^] as the approxim ation of the Hessian. This 
is justified by observing th a t the Frobenius norm projection of Ag[xe)  into 
the  subspace of all sym m etric m atrices is Be- Using this property and the 
Pythagorean Theorem  yields
where
;s
...l i
In the Iqo) Frobenius or li operator norm, it follows that
\[Hc]i,j ~~ [H{xc)]ij\ ^  m ax +  3|/ii| +  3jhj| +  2-r~ ^ .o ' I I I ri^  I /
Proof. The proof follows from the previous Lemmas. If Si =  hi,Sj = hj,  and
Sij — Si +  Sj, then
[ f { xe  +  Sjj) -  m ^ { x a  +  Sij)] -  [ f {xc  +  8*) -  {x^ +  Si)j
- [ f ( x c  +  S j )  -  m ^ { x c  +  S j ) ]
=  f { X c  +  -  f { X e  +  S i )  -  f { X c  +  S j )  +  f { X e )  ~  h i h j [ H { X c ) ] i j .
From the triangle inequality it is clear th a t
1
?
.1:
%!
S’
\hihj[Hc\ i j  -  hihj [H{xc)] i j \  g  ;^ 7 [ | |5 i i f  +  +  W^ j f ]
ANow th a t some useful rules for evaluating derivatives and analysing their 
accuracy have been established, two Theorem s which establish the  ra te  of a 
convergence of finite difference approxim ation shall be stated.
T h e o re m  1 Let F  : M.” — y be C^{x) in an open convex set D, D C. R.  
Let there exist constants r,j3 > 0 fo r  x^ G D, and, J{xc) G Lip.yN{x^,r),  
||7(æ*)|| ^  0,  and F(x^)  = 0. Then there also exists an e > 0 for  each
xq G N(x^ ,e )  in the sequence of  points {%&} generated by the steps 
2&+1 = Xk — J{xk)~^F{xk),  k = 0,1,2,  - ’ • 
which is well defined and converges to x^ and is satisfied by
lla^t+i -  ^  \\xk -  æ*||^.
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^ /a + 1  — ^k J{,^k) F(^Xk) iCjK ~]- J(^Xjfj F(^X^)
=  J{xk)~^[F{xfj  -  F{xk)  -  -  %&)].
This yields
exists and converges to æ*.
1
Proof. It follows trivially th a t Lipschitz continuity implies continuity of 
function. Furtherm ore, the determ inant of a m atrix  is a continuous func­
tion of the entries of the  m atrix. Thus it is obvious th a t J (x )  is invert­
ible, and also th a t ||J(æ )"^ || ^  2(3, for x G N (x^ , r ) .  If Xk G N[x^ ,e)  for 
e ^  m in{r, (2 /9 7 )“ ^}, æjt+i exists and
lî f^c+i ^fc|| — II F(^ Xk) ^A;)]||
g  2^~\ \xk -  x^\{^ ^  (d-yWxk -  x^ W'^
g  (3^e\\xk -  x^W ^ ~ \ \ x k  -  x^\\.
This establishes both convergence and quadratic convergence and thus con­
cludes the proof.
S;s
T h e o re m  2 I f  F  and x^ obey the hypothesis in the above theorem, then in t
the li operator norm there exists an e,p > 0 for  a sequence {hk} in E "  where 
0 ^  ll/ïTcll =  7 ; and Xq G N { x ^ , c). Also the sequence {2 7 } generated by
J { x k ) c j  U { h k ) j ^ Q
Xk+i — Xk -  B((^F{xk), k ^  0,1,2,  - ‘ ,
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B royd en ’s M eth od
The secant m ethod is an effective m ethod for solving nonlinear equations in 
one dimension. It is a forward difference m ethod in which the step size is 
used to  construct the next itera te  from x+ to  form the difference {xc — 2 4 ,), 
Thus resulting new local derivative will be is
obvious from this th a t no ex tra  function value will be needed to evaluate a 
new local model since F ( 2 + +  /i-|-) =  F{xc).  The secant m ethod assumes th a t 
the first order Taylor expansion of ^ ( 2 + +  d), # + ( 2 + +  d) =  7^(2 +) -f H+d, 
is evaluated by letting  M+{xc) tend towards F{xc). Thus B+ is evaluated by
F(Xc)  =  ikr^(2^ T (2c — 2^)) =  7^(2 + ) +  J5^-(2c — 2^J.
This yields a system of linear equations
B.^Sc — Vc
where yc = F{x.^.) — F{xc),  and Sc =  2 .4. — 2 c.
L e m m a  4 I f  Sc,yc G E ", Sc 7  ^ 0  and Be x  E", Broyden’s update
{ye -  BeSe)sf
B +  =  B e  F S i  Sr
m
F
■1
%:r
I
1!&'
I
gives the unique solution of
m in ||B  — Bd| s.t. Bse = yc-
Proof. The proof follows from the Lemmas established for forward differences. 
If Bsc = î/c, then B+ — Be = [B — we have
â  |1 B - B „ | |f -  p isi Sc 2
g  \ \ B - B c\\f
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for the  interpolation of g{xc), and f{x+).  H{x+)  is sym m etric, how­
ever, jB-i- or Be are not. If B+ is sym m etric, it will approxim ate H{x+)  more 
accurately since
3-
B FG S U nconstrained  O ptim isation  Technique
In the earlier section the secant approxim ation technique for choosing the 
Jacobian m atrix  was applied. Now this shall be adapted to the Hessian 
m atrix . The analog of the previous section is simply
B S e  — Pe — g{xPj — g{Xc),
where B  is the approxim ation of the Hessian m atrix , The above
equation uses the second order Taylor expansion
m (2 + F d )  = f{x+)  +  +  l-d'^B+d2 y.
i [S +  +  B jl  -  H(x+)\\p g  ||B+ -  H { x + ) y .  (T1.6)
..3;"3If a projection of Be on the intersection of m atrices obeying the above equa-
.tion w ith the subspace of sym m etric m atrices in is taken, is obtained
in the form of the PSB( Powell sym m etric Broyden) update  f
D D BeSe)s^ T  Sc(t/c BeSe) ^c(^c BeSf)ScS^ ■
=   ( 7 7 ? -------■ 3
It is clear th a t will inherit its sym m etry from Be- This is clearly an 
effective update  bu t has problems w ith poor scaling. Furtherm ore B+ only 
inherits its positive definiteness from Be and th a t too under conditions more 
restrictive than  (T1.6). An obvious condition for B  in (T1.6) to be positive 
definite is v
T T T-i «8g yc — 8^  Bse  0.
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It is also possible to show th a t a positive definite and sym m etric solution 
exists for B  by constructing the BFGS m ethod due to  Broyden, Fletcher, 
Goldfarb, and Shanno. If Be is assumed to be a positive definite and sym­
m etric then it could be expressed by using Cholesky factor. T hat is
Be = LeL l ,
Lc being lower triangular, B j^  m ust be positive definite and sym m etric where
Be — , and iI.^J_^Se — 2/c;
for nonsingular. Now let Vc =  such th a t J+Vc — yc- If Ve is known
then using Broyden’s m ethod could be evaluated as
{ye -  LeVe)v'^
VrV
Transposing the above equation and m ultiplying the right and left hand sides 
by Sc it is clear th a t
V vt  Sr J
If y jsc  >  0 the above equation can be further simplified to yield
It is easy to see th a t the above two equations define such th a t
which is the BFGS update. A lternatively the  update could be expressed as
D  ■ O  , y ^ y ' ^  B e S e S f  B e=  B c F  - f ---------------- 7 - 5 --------- .y( Se si  BeSe
This is the theoretical basis of the BFGS multi-dim ensional optim isation 
technique. However, there exist problems in its im plem entation. Clearly if
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33
-b
f ( x )  dx- b — a6 / ( a ) + 4 / (  14-/(5)
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"3a
F
„:Cv
a:,4
4:
the last evaluation is near the  minim um , then the update  will arrive at it 
w ithout any problem. If, however, it is further away, Sc m ay be sufficiently 
large such th a t it overshoots the minimum . The function evaluation could 
even explode. To elim inate this possibility a line m inim isation routine is 
em bedded within the algorithm  with the  following steps
1. Begin by choosing 2q G and an n x n positive definite m atrix  B q 
where B q ~  I  and set ^(^o). For k ~  0 , 1 , "  • obtain Xkj-i,Bk+i
from Xk, Bk using the  following steps:
2. If gk is zero, then stop; obviously because Xk is a stationary  point. Else
3. com pute Sk := B^^yk-
4. Choose the next coordinate
~  Xk ^kSk 
through the approxim ate m inim isation
F{ x k )  Rs m i n { F { x k  -  Xsk) \ X P  0},
and then set
9 k + l  • —  2& + 1  — X k ,  y k  9 k + l  9 k '
5. com pute Bk+i according to the BFGS update described above.
Technical A nnex 2-Sim pson’s R ule
If a function f { x )  G [o.,b] is C'^{x), then  it can be shown th a t
i:3..3'
.till
where '6
N
such th a t
K  =
It can be shown th a t for functions th a t are C^{x),  Simpson’s rule converges 
to  the  actual value of the function w ith a velocity of N —4 at worst. Here an 
au tom atic Simpson’s integrator is used where the lim its of the integration is
I
.3;
I
5%
I
?
7
I  [ / (« )  + 4 / ( ^ ) + / ( 5 )
is the Simpson approxim ation. Thus Simpsons’s rule is exact for all polyno­
mials of degree three or less. However, Simpson’s rule is m ost often applied
in its com pound form. The interval [a, b] is divided into a num ber of intervals
and Simpson’s rule is applied to  each. Let
Oi — X q X \  ^  . . .  ^  X ‘2 n —' l  ^  X ^ n  — b
be a sequence of points on [a, b] such th a t
Xi+i — Xi = h, 7 =  0, • • •, 2n — 1.
Then the com pound Simpson’s rule yields
f^2n A
/  / ( 2 )  d 2  =  — [ / o + 4 ( / i  H h /2n -l) +  2 ( /2 - f / 4 -i V f2n-2) F  f2n] F  EnJ Xq
where En is the rem ainder and is given by
07
E n - = a < i p < b .
Let N  be the even num ber of sub-intervals of [a, 6]. Then N  = 2n and h can 
be expressed as
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4
provided, along w ith a routine for com puting f { x ) ,  an error tolerance e, and 
an upper bound on the num ber of function evaluations. The source code, 
once compiled then  returns one of (a) the integral has been evaluated to the 
specified tolerance, (b) the interval of Integration has zero length, (c) the 
tolerance is either negative or not achievable, or (d) the error tolerance has 
not been m et w ithin the allowed iterations.
Technical A nnex S-R unge-K utta Order Four
Consider a function f ( t , y )  th a t is Î/) on D = {{ t ,y) \a P  t P b,c P
y  ^  d}. Let G D  such th a t
f { t , y )  =  Pn(t+,y+)  + Rn(t+,y+),
where 
Pnit+i Î/+) f i U , y + )  +  
+
dt du
-f -
j=0
2 +
df^-idy3
and
Rn{t, y) — 1 Q f n + l - ~ j Q y j
where Pn is the Taylor polynom ial resulting from the n th  order Taylor series 
expansion of f { t , y )  around and, Rn is the rem ainder resulting from
this expansion. The R unge-K utta scheme exploits this property to obtain 
a solution to a differential equation. Consider a differential equation of the
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form
A
w ith the initial condition
2/(^o) =  yo-
The R unge-K utta integrator order four integration scheme uses the formula
yo =  y{ t o)
h  =  f { t i , y i )
k2 =  +
h  =  / (u  + 2 jy*‘+  “^ )
^4 =  f{U F h,y{ F hks)
y i + i  =  Vi F  — +  2/t2 +  2^3 +  ^ 4 )
for i =  0 ,1 ,2 , , A  — 1. Here yi is the com puted value of the solution at
ti, where ^^ 4.1 — U — h. It can be easily seen th a t if f { t , y )  — g{x),  then the 
above scheme reduces to
h
V i + i  =  y i +  g / {ti) F  4 /  ^  F f ( t i  F  h)
This m ethod has a localised truncation error of order four, provided of course 
th a t y{t)  is C^{t). The R unge-K utta scheme used here is a m ore refined 
au tom atic integrator allowing for more efficient forward steps to  taken in the 
integration, based on rounding off errors obtained, w ith sim ilar conditions 
to Simpsons rule. If the integrator is performing function evaluations and 
the specified accuracy is being m et, then the evaluated function values are 
returned. However, if the accuracy is not being m et, then  it could retu rn
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either (a) the actual function values bu t w ith an accompanying warning th a t 
the requested accuracy has not been m et, or (b) more m em ory has been 
allocated than  is necessary. If the integrator fails, then the reason for failure 
is returned. W hich could be one of (c) the range of integration has been set 
to zero, (d) the effective range of integration is zero, (e) there has been a 
mem ory allocation failure, or finally (f) the order of equations has increased 
and m emory needs to be reallocated.
Technical A nnex 4-C hebyshev Polynom ials  
In tegration
Tn{x) =  cos 0 — arccosæ.
T n + l { x )  =  2 x T n { x )  — T n - l { x ) ,  n =  1,2,-
due to the trigonom etric identity
cos(n +  1)^ =  2 cos ri9 cos 9 — cos(n — 1)0.
They are also bounded, i.e.
|Tn(x)| ^  1 and a; G ( -1 ,1 ) ,  
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Chebyshev polynomials, Tn{x) are cosine functions after a change in the 
independent variable, i.e.
Preform ing the transform ation x = cos 9 allows numerous m athem atical and 
spectral relationships to be used in a Chebyshev system. They also satisfy a 
three te rm  recurrence relation
which follows from the fact th a t is a cosine.
It can be also shown th a t they satisfy the orthogonality property
/ Tm{x)Tn{x)x /ï1 V I — a;'
7F, m ~  n =  0,
0, m
Under m ild conditions on a function f { x ) \  e.g. f { x )  is C^{x), x  G [—1,1], 
f ( x )  can be expressed in a uniformly convergent series of T ’s
f ( x )  = F  aiTi{x)  F  a2T2{x) F  • "
The constant coefficients o* are referred to  as “Fourier-Chebyshev” coeffi­
cients and are given by
and
7T j _ i  i / T —
2 p  f ( x ) %( x ) dx r P i .7T p i  -  X‘
Significantly ao, «i, - - - decay rapidly to  zero. The partial sum |ao+aiT 'i(a:)-t- 
■ ■ ‘ F  anT]\[{x) is polynom ial of degree ^  N ,  which is one of the  m ost accu­
ra te  estim ations of f { x )  by a polynomial P n { x ) ,  the approxim ation being 
m easured in the sense of m ax_i<^<i|/(a;) — pAr(a;)|. Although three different 
quadratures could be used the preferred m ethod is the Chebyshev-Gauss- 
Labotto quadrature of the form
TTJ 2ÎV’X j  = cos —  W i  =N
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3 = 0 , N  
1 <  ;  ^  Æ -  1.
D ifferentiation
The derivative of a function f { x )  can be evaluated by the sum
OO
I
Î
I:
f  (a;) =
n _ 0
where
F  =  E  >“3  (T4.1)
i=«+l>i4-no(id
This is expression is derived from the trigonom etric identity 
2sin(0) cos(n0) =  sin((n +  1)0) — sin((n — 1)0),
n p4-n c :
3,
3'
which enables us to express Tn{x)  in the form
(n +  1) n — 1
In spectral space this specifies a relationship between the coefficients of the 
polynom ial of the  form
2nün — ^ i~ l ~  ^n+l5 ^  =  1,
form which (T4.1) follows. This relationship suggests an efficient m ethod by 
which Chebyshev polynomials could be differentiated in spectral space.
It clear by definition th a t Un = 0 îov n P N . Thus one could arrange the 
above equation in a way by which the coefficients of the function derivative 
could be estim ated from the  the  function coefficients through the  recursive 
relationship
F  =  4 + 1  +  2(fc +  l)a„+ i
T he same methodology is applied to derive the A;-th derivative in the form
— <^1 + 2  +  2(n +  l ) a ^ / \
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f ( x )  = p a „ c o s ( f j p j  n  = 0 , l . . - . , N .  (T4.5)
Assume th a t a transform ation of the  form is required for two sets of real da ta
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The com putational power required to  perform this task could prove to  be 
overpowering. Collocation differentiation offers a more efficient means of 
com puting derivatives, since differentiation implies only a linear operation 
on the  function values in physical space. The significant difference though 
is th a t we now need to use a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT ) which requires
equally spaced da ta  points.
The F F T  is a recursive algorithm  for obtaining a Discrete Fourier Transform, 
such as described above, and its inverse. The F F T  is conventionally expressed 
for the  evaluation of
N - l
ün = /c =  0,1, • • •, A  — 1 (T4.2)
N—1
^ / ( $ j ) e ”V -  A; =  0,1, • • ■, A  -  1, (T4.3)
j=0
where f { x j ) ,  j  ~  0 ,1 , • • • , A  — 1 are a set of complex data. See Cooley and 
Tukey (1965) for a description of the  F F T  algorithm. I
We know form previous sub-section th a t the  Chebyshev transform ation of a 
function, based on a G aus-Labotto quadrature are given by 
N
j=0 \ / 3
where ao and are halved, and :
N  /  \  4
and a^. To do this, first define complex da ta  of the form 
a i  +  m i
X)2N-j
n =  0,1, • ■ •, A  
n =  A  +  1, A  +  2, • • •, 2 A  — 1
Now define Zn, n = 0,1, , A  by (T4.4) and Zn, n  =  0 ,1 , • • •, 2A  — 1 by
(T4.2) w ith A  being replaced by 2A. Then it follows th a t
A ’
and
A T - l  N - lA , sin ^-  2 ^  w + 6  ^
j = 0  j = 0
2Trin,ie ^
See Burden and Faires (1993), Davis and Rabinowitz (1984), and C anute et. 
al. (1988) for details of this. Let qj be defined by
— ^2i +  ip2j+i — Z2j-i) J =  0,1, • • •, A  — 1, 
and estim ate Çn through the coinplex F F T  given by (T4.2). This yields
N - l N - l 27r>re.j
N
j = 0 j = 0
and N—1
Z 2 j €  JV -  g ( l  -  e  VY )
j=0 j-0
N - l
2 îrtn  V T — \  2i r inj  N
See Burden and Faires (1993), Davis and Rabinowitz (1984), and C anute et. 
al. (1988) for details of this. As a result
N
J lA i=o
Z n  — A
1 + 9n + 1 12 48in(^)y^" ^2 4 s in (^ )
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9 N -
m
I
Î
and
i=o
Based on these evaluations, the derivative coefficients can be evaluated more 
efficiently using the Differentiation m ethods listed above. The resulting col­
location m atrix  has the following points for the differentiation m atrix  {Dj^)
( D n ) j n
Cn[xi-Xj
—Xn
2JV^+1
6
2JV^  +  1 
6
j  P n  
l P l  = j P N  
1 =  j  =  1 
1 = j  = N
where
2 j  =  0, A  
1 i S j g A f - l
See Canuto et, ah (1988) for details of this. These points are obtained by 
differentiating the Lagrange interpolating polynomial 0  in the F F T
-  x^)Tk{x)
C n N ^ { x  -  X j )
-:3
■1?1•S:4;
R:
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*Technical A nnex 5-The Source Code Chap­
ter 2
# in c lu d e  < std io .h >  
# in c lu d e  <math.h>
# in c lu d e  < s td l ib .h >  
# in c lu d e  <nialloc.h>
In d e f in in g  th e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  root of th e  ODE, we s e t  SIGMA=0.1 
and RHD™0.05, th e r e fo r e  ALPHA„l=sqrt(2*RH0)/SIGMA=sqrt( 1 0 .0 ) .
■:l
# d ef in e SIGMA 0 . 1
# d e f in e RHG 0.05
# d e f in e ALPHA.1 sqrt(2.0*RH0)/SIGMA
# d e f in e K 0 .5
# d e f in e G 0 . 1
# d e f in e NITER 200
# d e f in e NV 4
double xva l; /*  x va l i n i t i a l  p o s i t io n  of s t a t e  * /
vo id  mainC vo id  )
{
vo id  parms4( double *, double * , double * , double double * );  
vo id  parms2 ( double * , double * , double * );
double va lu e„ fu n ct(d ou b le  * ) ,  min_value, h, d ix i t_ fu n c t (d o u b le  * ) ,  
t o l= 5 .0 e - 1 0 ,  d iag_hess ian [N V ], a, 1 , u, b ; 
double p[NV]“{ 0 .5 ,  0 .5 ,  1 .0 ,  1 .0 } ,
pl[NV]={ 0 .0 1 ,  0 .0 1 ,  0 .0 1 ,  0 .0 1 } ,  p p l [2]={ 0 .0 1 ,  0 .0 1 } ,  
pu[NV]={ 0 ,9 9 ,  0 .9 9 ,  3 .9 9 ,  3 .9 9 } ,  ppu[2]={ 3 .9 9 ,  3 .9 9 } ;  
in t  i t e r ,  i ;
vo id  b f g s ( i n t ,  double *, double *, double double , double *
in t  *, double * , double ( * f u n e ) (double * ) ) ;
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char f i l e n a m e [13];
FILE *OTitput ;
= 'C  
= '3 '
= 'R '
= ^E'
= 'S '
= 'U'
= ' L '
= 'T '
=  ' . '
=  ' D '  
'A') p )
/********************Create f i len am e appropriate to  application**=5=***=*=*******/ 
f i l e n a m e [0] 
f i l e n a m e [ 1] 
f i len a m e [2] 
f i l e n a m e [3] 
f i l e n a m e [4] 
f i l e n a m e [5]  ^
f i l e n a m e [6] • 
f i l e n a m e [7] • 
f i l e n a m e [8] ■ 
f i l e n a m e [9]  ^
f i l e n a m e [ 10] 
f i l e n a m e [ 11]
p r i n t f ("\nFilename in  %12s", f i l e n a m e ) ; 
f o r  ( h = 1 .0e-5  ; f ( h ) > 0 .0  ; h t= 1 .0e~ 5  );  
i t e r  = NITER;
f o r ( i=0 ; i<=40 ; i++ ) {
o u tp n t= fop en (fi len am e," a" ); 
p r in t f ( " \n  Implementing i t e r a t i o n  %3d", i ) ; 
x va l “ - 2 . 0+0 . 1*((doub le)  i ) ; 
f p r i n t f ( o u t p u t , "\n%10. 6 1 f \ t " , x v a l ) ; 
p [ 0] = 0 .5  
p [ l ]  = 0 .5
p [ 2] = 1 .0
p[3] = 1 .0  
i t e r  = NITER;
b fg s (N V ,p ,p i ,p u , t o i , d ia g .h e s s ia n , & ite r , &min„value, v a lu e . f u n c t ) ;  
parras4( p, &a, &1, &u, &b);
f p r i n t f ( o u t p u t , "%15.Gif %10.61f %10.61f %10.61f %10.61f",
m in .va lu e ,  a, 1 , u, b ) ;
p [ 0] = 1 . 0 ;
p [ l ]  = 1 . 0 ; 
i t e r  = NITER;
b f g s ( 2 , p , p p l , ppu, t o l , d ia g .h e s s ia n , & ite r , &min„value, d i x i t . f u n c t ) ;  
parms2 ( p, &a ,
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}
f p r i n t f ( o u t p u t , "%16. 61f %10.61f %10.Gif", m in .v a lu e ,  a, b ) ;
f c l o s e ( o u t p u t ) ;
e x i t ( 0 ) ;
;
f  ******************************** ****** ***************;,
The Value Function 4
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ÿ'I;-'1;:double v a lu e _ fu n c t(  double *p)
{
double a n g l,  ang2 , a, 1 , u, b, temp; 
vo id  parms4( double double * , double double double * );
iparms4( p, &a, &1, &u, &b);
angl = 0 . 5*ALPHA_l*(b+u~2. 0 * x v a l ) ; 
ang2 = 0 . 5*ALPHA_l*(a-l);
temp = (G-(K/RH0)*(pow(a,2)“p o w ( l ,2 ) ) ) * c o s h ( a n g l ) / s in h ( a n g 2 ) ; 
angl = 0 .5*ALPHA„l*(a+l“2 .0 * x v a l ) ; 
ang2 “ 0 .5*ALPHA_l*(b“u ) ;
temp -= (G-(K/RH D)*(pow(b,2)-pow(u,2)))=i'cosh(angl)/sinh(ang2) ; 
angl = 0 . 5*ALPHA_l*(a+l-b-u); 
temp = 0 . 5*temp/sinh(angl)+K*(pow(xval,2)/RHQ+pow(SIGMA/RHG, 2 ) ) ;  4
retu rn  temp;
> I
j * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ,
Parameter convers ion  fu n c t io n
?
k _ l= p [0] k_2=p[l]  c_3=p[2] c_4=p[3]
Ia = x v a l-p  [2]
1 = x v a l+ p [0 ]* p [3 ] - (1 .0 -p [0 ] )* p [2 ]  
u = x v a l + ( l . 0~p [l]  )*p [3] “p [l3*p[2]  
b " x v a l+ p [3]
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * y
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vo id  parms4( double *p, double *a, double *1, double *u, double *b)
{
*a = x v a l - p [2] ;
*1 = x v a l+ p [ 0 ] *p[ 3 ] - ( 1 . 0 - p [ 0 ] ) *p[2];
*u = x v a l+ ( l  .0 “p [ l ] ) * p [ 3 ] “p [ l ]* p [2 ]  ;
*b = x v a l+ p [3];
retu rn  ;
}
f ***************************************************************************** y
Parameter convers ion  fu n c t io n
a = x v a l - p [0] b = xval+p [ 1] 4
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * y  ::
il;|ivo id  parms2 ( double *p , double +a, double *b)
{
*a = ( x v a l - p [0] < - 0 .0 1  ) ? x v a l - p [0] : - 0 . 0 1 ;
*b = ( x v a l+ p [ 1]> 0 .0 1  ) ? x v a l+ p [ 1] : 0 . 0 1 ;
retu rn  ;
y * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 1
I
Our v e r s io n  of D i x i t ' s  s o lu t io n  fo r  th e  ODE ?
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * y
double d i x i t . f u n c t ( double *p)
{
vo id  parms2 ( double double * , double * );  
double a , b, temp, a n g l,  ang2 ;
parms2 ( p, &a, &b);
angl = 0 . 5*ALPHA„l*(a-2.0*xval);
ang2 = 0 . 5*ALPHA„l*b;
temp -  (G -(K /R H 0)*p ow (b ,2 ))*cosh (an g l)/s inh (ang2); 
angl = 0 . 5*ALPHA„l*(b-2.0*xval); 
ang2 = 0.5*ALPHA_l*a;
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3
temp (G -(K /R H G )*pow (a,2))*cosh(angl)/s inh(ang2); 
angl = 0 . 5*ALPHA_l*(b-a);
4
3
=7
/*
** Step 1. . . .  Check parameter ranges on entry  
* /
f o r  ( i =0 ; i<n ; i++ ) {
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retu rn  0.5*temp/sinh(angl)+K*(pow(xval,2)/RH0+pow(SIGMA/RH0,2));
}
■
/*****************************************************************************
BFGS Optimising tech n iq ue  
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * y  i;
# d e f in e  ALPHA 1.0e™4 ;;
# d e f in e  STEP.MAX 100.0
v o id  b f g s ( i n t  n, double *x, double * x l ,  double *xu, double t o i ,  double  
* d ia g „ h ess in ,  in t  * i t e r ,  double *y, double (* fu n c )(d ou b le  * ))
{
in t  i t s ,  i ,  j ,  k , i t erra; 
short in t  s t a r t ;
double * s c a le ,  *g, *dg, *xn, * x i ,  * p t r , * * h e ss in ,  **htmp; 
double t o l . g ,  t o l . h ,  t o l . h h ,  t o l _ x ,  amp.x, amp_g, rnderr, stpraax,
s lo p e ,  temp, tem pi, temp2 , f a c ,  fa d ,  f a e ,  sumdg, sumxi, f
h, fp ,  fm, x s t o r e ,  g e t _ s t e p (  double, d ouble);
/*
** D ec la ra t io n  o f  fu n c t io n  p ro to typ es  |
* /
v o id  ru n tim e.error (ch ar  *) ;
vo id  d fcn (  i n t ,  double * ,  double * ,  double, double * , i |
double (* fu nc)(dou b le  * ) ) ;  
short in t  p d . f a i l ( i n t ,  double * , double ++, double **);  
short in t  l in e „ s e a r c h (  i n t ,  double * , double * , double *, double +, 
double * , double *, in t  double, double, double, double * ,  
double ( * f u n e ) (double * ) ) ;  
double grad( i n t ,  double * , double , double (* fu n c )(d ou b le  * ) ) ;  4
::3
;
i f  ( x [ i ] < x l [ i ]  II x [ i ] > x u [ i ]  )
ru n tim e_error(" \n Star tin g  v a lu es  out of ra n g e . . . f a t a l  error  !\ n " ) ;
}
AI
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i f  ( * i t e r <=0 )
runt im e .e r r o r ("\nMumber of i t e r a t i o n s  u n s p e c i f i e d . . . f a t a l  error  !\ n " ) ;
/*
** Step 2. . . .  Acquire memory fo r  h o ld in g  v e c t o r ia l  q u a n t i t i e s  
**
** s c a le  -  Holds s c a le  f a c t o r s  o f  o r ig in a l  input
** g -  Gradient o f  su r fa ce  at x [  ]
** xn -  Next e s t im a te  of th e  minimum point
** dg -  I n i t i a l l y  g rad ien t  of su r fa ce  at xnC ] -  l a t t e r l y
** d i f f e r e n c e  in  g ra d ie n ts
** x i  “ Downhill s lo p e  at x [  ]
** htmp -  Temporary sto ra g e  f o r  C holesk i decom position
s c a le  = (double *) c a l l o c ( ( s i z e . t )  n, ( s i z e . t )  s i z e o f ( d o u b le ) );  
g = (double *) c a l l o c ( ( s i z e „ t )  n, ( s i z e . t )  s i z e o f ( d o u b le ) );  
xn = (double *) c a l l o c ( ( s i z e „ t )  n, ( s i z e . t )  s i z e o f ( d o u b le ) );
dg = (double *) c a l l o c ( ( s i z e . t )  n, ( s i z e . t )  s i z e o f ( d o u b le ) ) ;
x i  = (double *) c a l l o c ( ( s i z e . t )  n, ( s i z e . t )  s i z e o f ( d o u b le ) ) ;
h e s s in  = (double **) c a l l o c ( ( s i z e . t )  n, ( s i z e . t )  s iz e o f (d o u b le  * ) ) ;  
htmp = (double **) c a l l o c ( ( s i z e . t )  n, ( s i z e . t )  s iz e o f (d o u b le  * ) ) ;  
f o r  ( i =0 ; i<n ; i++ ) {
h e s s i n [ i ]  = (double *) c a l l o c ( ( s i z e . t )  n, ( s i z e . t )  s i z e o f ( d o u b le ) );
htmpCi] = (double *) c a l l o c ( ( s i z e . t )  n, ( s i z e . t )  s i z e o f ( d o u b le ) );
}
i f  ( Ihtmp[n-l] ) runtime„error("\nMemory a c q u is i t io n  p rob lem \n" );
/*
** Step 3. . . .  S ca le  v a r ia b le s  based on parameter range 
* /
fo r  ( i =0 ; i<n ; i++ ) { 
s c a le  [ i ]  =
( ( te m p l= fa b s (x u [ i ] ) ) > (temp2= f a b s ( x l [ i ] ) )  ) ? tempi : temp2 ; 
x [ i ]  /=  s c a l e  [ i ]  ; 
x l [ i ]  /=  s c a le  [ i ] ;
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XU Ci] /=  s c a le  [ i ] ;
}
/*
** Step 4 . . . .  Compute rounding error  
* /
rnderr = 1 . 0 ;
w h ile  ( rnderr+1 . 0 !=1.0 ) rnderr *= 0 .5 ;  
rnderr *= 2 . 0 ;
/  *
** Step 5. . . .  I n i t i a l i s e  t e s t  parameters and t o le r a n c e s
* /
t o l . h  = p o w ( to l , 0 . 66 ) ;
t o l . h h  = p o w ( to l ,0 .3 3 ) ;
t o l _ g  = t o l . h ;
t o l . x  “ 4.0=5=tol;
s t a r t  == 1 ;
iterra = -1  ;
i t s  = 0 ;
/*
+* Step 6 . . . .  S ta r t  th e  i t e r a t i o n  phase
* /
w h ile  ( i t s < * i t e r  ) {
i f  ( s t a r t  I 1 p d _ f a i l ( n ,  d ia g .h e s s in ,  h e s s in ,  htmp) ) {
/  *
** C a lcu la te  i n i t i a l i s a t i o n  fu n c t io n  va lue and dow nhill g rad ien t
** I n i t i a l i s e  th e  in v e r se  h e s s ia n  at th e  i d e n t i t y .
** Compute norms f o r  p o s i t io n  x [  ] and grad ien t  g [  ] .
* /
f o r  ( i =0 ; i<n ; i++ ) x [ i ]  *= s c a l e [ i ] ;
*y ™ f u n c ( x ) ;
f o r  ( i =0 ; i<n ; i++ ) x [ i ]  /=  s c a le  [ i ] ;
d fcn (n ,  x ,  g ,  t o l . h ,  s c a l e ,  f u n e ) ;
f o r  ( amp„x=0 . 0 , amp„g=0 . 0 , i “0 ; i  <n ; i++ ) {
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;
amp.x += x [ i ] * x [ i ] ;  
amp.g += g [ i ] * g [ i ]  ;
f o r  ( j =0 ; j<n ; j++ ) h e s s i n [ i ]  [ j ]  -  0 . 0 ; 
h e s s i n [ i ]  [ i ]  ~ 1 . 0 ; 
x i  [ i ]  = - g [ i ]  ;
}
i f  ( i t e r m != - l  ) x i [ i t e r m ]  -  0 . 0 ; 
amp.x = sq r t (a m p .x ) ; 
amp.g = sq r t (a m p .g ) ;
stpmax = ( (  arap„x>(double )n  ) ? amp.x : (double )n  )=t=STEP„MAX; 
s t a r t  “ 0 ;
}
/*
** Step 7 . . . .  Check e x i t  c o n d it io n  on parameter convergence  
* /
i f  ( s t a r t ==0 ) {
f o r  ( temp-0 . 0 , i ” 0 ; i<n ; i++ ) {
tempi = ( (temp2= f a b s ( x [ i ] ) )  > 1 . 0 ) ?  temp2 : 1 . 0 ; 
i f  ( temp < (temp2= f a b s ( x i [ i ] ) /tem pi) ) temp -  temp2 ;
}
i f  ( temp<=tol_x ) {
* i t e r  = i t s ;
f o r  ( i =0 ; i<n ; i++ ) {
temp = ( t e m p l = f a b s ( x [ i ] - x l [ i ] ) )  <
(temp2= f a b s ( x [ i ] - x u [ i ] ) )  ? tempi : temp2 ; 
i f  ( temp<-1 0 . 0*rnderr ) {
p r i n t f ("\nOptimal parameter v a lu e s  appear 
to  be on the boundary !\ n " ) ;
break ;
>
}
}
170
i t s+ + ;
i f  ( amp„g>stpraax )
f o r  ( fac=stpmax/amp_g, i =0 ; i<n ; i++ ) x i [ i ]  *= fa c ;  
fo r  ( s lop e= 0 . 0 , i =0 ; i<n ; i++ ) s lo p e  +- g [ i ] * x i [ i ] ;  
s t a r t  = l in e „ s e a r c h (  n, x ,  x l ,  xu, x i ,  xn, y ,
&iterm, s lo p e ,  rnderr, t o l . x ,  s c a l e ,  f u n e ) ;
/*
** s te p  8 . . . .  C a lcu la te  new g rad ien t  and check g ra d ien t  e x i t  c o n d it io n  
* /
y
p tr  -  dg; 
dg = g; 
g = p tr;
d fcn (n ,  X, g ,  t o l . h ,  s c a l e ,  f u n e ) ; 
tempi = (temp2= fa b s (* y ) ) > 1 . 0 ? temp2 : 1 . 0 ; 
fo r  ( temp=0 . 0 , i =0 ; i<n ; i++ ) { 
i f  ( i!==iterm ) { 
temp2 =
f a b s ( g [ i ] ) * ( f a b s ( x [ i ] ) > 1 . 0 ? f a b s ( x [ i ] ) : 1 . 0 ) /tem pi;  
i f  ( temp<temp2 ) temp = temp2 ;
>
>
i f  ( temp<=tol_g ) {
* i t e r  = i t s ;
f o r  ( i =0 ; i<n ; i++ ) {
temp = ( t e m p l = f a b s ( x [ i ] - x l [ i ] ) )  <
(temp2= f a b s ( x [ i ] - x u [ i ] ) )  ? tempi : temp2 ; 
i f  ( temp<=1 0 . 0 *rnderr ) {
p r i n t f ("\nOptimal parameter v a lu es  appear to  be on 
th e  boundary !\ n " ) ;
break ;
}
}
>
/*
** Step 9. . . .  Mo convergence and so continue w ith  update procedure  
** r e c o g n is in g  th a t  xn[ ] can now be used as temporary
** s to ra g e
* / u,
fo r  ( i =0 ; i<n ; i++ ) d g [ i ]  = g [ i ]  - d g [ i ]  ;
f o r  ( i =0 ; i<n ; i++ ) {
fo r  ( x n [ i ] = 0 . 0 , j =0 ; j<n ; j++ )
x n [ i ]  += h e s s i n [ i ]  [j]  *dg[j]  ;
}
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/*
** s te p  10. . . .  C a lcu la te  dot products fo r  denominators  
* /
fo r  ( fac=fae~sumdg=suinxi™0 . 0 , i =0 ; i<n ; i++ ) { 
fa c  +~ d g C i ] * x i [ i ] ;  
fa e  += d g [ i ] * x n [ i ] ;  
sumdg += d g [ i ] * d g [ i ] ;  
sumxi += x i [ i ] * x i  [ i ] ;
/*
** Step 11. . . .  Test f a c  fo r  s i z e  -  sk ip  update i f  too  sm all 
* /
i f  ( fac*fac>rnderr*sumdg*sumxi ) { 
fa c  = 1 . 0 / f a c ;  
fad  = 1 . 0 / f a e ;
fo r  ( i =0 ; i<n ; i-t-s* ) d g [ i]  = f a c * x i [ i ] - f a d * x n [ i ] ;
f o r  ( i =0 ; i<n ; i++ ) {
fo r  ( j =0 ; j<n ; j++ ) {
h e s s i n [ i ]  Cj] +~ f a c + x i [ i ] * x i [ j ] -
fad*xn [ i ]  *xn [j ] tfae*d g  [ i ]  *dg Cj ] ;
}
}
}
/»
** Step 12. . . .  Compute next search  d ir e c t io n  
* /
f o r  ( amp_g=0 , i =0 ; i<n ; i++ ) { 
amp„g += g [ i ] * g [ i ]  ;
f o r  ( x i [ i ] = 0 . 0 , j =0 ; j<n ; j+ t  ) x i [ i ]  -= h ess in C i]  [ j ] * g [ j ]  ;
>
amp„g = sqrt(amp_g);
/*
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** s te p  13. . . .  Free temporary v e c to r  memory -  r e s c a l e  to  t r u e  v a lu es  
* /
/  *
** Step 14. . . .  Compute tru e  H essian matrix at minimum 
* /
i f  ( p d _ f a i l (  n , d ia g „ h e s s in ,  htmp, h e s s in )  ) {
fprintf(stderr,"\nWARNIMG -  Irreg u la r  e x i t  from BFGS . . . . " ) ;  
f p r in t f ( s td e r r ," \n T h e  H essian i s  not p o s i t i v e  d e f i n i t e  !\ n “) ; 
f o r  ( i “0 ; i<n ; i++ ) { 
f r e e ( h e s s i n [ i ] );
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f r e e ( g ) ; 
f r e e (d g )  ; 
f r e e (x n )  ; 
f r e e ( x i )  ;
f o r  ( i =0 ; i<n ; i++ ) { 
x [ i ]  *= s c a l e d ] ;  
x l [ i ]  *= s c a l e d ] ;  
x u [ i ]  *= s c a l e d ] ;
}
f o r  ( i =0 ; i<n ; i++ ) {
f o r  ( j =0 ; j<n ; j++ ) {
h = ( (h = to l_ h * fa b s(x C j]) )> to l_ h h  ) ? h : to l_h h ;  
x s to r e  = x [ j ]  ; 
h = g e t „ s t e p ( x s t o r e ,  h) ; 
x [ j ]  = xstore+h;  
fp  = g r a d ( i ,  x ,  to l_ h h ,  f u n e ) ; 
x [ j ]  = x s to r e -h ;
fm = g r a d ( i ,  x ,  to l_ h h ,  f u n c ) ; g
x [ j ]  = x s to r e ;
htm pd] Cj] = 0 . 5 * (fp -fm )/h ;  :s
> :
/*
** Step 15. . . .  T est H essian m atrix f o r  p o s i t i v e  d e f in i t e n e s s  
** and compute in v e r se  when p o s i t i v e  d e f i n i t e
* /
7
i ï
h = ( (h = to l_ ] i+ fab s(x [j]  ) )> to l_ h  ) ? h : to l_ h ;
x s to r e  ™ x [ j ]  ;
h  = g e t „ s t e p ( x s t o r e ,  h );
x [ j ]  = xstore+h;
fp  = f u n c ( x ) ;
x [ j ]  = x s to r e -h ;
fm = f u n c ( x ) ;
x [ j ]  = x s to r e ;
retu rn  0 .5 * ( fp - fm ) /h ;
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f r e e (htmpCi]);
}
} e l s e  {
f o r  ( i=0 ; i<n ; i++ ) {
h ess in C i ]C i ]  -  1 . 0 / d i a g _ h e s s i n C i ] ; 
f o r  ( j=i*M ; j<n ; j++ ) {
f o r  ( temp=0.0,k“ i  ; k<j ; k++ )
temp -= hess inCj]  Ck] *hessinCk] Ci] ; 
h ess in C j]C i]  ” t em p /d ia g „ h es s in C j ] ;
>
}
f o r  ( i=0 ; i<n ; i++ ) {
f o r  ( temp=0.0 ,j=0 ; j< = i  ; j++ ) temp += pow(hess inCi]Cj] ,2)  ; 
diag_hess inCi]  “ sqrt( temp);  
f r e e ( h e s s i n C i ] );  
f r e e (htmp Ci] );
}
>
f r e e ( s c a l e ) ; 
f r e e ( h e s s i n )  ; 
f r e e (htmp); 
return;
double g r a d ( in t  j ,  double *x, double t o l_ h ,  double (* fu n e )(d ou b le  +))  
{
double h, f.p, fm, x s t o r e ,  g e t _ s t e p (  double, dou ble);
■Il
Function to  s ig n a l  run_time errors  and e x i t  to  system .
vo id  ru n tim e.error (ch ar  * err o r_ tex t)
{
fp r in t f (s td e r r ," R u n -t im e  e r r o r . . . \ n " ) ;
fp r in t f ( s t d e r r ," % s \n " ,e r r o r „ t e x t ) ;
f p r i n t f ( s t d e r r , " . . .now e x i t i n g  to  s y s t e m . . . \ n " ) ;
e x i t ( 1) ;
}
y*************:***************************#************************************ 
Function which performs l i n e  m in im isation .
VARIABLES USED IN LINE.SEARCH FUNCTION I
ON ENTRY: 
n
x [  ] 
xlC ] 
xuC ] 
x i  [ ] 
xnC ]
*y
*iterm
s lo p e
rnderr
t o l . x
func(doub le  *)
ON EXIT: 
n
x [  ]
number of  independent parameters
current e s t im a te  o f  parameters at minimum
v e c to r  h o ld in g  lower bounds on parameters
v e c to r  h o ld in g  upper bounds on parameters
s c a le d  dow nhill search d ir e c t io n
co n ta in s  temporary e s t im a te s  o f  x [  ]
current e s t im a te  of minimum ( *y=func(x) )
v a r ia b le  p r e v io u s ly  a g a in s t  boundary
measures c o s in e  o f  angle  between search  d ir e c t io n
and g rad ien t  at p o in t x [  ]
com piler rounding error
to le r a n c e  on components o f  x [  ]
p o in te r  to  a s c a la r  fu n c t io n  of a v ec to r
(u ser  su pp lied )
unchanged on e x i t
new e s t im a te  o f  parameters at minimum
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.x l [  ] 
xuC ] 
x i [  ] 
xnC ]
*y
*iterm
s lo p e
rnderr
t o l . x
“ unchanged on e x i t
-  unchanged on e x i t
-  unchanged on e x i t
-  con ta in s  a copy of  x [  ]
" new es t im a te  of  minimum ( *y=func(x) ) 
" v a r i a b l e  now ag a in s t  boundary ( i f  any)
-  unchanged on e x i t
-  unchanged on e x i t
-  unchanged on e x i t
short  in t  l i n e „ s e a r c h ( i n t  n,  double *x,  double * x l ,
double *xu, double * x i ,  double *xn, double *y,  
i n t  *i term,  double s l o p e ,  double rnderr ,  
double t o l . x ,  double * s c a l e ,  
double ( * f u n e ) (double * ) )
{
f o r  ( templ=0 . 0 , i =0 ; i<n ; i++ ) {
temp2 = ( te m p = fa b s (x [ i ] ) )  > 1 .0  ? temp : 1 . 0 ;
i f  ( tempi < ( tera p = fa b s(x i[ i ] ) / tem p 2 ) )  tempi = temp;
}
v l .m in  " to l„ x / te m p l;  
vl.m ax = 1 . 0 ;
/  *
** F ix  maximum v l  as th e  sm a ller  o f  u n ity  and a va lu e  determined  
** by th e  upper and lower bounds. Near th e  minimum, v l= 1 .0  
* /
f o r  ( * i t e r m = - l , i =0 ; i<n ; i++ ) {
i f  ( x i [ i ] > 0 . 0  && v l .m a x > ( t e m p = ( x u [ i ] - x [ i ] ) / x i [ i ] )  ) { 
vl.m ax “ temp;
*iterm  = i ;
}
i f  ( x i [ i ] < 0 . 0  M  v l_ m a x > ( t e m p = ( x l [ i ] - x [ i ] ) / x i [ i ] )  ) { 
vl.m ax -- temp;
in t  i ,  j ;
double tempi,  temp2, temp, v l . m in ,  vl .max,  v l , v l l ,  yn,  ynn, a , b,  d i s c ;  
vo id  ru n t im e .error (char  *);
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1*iterm  = i ;
i
i f  ( vl„max<=vl_niin) {
fo r  ( i - 0  ; i<n ; i++ ) x [ i ]  += vl„max*xi [ i ] ; I
retu rn  1 ; I
} e l s e  {
v l  = 1 . 0 ; 
v l .m in  /=  vl.max;
fo r  ( i =0 ; i<n ; i++ ) x i [ i ]  =f== vl.max;
}
/*
** Take a Newton s tep  . . .
* /
f o r  ( i - 0  ; i<n ; i++ ) x n [ i ]  " x C i ] + v l * x i [ i ]  ;
f o r  ( j=0 ; j<n ; j++ ) x n [ j ]  *= s ca leC j ] ;
yn = fu n c(xn) ;
f o r  ( j - 0  ; j<n ; j++ ) x n [j ]  /=  s c a le C j] ;  
temp = yn-*y“ALPHA*vl*slope+vl_max; 
w h ile  ( v l>vl„m in k k  yn>*y+ALPHA*vl*slope*vl„max ) { 
i f  ( fa b s(1 .0 -v T )< -r n d er r  ) {
temp = ”0 .5 * s lo p e / ( y n - ^ y - s lo p e ) ;
} e l s e  {
tempi = y n -* y -v l* s lo p e ;  
temp2 = y n n -* y -v l l* s lo p e ;  J;
a -  ( t e m p l / ( v l * v l ) “t e m p 2 / ( v l l * v l l ) ) / ( ( v l “V ll)* p o w (v l_ m a x ,3 )) ;
b = ( - v l l * t e m p l / ( v l* v l ) +
vl*tem p2 / ( v l l * v l l ) ) / ( (v l-v l l )* p o w (v l_ m a x ,2 ) ) ;  
i f  ( fabs(a)<= rnderr  ) { 
temp = - 0 .5 * s lo p e /b ;
} e l s e  {
d i s c  = b *b -3 .0*a*slop e;  
i f  C d is c < 0 . 0  )
runtim e.error(" \nR oundoff problems in  l i n e  sea rch \n " );
temp = (~b+sqrt( d i s c ) ) / ( 3 . 0 * a ) ;
i f  ( temp>(templ=0 . 5*v l)  ) temp = tempi;
>
}
v l l  = v l ;
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ynn = yn;
v l  = ( temp>(templ=0. l * v l )  ) ? temp : tempi;  
f o r  ( i=0 ; i<n ; i++ ) x n [ i ]  = x [ i ] + v l * x i [ i ] ; 
f o r  ( j - 0  ; j<n ; j++ ) x n [ j ]  *= sca leCj]  ; 
yn “ fu n c(xn) ;
f o r  ( j=0 ; j<n ; j++ ) xnCj] / ” s ca le C j ] ;
>
f o r  ( *y=yn, i=0 ; i<n ; i++ ) { 
xCi] = xnCi] ; 
xiC i]  *= v l ;
}
return  0 ;
}
Function c a l c u l a t e s  numerical  grad ie n ts  o f  func(xC ] )  at  xC ] 
******************************+*********************************************+/
vo id  d f c n ( i n t  n, double *x,  double *g,  double t o l . h ,  double * s c a l e ,  
double ( * f u n e ) (double * ))
{
i n t  i ,  j ;
double h, fp ,  fra, x s t o r e ,  g e t „ s t e p (  double,  double) ;
f o r  ( i=0 ; i<n ; i++ ) {
h = ( (h - t o l„ h * f a b s ( x C i ] ) ) > to l „ h  ) ? h : t o l . h ;  
x s t o r e  = xCi] ; 
h = g e t „ s t e p ( x s t o r e ,  h ) ; 
xCi] = xstore+h;
f o r  ( j=0 ; j <n ; j++ ) xCj] *= s c a l e  Cj] ; 
fp  = f u n c ( x ) ;
f o r  ( j=0 ; j<n ; j++ ) xCj] /=  s c a le C j ] ;  
xCi] = x s to r e -h ;
fo r  ( j=0 ; j<n ; j++ ) xCj] *= s c a le C j ] ;  
fra = fu n c (x ) ;
f o r  ( j=0 ; j<n ; j++ ) xCj] /=  sca leCj]  ; 
xCi] = x s to r e ;  
g Ci] = 0 .5 * ( fp - fm ) /h ;
}
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return  ;
Function to  ensure s t e p s i z e  in  gradie nt  i s  machine r e p r e s e n ta b le .  
Provided as a separate  fu n c t io n  to  d ece ive  o p t im is in g  com pilers .
+ j
double g e t . s t e p ( d o u b l e  x ,  double h)
{
double temp; 
temp = x+h;
re turn  temp-x;
Function to  check i f  updated H essian i s  p o s i t i v e  d e f i n i t e .
T r ies  to  perform a C holesk i decom position  on h e s s i n [ ] [ ] . 
*****************************************************************************j
short in t  p d _ f a i l (  in t  n, double *p  ^ double **hes8 in ,  double **bb )
{
in t  i ,  j ,  k; 
double sigma;
f o r  ( i=0 ; i<n ; i++ ) {
fo r  ( j=0 ; j<n ; j++ ) b b [ i ]  [ j ]  -  h e s s i n [ i ]  [ j]  ;
}
f o r  ( i =0 ; i<n ; i++ ) {
f o r  ( j = i  ; j<n ; j++ ) {
f o r  ( s ig m a = b b [ i ]C j ] ,k = i - l  ; k>=0 ; k— ) 
sigma -= bbCi] Ck]*bbCj] Ck] ; 
i f  ( i==j ) {
i f  ( s igma<=0.0 ) return 1; 
pCi] = sqr t ( s igm a);
} e l s e  {
bbCj]Ci] = sigma/pCi];
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}
>
}
retu rn  0 ;
}
T he source code evaluating D ix it (1991a)’s op tim al li 
and cost function
# in c lu d e  < std io .h >
# in c lu d e  <niath.h>
# in c lu d e  < s td l ib .h >
# in c lu d e  <malloc.h>
/***************************************************************************** 
In d e f in in g  th e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  roo t  of th e  ODE, we s e t  SIGMA=0.1 
and RH0=0.05, th e r e fo r e  BETA=sqrt(2*RH0)/SIGMA==sqrt( 1 0 .0 ) .  
*****************************************************************************/
# d e f in e  SIGMA 0 .1
# d e f in e  RHG 0 .05
# d e f in e  BETA s q r t ( 2 . 0*RH0)/SIGMA
# d e f in e  K 0 .5
# d e f in e  G 0 .1
# d e f in e  GAMMA (G*pow(RHO, 2 ) ) / ( 2 . 0*K*pow(SIGMA,2))
double x v a l;  x v a l i n i t i a l  p o s i t io n  of s t a t e  * /
vo id  raain( vo id  )
{
double fu n c (d o u b le ) , d i x i t ( d o u b l e ) , h; 
in t  i  ;
f o r  ( h=1 . 0e - 6  ; fu n c (h )> 0 . 0  ; h + -1 . 0e - 6  ) ;  
f o r (  i=0; i<=3; i+ + ){
x v a l = 0 . 1*((d oub le)  i ) ;
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p r in t f ( " \n  H i s  % 15.61f\t  DIXITS VAL h, d i x i t ( h ) ) ;
1
.1
::k=
e x i t ( 0 ) ;
}
j  ****** He**********************************************************************
Function p rov id in g  th e  'op tim al' va lue  fo r  D ix i t  (1 9 9 1 a ) 's  h 
*****************************************************************************j
t
double func(double  h)
{
return  (G*RH0"K*pow(h,2))*BETA*sinh(BETA*h)+
2 . 0*K*h*(cosh(BETA*h)” l .0 );
} .?
! *****************************************************************************%  
The s o lu t io n  to  th e  HJB(QDE) equation  obtained  D ix i t  (1991a) |
*****************************************************************************yw
I
double d ix i t (d o u b le  h)
{
double temp;
temp = - 2 . 0*K*h/(RHD*BETA*sinh(BETA*h));  
temp *= cosh(BETA*xval); 
temp += K*pow(xval,2)/RHQ; 
temp +“ K*pow((SIGMA/RHO),2 ) ;
retu rn  temp;
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Technical A nnex 6-The Source Code Chap
ter 4
# in c lu d e < std io .h >
^ in c lu de <math.h>
# in c lu d e < s td l ib .h >
# in c lu d e <malloc.h>
# d e f in e N 20 /***No. o f  Modes used in  Chebyshev P o ly n .* * * /
# d e f in e VAR 2 .5 e -3 /***V ariance of Geometric Brownian Motion***/
# d e f in e MU 0 . 0 /***Mean of Geometric Brownian Motion***/
# d e f in e RHG 0.05 /***Constant Continuous Discount R ate***/
# d e f in e WEALTH 1 .0 / * * * I n i t i a l  Level of Wealth***/
# d e f in e G l.O e -3 /***Lump Sum Transaction  C ost***/
# d e f in e OMEGA 0 .0 1 0 /***Prop. Trans. Cost at Upper Boundary***/
# d e f in e DELTA 0.030 /***Prop. Trans. Cost at Lower Boundary***/
# d e f in e ODRATE 2 . 0e - 2 /***O verdraft Premium i s  2%***/
double m val, alpha._p, alpha.,m, tr ig s [N + 1 ][N + 1 ] , d iff [N + 1][M + 1], cash .
p [ 2] ;
m ain(voi
■f
d)
in t j ;
double pi„by_n, f u n c . l (d o u b le  * );  
char f i l e n a m e [13];
FILE ^output ;
/+  Create f i len am e ap prop riate  to  a p p l ic a t io n  * /  
f i l e n a m e [0] ~ 'M' 
f ilenam eC l] -  ’U’ 
f i l e n a m e [2] = 'O' 
f i l e n a m e [3] ™ 'R' 
fi len a m e [4] = 'E' 
f i l e n a m e [5] = 'S'  
f i l e n a m e [6] » 'U'
182
f i le n a m e [7 ]  ~ 'L ';  
f i len a m e [8] = ' T ' ; 
f i l e n a m e [9] = 'S ' ;  
f i l e n a m e [ 10] = ' . '  
f i l e n a m e [ l l ]  = 'D' 
f i l e n a m e [12] = 'A' 
f i l e n a m e [13] ” 'T' 
p r i n t f ("\nFilename in  %12s", f i l e n a m e ) ;
p i_ b y .n  = P I /( (d o u b le )  N );
f o r (  j= 0 ; j<=N; j++)
f o r (  i= 0 ; i<=M; i++)
t r i g s [ i ] [ j ]  = co s (p i .b y „ n * ((d o u b le )  i * j ) ) ;
cash = 0 . 0 ;
p [ 0] = - 0 . 0 2 ;
f o r  ( j = l ;  j<~40 ; j+ + ){
ou tp ut= fop en (fi len am e, "a"); 
p [ l ]  = cash+0 . 001*((d oub le)  j ) ;
fp r in tf (o u tp u t ," % 1 0 .G if %10.61f %10.61f\n", f u n c . l ( p ) ,  p [ 0] ,  p [ l ] ) ;  
f c l o s e ( o u t p u t ) ;
}
e x i t ( 0 );
/***************************************************************************** 
Function To Be Optimised Which Also Contains The I n i t i a l  Value Problem 
*****************************************************************************^
double f u n c _ l (  double *pval )
{
s t a t i c  in t  s t a r t  = 1 ;
in t  i f a i l ,  in t e g r a t e (  double, double, double, double *,
double ( * f u n e ) (d o u b le )) ,  i ,  j ;  
double f c n (  d o u b le ) ,  temp, m[M+l], v [M + l] , v a lu e ,  r „ in ,  r„out;
s t a t i c  double t h e t a ,  tm pl, tmp2 , p i .b y .n ,  t o l = 1 . 0e - l l ;  
v o id  fp r im e(d o u b le , double * , double * );
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vo id  coef fsC  i n t ,  double *,  double *);
vo id  f s o l v e ( i n t ,  double ,  double *, double,  double *, vo id  (* fv a lu e )
(double,  double *,  double * ) ) ;
/****Compute Values f o r  a lp ha .p  and alpha.m fo r  th e  I n i t i a l  Value Problem****/ 
i f ( s t a r t  ) {
tmpl = MU/VAR-0.5; 
tmp2 = 2.0*RH0/VAR;
a lp ha .p  = "tmpl+sqrt(tmp2+pow(tmpl,2 ) ) ; 
alpha.m -  - tm p l-sq rt(tm p 2+pow(tmpi,2 ) );  
pi„by„n = P I /( (d o u b le )  N ) ; 
s t a r t  = 0 ;
}
/*******5|c**************Solution o f  I n i t i a l  Value Problem*********************/ 
f o r  ( i - 0  ; i<=N ; i++ ) {
t h e t a  = 0 . 5*pi_by„n*((double) i ) ;
mval -  p[0] + (p[l]-pCO] )*p ow (cos(th eta ) ,2 )  ;
m[i] = mval;
mval += WEALTH;
i f a i l  = in t e g r a t e ( 0 . 0 , 1 . 0 , t o i ,  &value, f e n ) ;  
i f  ( i f a i l  != 0 ) {
p r in t f (" I n te g r a t io n  problem ! \ n \ n " ) ; 
return;
} e l s e  {
temp = mval/(VAR*sqrt(tmp2+pow(tmpl, 2 ) ) ) ;
v [ i ]  = tem p *(va lue+ (1 . 0/pow (alpha„p,2 ) ) / ( l . 0+ m val));
v [ i ]  += log(1.0+mval)/RH0;
>
>
r . i n  = 0 . 0 ; 
r„out = 4 .5 e - 2 ;
/********S o lu tion  Being Obtained To The E ntire  Problem To Be Optimised*******/ 
f s o l v e (  N+1 , t o i ,  (fer.in, r . o u t , v ,  fprim e);  
c o e f f s (  N+1, V ,  m);
va lu e  = 2 . 0* (cash  -  p [ 0] ) / ( p [ l ]  -  p [ 0] )  -  1 . 0 ;
/HcHc**++*******+*Value i s  th e  S p e c tr a l ly  Transformed Value o f  Cash************/ 
f o r (  temp=m[0] , j = l  ; j<=N ; j++) 
temp += m [ j ]* c o s ( j* a c o s (v a lu e ) );
retu rn  temp;
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I}
vo id  fp r im e( double r ,  double *v, double *dv)
{
double temp, temp_2, c j , ck, v v [N + l] ,  r a t e ( d o u b le ) ;
in t  k, j ;  I
s t a t i c  in t  s t a r t = l ;
s t a t i c  double p i .b y .n ,  pi_by_2n, c o n . l [ N + l ] ,  con„2[W+l], con„3, |
con_4, f [N + l] ;  
v o id  c o e f f s (  i n t ,  double *, double * );
i f  ( s t a r t  ) {
/**************D elivers Ghebychev-Lobatto d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  m atrix .************/  
con„3 = RHO; 
con_4 = - 1 .0 ;
pi_by_n = P I /( (d o u b le )  N ) ; 
pi_by_2n = 0 . 5 * P I / ( (double) N ); 
f o r  ( j=0 ; j<=N ; j++ ) {
cj = 1 . 0 ;
i f  ( j ==0 II j==M ) cj = 2 . 0 ; f
f o r  ( k=0 ; k<=N ; k++ ) { 
ck = 1 . 0 ;
i f  ( k==0 I I k==M ) ck = 2 . 0 ; 
i f  ( j !-k  ) {
temp = 2 . 0* s in (p i_ b y _ 2n*((double)  k + j ) )*  
s in (p i„ b y „ 2n*((double) k - j ) ) ;  
d i f f [ j ] [ k ]  = ( c j /c k )* p o w (-1 . 0 , j+k)/tem p;
}  e l s e  i f  ( j ==0 ) {
d i f f [ 0] [ 0] = ( 2 . 0*pow(((double) N) , 2 ) + l . 0 ) / 6 . 0 ;
} e l s e  i f  ( j-=N ) {
diff[M][M] -  " (2 .0*pow (((double)  N) , 2 ) + l . 0 ) / 6 .0;
} e l s e  {
temp = 2 . 0*pi_by_2n*((double) j ) ;  
d i f f [ k ] [ j ]  = " 0 .5 /( ta n (tem p )* s in (tem p ))  ;
>
}
>s t a r t  = 0 ;
>/H=H<*****************Treatement of S ta t io n a ry  Condition**********************/ 
f o r  ( j =0 ; j<"N ; j++ ) {
185 a
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temp = cos (p i_ b y .n * ( (d o u b le )  j ) ) ;
temp_2 = WEALTH+p[0]+0.5*(p[l]"p[0])*(1.0+temp);
if(WEALTH <= temp_2){
f [ j ]  = con_4* log ( l .0+ tem p „2) ;
} e l s e  {
f [ j ]  = c o n _ 4 * l o g ( l .0+
WEALTH*( 1 . 0 - (ODRATE+r) ) * (p [0 ]+ 0 .5 * ( p [1] - p [ 0 ] ) * ( 1 . 0+terap)) ) ;
}
co n . lC j]  = 0 . 5*VAR*con_4*pow(temp,2); 
con_2[j ]  = MU*con_4*temp;
/*  p r i n t f ( " \ n  A i s  %20.181f\t  C0N.2 i s  %20.181f \ t" ,  p [ 0 ] ,  c o n _ 2 [2 ] ) ;
g e tch a rO  ; * /
i f  ( r a t e ( r )  == 0 .0  ) {
f o r (  j - 0  ; j<=N ; j++ ) dvCj] = 0 . 0;  
retu rn  ;
>
/*******************Application of  Boundary Conditions***#*******************/
i f  ( r  > 0 .0  ) { 
do{
temp = v[0]  ;
c j = V [W] ;
c o e f f s ( N + l , V , v v ) ;
f o r (  ck = vv[0 ] ,  j = i  ; j<=N ; j++)
ck += v v [ k ] * c o s ( j * a c o s ( ( p [ l ] + p C O ] ) / ( p [ 0 ] - p [ l ] ) ) )  ; 
v[0] = ck+log(l .0+G+0MEGA*fabs(p[l])); 
vCN] -  ck-log(1.0+G+DELTA*fabs(p[0]));
} w h i l e (  fab s( tem p" v[0 ] ) > l .O e-12  && f a b s ( c j ~ v [ N ] ) > l .O e -1 2  );
}
f o r (  j=0 ; j<-N ; j++ ) {
f o r (  temp=0.0,k=0 ; k<=M ; k++ ) temp +- d i f f [ j ] C k ] * v [ k ] ; 
v v [ j ]  = temp;
}
f o r  ( j=0 ; j<=N ; j++ ) {
fo r  ( temp=0.0,k=0 ; k<=N ; k++ ) temp += d i f f [ j ] [ k ] * v v [ k ] ; 
d v [j ]  -  ( f  [ j ]+ c o n „ lC j]* tem p + co n „ 2 [j]* v v [j ]+ co n _ 3 * v C j]) / (ra te (r ))  ;
}
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/ *  p r i n t f (" \n  Value of  V(a) i s  %20.181f\t",  v [ 0 ] ) ;  
g e tc h a r O  ; * /
re turn  ;
The Function t o  be in te g r a te d
double f c n (  double x)
{
double tmpl,  tmp2;
tmpl = pow (x , -a lp h a_m )/ ( l .0+ m va l*x ) ; 
tmp2 “ pow(x ,a lpha .p ) /pow (m val+x ,2 ) ;
return  tmpl/alpha_ra+tmp2/pow(alpha.p,2);
Adaptive Simpson’s r u le  i n t e g r a t o r
# d e f in e  MAXSPL 30 
# d e f in e  MINSPL 5 
# d e f in e  RNDERR 5 . e - 1 6
in t  in t e g r a te (d o u b le  a, double b, double eps 
double ( * f u n e ) (double) )
double *quad,
/*
** Return codes
Return 0 . . .  Regular e x i t .
Return -1 . . .  I n te r v a l  of  I n te g r a t io n  has zero le n g th
Return -2  . . .  Tolerance  i s  e i t h e r  n e g a t iv e  or unachievable
Return -3  . . .  Error t o l e r a n c e  has not been met w i th in  th e
al lowed i t e r a t i o n s .
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{ ï
double area=0 .0 ,  v a l o l d ~ 0 .0 ,  hnow, t o i ,  t o l e r r ,  v lower,  valnew,  
v a l d i f ,  x [ 5 ] ,  f  [5] , v[MAXSPL] , x s to r e  [3] [MAXSPL] , 
f s t o r e [ 3 ] [MAXSPL]; 
i n t  f i n i s h = l ,  j ,  n s p l i t ;  
long  number;
i f  ( f a b s ( b - a )  <= RNDERR ) re turn  -1;  
i f  ( eps <= RNDERR ) return -2  ; I
number=pow( 2 , MINSPL); 
t o i  -  ( 3 0 . 0 * e p s ) / ( b " a ) ;
*quad = 0 .0 ;  
x[0]  “ a; 
x[2]  = 0 .5*(a+b);  
x[4]  -  b;
f [ 0 ]  ” (*func) (x[0] ) ; ;3
f [ 2 ]  = (*func) (x [2]  ) ; 
f [ 4 ]  = ( t fu nc )  (x[4]  ) ;
f o r  ( n s p l i t = 0  ; nsplit<MINSPL ; n s p l i t + t  ) { 
x [ l ]  = 0 . 5* (x [0 ]+x[2 ]  ) ; 
x[3]  = 0 . 5 * ( x [ 2 ] + x [ 4 ] )  ; 
f [ l ]  = (*func) ( x [ l ]  ) ; 
f [ 3 ]  “ (*func) (x[3]  ) ; 
hnow = ( x [ 4 ] - x [ 0 ] ) / 1 2 . 0 ;  
vlower ” hnow*(f [0 ]+ 4 .0 * f  [ l ] + f  [2 ] ) ;
V [n s p l i t ]  == hnow*(f [2 ]+ 4 .0* f  [3]+f  [4])  ; 
valnew = v l o w e r + v [ n s p l i t ] ; 
v a l d i f  = va lnew -va lo ld;  
area = area+ va ld i f ;  
f o r  ( j=0 ; j<=2 ; j++ ) {
x s t o r e  [j ]  [ n s p l i t ]  = x [ j + 2 ] ;  |
f  s t o r e  [j ]  [ n s p l i t ]  = f [ j + 2 ] ;
} '1 
v a l o l d  = vlower;
x[4] = x[2]  ;
f  [4] = f  [2] ;
x[2]  = x [ l ] ;
f  [2] = f  [1] ;
}
n s p l i t - - ;
w hi le  ( f i n i s h = - l  ) {
J'
:f| 
I
m■
I
x [ l ]  = 0 . 5 * ( x [ 0 ] + x [ 2 ] )  ; 
f [ l ]  = (*func) (xCl] ) ; 
x[3]  = 0 .5 * (x [2 ]+ x [4 ]  ) ; 
f [ 3 ]  = (*func) (x[3]  ) ; 
hnow = ( x [ 4 ] - x [ 0 ] ) / 1 2 . 0 ;  
vlower = h n o w * ( f [0 ]+ 4 .0 * fC l ]+ f [2 ] ) ;  
v [ n s p l i t + l ]  = hnow* ( f  [2]+4. 0*f [3 ]+f [4] ) ; 
valnew = vlower+v [ n s p l i t + 1 ] ; 
v a l d i f  = va lnew -va lo ld;  
area = a r e a + v a l d i f ; 
t o l e r r  = to l* h n o w * fa b s (a rea ) ; 
t o l e r r  = ( t o l e r r  > t o i )  ? t o l e r r  : t o i ;  
i f  ( (nsplit+l)>=MAXSPL ) { 
return  -3 ;
} e l s e  i f  ( f a b s ( v a l d i f ) < - t o l e r r  ) {
*quad += (v a ln e w + v a ld i f /1 5 ,0 ) ;  
whi le  ( number != ( 2 * (number/2)) ) { 
number -  number/2; 
n s p l i t - - ;
>
number++; 
i f  ( n s p l i t < 0  ) { 
f i n i s h  = 0;
} e l s e  {
v a l o l d  = V [ n s p l i t ] ;
X [0] = X [4] ; 
f  [0] “ f  [4] ;
f o r  ( j=0 ; j<=2 ; j++ ) {
f [ 2 * j ]  = f  s t o r e  [ j ]  [ n s p l i t ]  ; 
x[2 * j ]  = x s to r e  [ j ]  [ n s p l i t ]  ;
}
}
}■ e l s e  {
number *= 2; 
n s p l i t+ + ;
f o r  ( j=0 ; j<=2 ; j++ ) {
x s t o r e  [ j ]  [ n s p l i t ]  = x [ j + 2 ] ;  
f s t o r e [ j ]  [ n s p l i t ]  -  f  [j+2] ;
}
v a lo l d  = vlower;
X [4] = X [2] ;
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If  [4] = f  [2] ; r
x[2] = x [ l ] ;  
f  [2] = f  [1] ;
}
return  0 ;
}
-I
FUNCTION INTEGRATING PDE
vo id  f s o l v e ( i n t  n,  double t o i ,  double * a s t a r t ,  double aend, double *y,  
void  (* f v a lu e ) ( d o u b l e ,  double *,  double *) )
{
double d l ,  hmin, hmax, t o l e r r ,  temp, hnow, range,  errmax, a r r e s t ,  ain;  
double s i z e ( i n t ,  double *) ;  
double rnderr,  **w; 
i n t  reduce ,  f i n i s h = 0 ,  returnval=0;
i n t  o d e i n t ( i n t ,  double *,  double *,  double *,  double **,  double ,  
double,  double,  vo id  ( * f v a lu e ) ( d o u b l e , double *,  double * ) ) ;
vo id  f s o l v e . e r r ( i n t ) ;
w = (double **) m al loc (  7 * s i z e o f ( d o u b le  *) );  
i f  (!w) f s o l v e . e r r ( - 3 ) ;
f o r  ( reduce=0 ; reduce<7 ; reduce++ ) {
w[reduce] = (double *) m a l loc (  n * s iz e o f (d o u b le )  );  
i f  ( !w[r educe] )  f s o l v e „ e r r ( ~ 3 ) ;
}
rnderr  = 1.0;
w hi le  ( rnderr+1 . 0 !=1.0 ) rnderr  *~ 0 .5;  
rnderr *= 2 .0 ;  
range -  a e n d - * a s t a r t ; 
hmax = fa b s (r a n g e ) ;  
i f  ( hmax<=rnderr ) f s o l v e _ e r r ( - l ) ; 
i f  ( t o l “=0.0 ) { 
t o l e r r  = rnderr;
> e l s e  {
t o l e r r  -  t o i ;
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hmin ~ f a b s ( * a s t a r t ) ; 13dl = fab s (ae nd );
hmin = (hmin > d l )  ? hmin : d l ;
d l  = (hmin > 1 .0 )  ? hmin : 1.0;
hmin = dl  * pow(rnderr, 0 .3 3 ) ; 1i f  (hmin >- hmax) f s o l v e . e r r ( - 2 ) ;
d l  = t o i  * s i z e ( n ,  y ) ;
e r r e s t  = (d l  > t o i )  ? d l  : t o i ;
( * f v a l u e ) ( t a s t a r t , y , w [ 0 ] ) ; 1errmax = s i z e ( n , w [ 0 ] ) ; -3
temp = errmax*pow(hmax,5); 3
hnow = hmax;
i f  ( e r r e s t  < temp) { ;:C,-
d l  = f a b s ( * a s t a r t ) ;
hnow = (hmax > d l )  ? hmax : d l ; 1
hnow = t o i  * hnow;
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dl = e r r e s t /errmax; 
temp “ p o w ( d l ,0 . 2 ) ;  
hnow “ (hnow > temp) ? hnow : temp;
} Ï
d l  = (range > 0 .0 )  ? 1.0  : - 1 . 0 ;  
hnow *= d l ; 
a in  = * a s ta r t ;  
w hi le  ( ! f i n i s h  ) {
i f  ( (ain+hnow-aend)*range >- 0 .0 )  { 
hnow = aend-ain;  
f i n i s h  = 1;
}
reduce = o d e in t ( n ,  &ain, &hnow, y ,  w, hmin, hmax, t o l e r r ,  f v a l u e ) ; 
i f  ( fabs(hnow)"=hmin ) re tu rn va l  = 1; 
i f  ( ! reduce && f i n i s h  ) {
*a s t a r t  = aend;
} e l s e  {
f i n i s h  = 0;
}
>
i f  ( r e tu r n v a l“=l ) f s o l v e . e r r (1) ;
f o r  ( reduce=0 ; reduce<7 ; reduce++ ) f r e e (w [ r e d u c e ] );  
f r e e ( w ) ;
return;
}
vo id  f s o l v e _ e r r ( i n t  error .c od e )
{
i f  ( error„code>0 ) {
p r i n t f ("\n\nWARMING error  in  f s o l v e " ) ;  
i f  ( error_code==l )
p r i n t f (" \n In teg r a t io n  completed but requested  accuracy not met!");  
i f  ( error„code~=2 )
p r i n t f ("\nMore memory a l l o c a t e d  than i s  n e c e s s a r y !" ) ;
return;
} e l s e  {
p r i n t f ("\n\nFATAL execut ion  error in  f s o l v e " ) ; 
i f  ( e r r o r . c o d e = - - l  )
p r i n t f ("\nZero range of  in t e g r a t i o n !" ) ;  
i f  ( error_code==-2 )
p r i n t f (" \n E f f e c t iv e  range of i n t e g r a t i o n  i s  z e r o !" ) ;  
i f  ( error„code==-3 )
p r i n t f ("\nMemory a l l o c a t i o n  f a i l u r e ! " ) ;  
i f  ( error_code==-4 )
p r i n t f ("\nOrder of  equat ions  increased  -  r e a l l o c a t i o n  memory!");
e x i t (1 ) ;
}
in t  o d e i n t ( i n t  n, double *a, double *h, double *y,  double **w, double hmin,
double hmax, double t o l e r r ,  vo id  ( * f c n ) ( d o u b l e , double *,  double * ) )
{
double d l ,  d2, h v a l ,  t o l e s t ; 
i n t  j , i ;
vo id  r k c k ( i n t ,  double,  double,  double *, double **,  
void  ( * f c n ) (  double ,  double *, double * ) ) ;
rkck(n ,  *a, *h, y , w, f e n ) ;  
t o l e s t  -  0 .0 ;
f o r  (j = 0; j < n; j++ ) {
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}double s i z e C in t  n,  double *y)
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d l  = f  abs (w [ l ]  [ j]  ) ; 
d2 = f  abs(w[6] Cj] ) ; 
i f  ( d l> 1 .0 )  d2 = d 2 /d l ;  
t o l e s t  = ( t o l e s t  > d2 ) ? t o l e s t  : d2;
>i f  ( t o l e s t  >= t o l e r r )  {
i f  ( t o l e s t  >== t o l e r r  * 59049.0)  {
*h *“ 0 .1 ;
} e l s e  {
dl  = t o l e s t  /  t o l e r r ;
*h *= 0 .9  /  p o w ( d l ,0 .2 ) ;
>i f  ( fab s(*h)  <= hmin) {
*a +- *h;
f o r  (j = 0; j < n; j++ ) y [ j ]  -  w[ l]  [ j]  ;
dl  = (*h > 0 .0  ) ? 1 .0  : - 1 . 0 ;
*h = dl*hmin;  
return  0 ;
>
return  1 ;
>
*a += *h;
f o r  (j = 0; j < n; j++ ) y [ j ]  = w[l]  [j]  ;
i f  ( t o l e s t  <= t o l e r r  * 1 .889568e-4)  {
*h 5 .0 ;
} e l s e  {
dl  " t o l e r r  /  t o l e s t ;
*h *= 0 .9  * p o w ( d l ,0 . 2 ) ;
}
d l  = f a b s ( * h ) ;
hval  ~ (hmin > d l )  ? hmin : d l ; 
hval “ (hmax > hval)  ? hval  : hmax; 
dl = (*h > 0 .0 )  ? 1.0  : “ 1.0;
*h -  d l*hval ;
re turn  0 ;
double v s i z e ,  d l ; 
in t  j ;
v s i z e  = f a b s ( y [ 0 ] ) ;  
f o r  (j = 1; j < n; j++ ) { 
dl = fabs  (y [ j ]  ) ;
v s i z e  = ( v s i z e  > d l  ) ? v s i z e  : d l ;
}
return  v s i z e ;
}
vo id  r k c k ( in t  n, double a,  double h,  double *y,  double **w, 
vo id  (* fpr im e)(double ,  double *, double * ) )
{
s t a t i c  double b l = - l l . 0 / 5 4 . 0 , b2=2.5 , b3=-70 .0 / 2 7 . 0 , b4=35.0 / 2 7 . 0 ,
c l= 1 6 3 1 . 0 / 5 5 2 9 6 . 0 , c2=175. 0 / 5 1 2 . 0 , c3=575 .0 /1 3 8 2 4 .0 ,  
c4=44275. 0 / 1 1 0 5 9 2 .0 , c5=253.0 /4 0 9 6 ,0 ,
d l = 3 7 . 0 / 3 7 8 . 0 , d2=250. 0 / 6 2 1 . 0 ,d3=125. 0 / 5 9 4 . 0 , d4=512.0 /1 7 7 1 .0 ,  
e l= " 2 7 7 . 0 / 6 4 5 1 2 . 0 , e2=6925. 0 / 3 7 0 9 4 4 . 0 , e3=-6925 .0 /2 0 2 7 5 2 .0 ,  
e4 = -2 7 7 . 0 / 1 4 3 3 6 . 0 , e5=277.0 /7084 .0  ;
i n t  j ;
double tmpl,  tmp2, tmp3, tmp4, tmp5, tmp6;
( * f p r i m e ) ( a , y , w [ 0 ] );  
tmpl = h*0.2;
f o r  ( j=0 ; j<n ; j++ ) w [ 6 ] [ j ]  “ y[ j ]+w [0]  [j ]*tmpl ;
(* fpr ime)(a+h*0 .2 ,w[6]  , w [ l ] ) ; 
tmpl = 0.075*h;  
tmp2 = 0.225*h;
f o r  ( j=0 ; j<n ; j++ ) w[6] [ j ]  = yCj]+w[0] [j ]*tmpl+w[l]  [j]  *tmp2;
( * fp r im e ) ( a+0. 3*h, w[ 6 ] , w[2] );
tmpl = 0.3*h;
tmp2 = -0 .9*h ;
tmp3 “ 1 . 2*h;
f o r  ( j=0 ; j<n ; j++ ) {
w[6] [ j]  = y [ j ]+w [0][ j ]* tm pl+w [ l ] [ j ]* tm p2+w [2] [ j ]* tm p3;
}
(* fp r im e ) (a + 0 . 6*h , w [ 6 ] , w [3 ] ) ;
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j<n ; j++ ) {
= yCj3+w[0] Cj] *tmpl+w[l] Cj] *tmp2+wC2] Cj] *trap3+wC3] Cj]*trap4;
tmpl “ h*bl;  
tmp2 = h*b2; 
tmp3 = h*b3; 
tmp4 = h*b4; 
for ( j=0 ;
wC6] Cj]
>
(*fprime) (a+h,wC6] ,wC4] ) ; 
tmpl ” h*cl  
tmp2 = h*c2 
tmp3 = h*c3 
tmp4 = h*c4 
tmp5 = h*c5 
for ( j=0 ;
wC6] Cj]
j<n ; j++ ) {
= y Cj] +wCO] Cj] *tmpl+wCl] Cj] *tmp2+wC2] Cj] *tmp3 
+wC3]Cj] *tmp4+w C4]Cj] *tmp5;
(*fprim e)(a+0.875*h,wC6],wC5]);  
tmpl = h*dl 
tmp2 -  h*d2 
tmp3 = h*d3 
tmp4 = h*d4 
for (j = 0
wCl] Cj]
j<n ; j++ ) {
: yCj]+wCO] Cj] *trapl+wC2] Cj] *tmp2+wC3] Cj] *tmp3+wC5] Cj]*tmp4;
tmpl = h*el  
tmp2 “ h*e2 
tmp3 = h*e3 
tmp4 = h*e4  
tmp5 = h*e5  
for (j=0 ; j<n ; j++ ) {
wC6] Cj] = wCO] Cj] *tmpl+wC2] Cj] *tmp2+wC3] Cj] *tmp3+wC4] Cj] *tmp4 
+wC5] Cj] *tmp5;
}
re turn  ;
Sub-Routine e v a l u a t i n g  S p ectra l  C o e f f i c i e n t s
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H e * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * /
vo id  c o e f f s (  in t  n, double *v,  double *v_hat )
{
unsigned k,  j ; 
double sum;
f o r  ( k=0; k<=n; k++ ) {
f o r  ( sum-0.0 ,  j = l ;  j<n; j++ )
sum += v [ j ] * t r i g s C j ]  [k] ; 
sum += 0 . 5 * (v [ 0 ]  + v [n ]*cos (P I* (d ou b le )  k ) ) ;  
v.hatCk] = 2 . 0*sum/((double)  N ) ;
>
v . h a t Co] * - 0 . 5 ;
v.hatCn] * = 0 . 5 ;  / *  we ha lve  th e  nth c o e f f i c i e n t  because we
are us ing  a Gauss-Labboto quadrature * /
return;
}
j * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * I
C o e f f i c i e n t  fu n c t io n  f o r  opportunity  r a t e
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * / J
double ra te (d o u b le  r)
/*  return  c o s ( P I * r / 0 . 2 0 ) - s i n ( P I * r / 0 .20);  * /
re turn  - 1 . 0 ;
}
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